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ABSTRACT 
Anarchists are commonly perceived to possess a pathological 
attraction to violence. Other stereotypes define anarchists as utopians 
with little grasp of either human nature or economic and political 
processes. Furthermore, anarchism is not accorded the same gravity by 
academics as they give to other political doctrines. The apparent failure 
of anarchist theorists to match their formidable goal with a consistent 
strategy is one more reason for academics to maintain their general 
indifference to anarchism. 
This thesis seeks to challenge the currency of anarchist stereotypes 
by producing evidence which suggests that anarchists are not significantly 
given to unrealistic expectations, nor the glorification of violence. The 
attitudes of anarchists concerning violence in revolutionary and pre-
revolutionary situations are examined empirically. The ideological and 
moral consistency of violence with anarchism is investigated by 
theoretical enquiry. Documentary analysis is the·usual mode for 
determining theoretical and propagandist perspectives. However, this study 
also refers to the activists who compose the greater part of the anarchist 
movement. A pilot qualitative interview study is, therefore, an important 
constituent. 
The reader is oriented in the study by definitional work on ideas 
surrounding anarchism and violence. The novel methodology of the study is 
explained in depth both to ensure internal validity and to guide further 
forays in the field. Information extracted from contemporary propagandist 
literature and the testimony of activist respondents is then analysed for 
attitudes toward violence, nonviolence, and social change. Finally, issues 
of theoretical and historical significance are examined. The anarchist 
experiment with covert violence at the end of the nineteenth century, and 
the moral and ideological dilemmas concerning consistency are given 
particular attention. 
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CHAPTER 1 AIMS AND DEFINITIONS 
Introduction 
The Popular Conception of Anarchism and Violence 
A recurring theme in books or articles on anarchism is the need to 
dispel the presumed popular conception that anarchists tend to be black-
cloaked, bomb-throwing psychopaths who seek to create chaos out of order 
for their own nefarious reasons (e.g., Woodcock, 1983, p. 11; Perlin, 
1979, p. 4; Nursey-Bray, 1992, p. xiii; Walter, 1969, p. 14; D. Miller, 
1984, p. 2). Any anarchist is likely to be able to produce anecdotal 
evidence of the existence of this popular image, from conversations with 
both the politically illiterate and those with some degree of political 
sophistication. To use the expression with which Bakunin 1s most 
commonly associated, anarchists are thought to possess the "urge to 
destroy." 
The bomb-throwing image of anarchists began in the late nineteenth 
century, culled out of an agglomeration of truth, association, and 
fictitious representation. The last decades of the nineteenth century 
saw countless explosions in the Europe and America; political figures 
were assassinated in Russia, Austria, Germany, Ireland, France, America, 
Spain, Italy, and elsewhere. Of all the perpetrators of these deeds -
popUlists, nationalists, socialists, anarchists, organised labour - it 
is the anarchists who have experienced enduring association. They 
performed some of the more spectacular acts, but equally importantly 
they were also the least afraid to applaud, or at least justify, them. 
Incendiary anarchist propaganda eulogised dynamite and retribution 
against the ruling class. Nor was the spirit of violent revolution 
confined to a lunatic fringe; fine scientific minds such as Kropotkin 
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and Reclus were seen to have approved of the bomb and the bullet. 
Novelists and journalists fed off the reports and images that each other 
provided (for an idea of American media sensationalisation see Hong, 
n.d.; R.N. James, 1985, pp. 5-7). James' The Princess Casamassima, 
Dostoevsky's The Possessed, and Conrad's The Secret Agent - actually an 
indictment of official shenanigans rather than of anarchist terrorism 
(Sherry, 1973, pp. 216-27) - contain all the necessary elements for the 
anarchist caricature. Lionel Trilling declares the hierarchy and 
conspiracy amongst the revolutionaries in The Princess Casamassima to be 
"a classic anarchist situation" (1951, p. 72). 
Into the last decades of the twentieth century the notion of the 
shadowy anarchist agitator has maintained its currency. Police, 
politicians, and media assert that external instigation by anarchists 
remains a significant factor in urban disturbances (Times, 8/10/85, 
1/4/90; Sunday Telegraph 1/2/87). Even some academics have been loath to 
discard the fundamental identification of anarchism and romantic 
violence. John Dunn's opinion that some anarchists get "sadistic 
pleasure" from the idea of violent revolution is derived directly from 
Dostoevsky and Conrad (1972, p. 12; see also Apter, 1971). 
Anarchists are faced with a secondary caricature, that of the 
hopeless dreamer. This is reflected in two ways. The first is the idea '/ 
that anarchists believe that acts of violence (bombs, assassinations, 
or, more commonly in the last decade, rioting) can bring about the 
dissolution of the state. State socialists in particular are quick to 
denounce the anarchists' simplistic analysis and lack of organisation. 
Secondly, and usually from a more politically liberal or conservative 
perspective, anarchism is dismissed because it is seen to be 
unrealistically positive about human nature: believing that people are 
capable of living together in harmony without referring to primitive 
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aggressive instincts to resolve disagreement. The hippy pacifist imbued 
with eastern mysticism is a prime source of ridicule associated with the 
anarchist idea of coercion-free harmony. The good-but-naive pacifist in 
the Tolstoyan mould is his predecessor (Perlin, 1979, p. 4). 
Anarchists and their fellow travellers cannot be wholly exonerated 
from the maintenance of the figure of the shadowy terrorist. Where the 
nineteenth century press could point to the bomb-making recipes in 
anarchist periodicals latter day media "expose" the "riot tipsll that are 
reproduced on the pages of many activist anarchist newspapers. Class 
War, "Britain's unruliest tabloid, II positively thrives on the pictures 
of "hospitalised coppers" and reports of "toffs" being "bashed." The aim 
of the wild claims contained therein are primarily propagandistic. A 
great deal of media exposure is generated, members are attracted (the 
Class War Federation, in the mid-1980s to present, has been the largest 
quas~-anarchist organisation in Britain if not the English-speaking 
world), but the general conception of the mindless thug is reinforced to 
the general mass of the population. In a lighter vein, the anarchist 
press has a certain affection for symbols, which liberally adorn their 
pages. Amongst the circled A's, the black cats, flags or eagles is the 
little black-caped anarchist holding a smoking bomb. The maintenance of 
this figure serves as a reminder that this is how anarchists feel they') 
are portrayed, and has now become a source of inverted pride. 
The media image and the anarchist and quasi-anarchist attempts to 
propagate a mystique are but caricatures of reality. Having observed the 
anarchist milieu - sympathetically - for over a decade, the researcher 
has seen little evidence that anarchists are any more inclined towards 
violence than any other group in society that is strongly committed to 
creating or defending an idea (whether that idea be socialism, 
democracy, or the motherland). Given the attraction of pacifists to the 
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non-coercive ideal of anarchism it seems likely that if such a survey 
was possible, the anarchist mean would probably be less prepared to use 
violence than the liberal democratic mean. Theirs is not an urge to 
destroy, rather it is a "creative urge." Anarchists who are prepared to 
sanction violence in order to achieve their goals - and that is a 
majority - are simply being more honest about how deeply they value 
their ideal than their liberal democratic counterpart. 
The proposition that anarchists are dreamers is again disputable. 
While this is not a subject to be given much weight in this study, the 
researcher believes that many of the arguments given by anarchists on 
the nature of human motivations and the possibility of non-coercive 
harmony (shared by communists) are at least as cogent as theories 
defending the idea of democracy. That the reality might not exactly 
resemble the theory does not lessen its validity as a benchmark; again, 
observe the distance between democratic theory and liberal democracies. 
Overview of the Study 
The prejudices and misunderstanding surrounding the means and ends 
of anarchists are manifold. The primary purpose of this study is to 
ascertain nature of the relationship between anarchism and violence. The 
subsidiary aim is to uncover how this pertains to the way that 
anarchists look at the process of social change. Under these broad 
headings are found a number of questions, the answers to which will be 
pursued in the following chapters: Do anarchists positively seek 
anarchy? under what circumstances do anarchists justify violence? Why do 
some anarchists reject the use of violence? Is violence morally and 
ideologically consistent with anarchism? 
In order to answer these questions one must decide who the 
questions pertain to. One cannot expect to produce a comprehensive 
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overview by relying upon a single source. The fullest picture possible 
can only be achieved by addressing three fractions of anarchism (which 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive>: theoretical, propagandist, and 
activist. The theoretical fraction requires the least powers of 
discovery, being approached through the works of the noted anarchists, 
their philosophical descendants, historians, and academic commentators. 
The propagandist fraction, popularising and disseminating ideas, is 
located in popular and immediate forms of literature such as periodicals 
and pamphlets. The activist fraction, can only be reached by approaching 
the grassroots anarchist movement. This study is unique among academic 
works in attempting to address all three fractions to some extent. 
Chapter 3 is given over to the activists in the form of an interview 
study; Chapter 4 examines propagandist literature; Chapter 5 is an 
amalgam of the theoretical and historical. The novel approach used means 
that this research was in danger of being neither fish nor fowl. 
However, in giving vent to all three fractions of the anarchist whole 
the study may make meaningful contributions both as political theory and 
empirical examination of a fringe political minority. 
In order that the reader is properly oriented to the perspective 
taken by the researcher the second section of Chapter 1 dissects some of 
the central tenets of anarchism, and examines the major theoretical 
divisions which accompany the split over violence. The final section 
addresses the contrasting employment of the terms violence, nonviolence, 
and pacifism, that useful definitions for the study be determined. 
Chapter 2 covers the area of methodology. It includes discussions 
on the triangulation of methods, and the constraints upon the collection 
of data. The main concern of this chapter is the interview study. The 
use of interviews in this context is unique. Political theory academics 
dealing with anarchism tend to shy away from examining anything which 
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has not been espoused by "great minds." The result of this is sterile 
work (of little interest or relevance to anarchists) which is only ever 
alleviated by historical reviews. Behaviour may be ascertained by poring 
over past events. Attitudes, however, are best determined by directly 
approaching anarchist activists. The aim of the interview study was the 
production of the richest qualitative snapshot of grassroots anarchists 
that was within the capability and budget of the researcher. A good 
interview strategy could produce copious amounts of interesting and 
relevant data. However, all of this would be irrelevant if the study 
were invalidated by a faulty methodology. Therefore a comprehensive 
explanation of the interview methodology employed is given. Chapter 3 
introduces the data gleaned from the interview study. In the first 
sections of the chapter the basis of the informants' anarchism, their 
expectations, and their goals, are examined. In the latter part of the 
chapter the role of violence in the thinking of the informants is 
investigated. 
Looking at anarchist periodicals is the most consistent means of 
assessing the state of the anarchist movement, yet academics have failed 
to utilise them except in the context of historical studies. Chapter 4 
is a study of contemporary propagandist literature in the form of 
anarchist pamphlets and periodicals. The nature of anarchist periodicals 
is examined, and the elements of how violence and nonviolence are 
justified or denounced in their pages are extracted. 
Chapter 5 examines some of the historical and doctrinal issues 
concerning the relationship between anarchism and violence. The first 
section asks how some of the noted theorists of anarchism have addressed 
this relationship. The second section investigates the history and 
significance of individual anarchist violence in the late nineteenth 
century. The final section surveys the important questions of whether 
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nonviolence and pacifism can conceivably be revolutionary, and whether 
combining revolution and anarchism is both ethical and consistent. 
Anarchism 
An introduction to anarchism must be made to prepare the reader 
for the fundamental theoretical and strategic similarities and 
differences amongst anarchists. Disagreement between anarchists over the 
issue of violence is, after all, only one element of a mass of 
ideological contentions - possibly not even a critical one (though 
anarcho-pacifists would contend this). The aim here is not to become 
embroiled in the wider debates over ideological consistency that may be 
followed in greater depth elsewhere (e.g., Ritter, 1980; D. Miller, 
1984; Carter, 1971; Wolff, 1976; etc). Rather, it is necessary to break 
open the shell of anarchism and examine what major elements claim to 
belong and why. In doing this a context for the remainder of the study 
is established. 
"What kind of anarchist are you?" is not an unexpected question 
nor necessarily a derogatory one. The term anarchist tells questioners a 
fraction (albeit a significant one) of what they need to know in order 
to understand the political stance of the respondent. The existence of 
hyphenated forms is not, of course, unique to anarchism. They are used 
by political groupings across the spectrum wishing to qualify a 
descriptive term. Anarchists themselves have joked that Marxism comes in 
57 varieties. Anarchism is significant in that the common hyphenations 
allow for such a broad range of social and economic stances: anarchist 
communist, anarcho-syndic~list, individualist anarchist, anarcho-
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capitalist, anarcho-pacifist, philosophical anarchist, and green 
anarchist. Nor are all of these appellations mutually exclusive. 
Anarchism has been described as an "amorphous" ideology resisting 
straightforward definition (D. Miller, 1984, p. 2). It is certainly 
difficult to argue for the existence of a seamless unitary anarchist 
theory either from ideological or historical perspectives. There is, to 
be sure, no authoritative text to which one may refer for doctrinal 
orthodoxy; anarchism lacks a Bible or bibles. Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, 
and Kropotkin have each in their own way been valuable, but none 
provided a systemic approach to anarchist theory and practice. 
Kropotkin's scientific defence of the feasibility and economy of 
anarchist communism runs alongside the influential pseudo-anarchist 
Stimer's elevation of egoism. Anarchists would doubtless find the idea 
of a monolithic theory thoroughly undesirable if there were claims to 
its existence. Nevertheless most anarchists would recognise the 
accumulation of certain features which tend to separate anarchism from 
the ideologies to which it is predominantly associated: liberalism and 
socialism. Claims to authenticity of the hyphenated ideological 
developments might be gauged by the distance they put between themselves 
and the more fundamental features. 
Most anarchists regard the core of anarchism to be a critique of 
existing conditions, and a demand for their correction. Though social 
and economic conditions may vary through time and geography, the 
anarchist fundamentals remain in essence the same. They are dependent 
only on the existence of asymmetric power, external positional authority 
and the failure (or inability) of individuals to maximise their moral 
autonomy. 
The critique and the demand can be broken down into the following 
features: the need for the abolition of the state; the rejection of the 
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validity of the resources of positional authority and its corollary, the 
obligation to obey; that parliamentary reform or political revolution 
alone are insufficient means of change; the development of a society 
balancing maximal individual sovereignty and the idea of voluntary 
association. 
Not all anarchists give equal consideration to all these areas, or 
would necessarily agree that all these factors were fundamental to their 
personal conception of anarchism. Philosophical anarchists have a 
tenuous position in anarchist circles as their qualified appellation 
suggests. They tend to concentrate on forming critiques of government 
and authority while disregarding or minimalising the feasibility of 
positive action and the creation of stable anarchy. Their critique of 
the state as an exercise in logic, no matter how incisive it is, means 
that they are they are often not considered to be "actual" anarchists 
either by activist anarchists or themselves (this has not, however, 
always excluded them from persecution, e.g. the u.s. allowed for 
deportation of foreign-born philosophical anarchists; The Nation, 
31/1/20, p. 131). Anarchist communists accent association, while 
individualist anarchists emphasise personal sovereignty. Lifestylists 
attempt to live their anarchism in the present, while others claim that 
conditions in the global state system do not allow such indulgence for 
those seeking social justice for all. 
If a core feature is rejected, or one factor over-emphasised to 
the detriment of the others, it increases the likelihood that an 
anarchist's pedigree will be questioned by other anarchists. Willingness 
to participate in the electoral system is one example of such 
contention: 
So far as we are concerned we cannot prevent anybody calling 
himself an anarchist. But we consider an anarchist who at election 
time goes and votes rather in the same way as we would consider a 
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vegetarian who is caught eating a ten ounce underdone steak, or a 
Christian who tells us he hates his neighbour, or a pacifist who 
refuses to turn the other cheek (Raven 14, 4(2), April-June 1991, 
p.97). 
Anybody can call themselves an anarchist, but this does not mean that 
they will be automatically accepted by their ostensible comrades. 
Human Nature 
If some combination of individual sovereignty and voluntary 
association is stated to be the desirable basis of anarchic society, it 
becomes necessary to ask why this should be so. Firstly, anarchists do 
not believe that institutionalised authority is necessary for peaceful 
human interaction. Secondly, they believe that it inhibits individual or 
societal development. To say this is to say that humans can be ordered 
creatures among each other and/or within themselves (this sentence looks 
uncomfortably conditional; there is a very good reason for this which 
will be mentioned presently). The second prevalent caricature of the 
anarchist - the anarchist as hopeless utopian - sterns from the idea that 
human nature will not allow an ordered anarchy (see, for instance, the 
review of Miller's Anarchism by Kolakowski, 1985, p. 3). The prevailing 
western perception of human nature is that of the selfish possessive 
individualist. This perception fits well with the idea that a capitalist 
economic system is the most efficient way to extract an individual's 
potential, and that firm government as a political system is necessary 
to ensure this potential does not get out of hand. 
Historically speaking, anarchist theorists have not confronted the 
dominant ideology from a single direction; they do not agree about the 
nature of human motivation. Not all deny the idea that people are 
possessive individuals. Egoistically minded individualist anarchists 
simply argue that rationality precludes the need for artificial 
restrictions on the ego. However, alternative interpretations of primary 
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human impulses could be derived from historical, anthropological, 
zoological and philosophical observations. 
The most influential voice among the more communally inclined 
anarchists was Kropotkin. His view of a sociable human nature developed 
from evolutionary theory in a way quite removed from that propounded by 
Spencer or Huxley. The zoologist Kessler sparked in Kropotkin the idea 
that natural selection in fact favoured those who were cooperative in 
adversity: 
The law of mutual aid, which for the success of the struggle for 
life, and especially for the progressive evolution of the species, 
is far more important than the law of mutual contest (M.A. Miller, 
1976, p. 173). 
Society, he determined, was a natural phenomenon that pre-dated even 
humanity, and as such was central to human well-being. Through 
anthropological and historical study Kropotkin deduced that the 
"absorption of 'I' by the clan or tribe" was as relevant today as it had 
been in primitive society (Kropotkin, 1925?, p. 60). Individual 
personality was a recent development which did not preclude the 
dependence of individuals on the community for orientation. The 
individualism of Max Stirner or Niet~$che (Kropotkin's particular egoist 
bugbear) led not to the fulfilment of the individual but the 
"annihilation of the personality," because it artificially divided 
individual from community, and harmfully so. Development of the 
individual outside of community paralleled the development of 
authoritarian tendencies as a secondary human drive. This naturally 
leads to the question of how such secondary impulses have seemingly 
managed to subordinate the primary ones, at least in industrial society. 
Some anarchists, especially individualists, have been inspired to 
look to the ego as a source of inspiration for human actions. Egoism 
articulates concern for ones own interests, welfare, and independence. 
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The elevation of the ego above all other impulses leads to the 
Stirnerian ideal that the maximisation of personal desires is the only 
reality, and therefore the only morality (see Stirner, 1982, pp. 3-5; 
Clark, 1976, pp. 51-3). The Stirnerian egoist observes sociability as 
nothing more than a tactic to maintain self-interest, to be abandoned 
when at once detrimental. Thus, to speak, at the beginning of this 
subsection, of society and societal order as factors in all anarchists' 
desires would have been an overstatement. 
If few exponents of Stirner would describe themselves as 
anarchists, one should not ignore anarchist appreciation of Stirner's 
elevation of "ownness." However, emphasis on the self-interested being 
as the basis for anarchy is maintained only by individualists and 
anarcho-capitalists. Their belief is that rationality should be allowed 
to dictate the limits of behaviour for individuals. One compromise to 
the voracious Stirnerian creature is the "morally autonomous man". 
Robert Paul Wolff (1976) derives his autonomous man from Kantian 
metaphysical freedom; people have the reasoning capacity to choose how 
to act, and of assuming responsibility for those acts. As Wolff puts it: 
The responsible man is not capricious or anarchic, for he does 
acknowledge himself bound by moral constraints. But he insists 
that he alone is the judge of those constraints (1976, p. 13). 
Autonomous man is both the author and the only fully competent judge of 
his own acts. He cannot, therefore, acknowledge the legitimacy of 
institutionalised authority over him. 
William Godwin believed that each individual was born with a 
disposition for sociability, a potential for rationality and a certain 
uniqueness. However, he rejected as preposterous the notion of free 
will, believing that rational processes were guided by circumstance and 
experience. Humans were perfectible once their rational traits had 
developed (through experience and education). Greater aggregate 
12 
'J 
rationality was in turn interdependent with increased systemic 
egalitarianism. In renewing the Godwinian theory - though without 
Godwin's emphasis upon inevitability - Peter Marshall (1989) seeks to 
sweep aside any notion of the existence of a fixed human nature. 
"Nature" suggests a universal character, and yet as Marshall and 
Kropotkin both point out, human motivations have differed through 
time and cultures. Marshall argues for a "soft determinist" 
perspective on human motivation - that humans are influenced by 
events and unconscious drives (e.g. libido), but by dint of their 
consciousness need not be dictated by them: 
Like plants, human beings realize their potential according to 
their environment; but unlike plants, they can change the 
environment they find themselves in (1989, p. 141). 
For Marshall the human being is as capable of anarchic organisation 
as any other more selfish or megalomaniac option. 
Anarchists, then, see nothing in human nature or motivations 
that suggest order without government as utopian. People may be seen 
as either naturally cooperative, but undermined by the state; or they 
are naturally egoistic, and capable of judging acceptable limits for 
behaviour; or they have the potential for cooperation (as well as the 
potential for authoritarianism, or individualism) depending on the 
environment and their consciousness. 
Authority and the State 
Anarchists do not believe that the state has a right to rule 
morally autonomous (or social-rational, or egoistic) man. By contrast 
(with the possible exception of unassimilated conquest), governments 
claim a light of command and dutiful obedience from their citizens 
which is best encountered in the concept of de Jure positional 
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authority. The paradigm expression of de jure positional author~ty is 
the ability to secure obedience by imperative command. There are any 
number of reasons why an individual might obey an imperative command 
without need for further explanation. For instance, one might reject 
the legitimacy of the commander but agree to conform because of the 
prudent fear of punishment (a residual form of coercion); or reject 
any legitimacy but see the value of conforming to the demand, though 
this may not be the for the same reason as the commander (individual 
rational decision). But what de jure positional authority 
hypothetically needs to be able to secure is conformity to a command 
because one accepts the legitimacy of the commander to make this 
command. The definition for de jure positional authority might be: 
the acceptance of the legitimacy of agents of the state to command 
and be obeyed not because the state has the power to enforce 
obedience, or because the executors persuade citizens of the value of 
their commands, but because the subjects recognise their right to be 
obeyed. Anarchists argue that people might believe the state is 
legitimate and accord it de jure authority, but that this is a 
mistaken belief. They say that the state is always illegitimate and 
only de facto authority can exist. The debate is dependent on the 
statist's defence of the legitimacy of the state. 
The resources of the putative de jure authority are complex. 
Statist theorists argue that authority tends to rest on a combination 
of paternalism and "rational-legality". Paternalistic authority may 
be subdivided into charisma, tradition, and divine right. Authority 
is accorded to some leaders based on their own personal charisma. To 
some extent they claim a parental role, ot knowing more, and more 
clearly, than their subjects. There may be nothing more to the 
charismatic leader than a personality that engenders trust and 
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support, like so many megalomaniac dictators or prophets of doom. On 
the other hand the charismatic leader may have produced successful 
results which provide evidence of competence. Hitler's later 
popularity was certainly sustained by past evidence of an ability to 
secure positive results. 
Traditional resources of authority depend on the idea that 
"experience and wisdom reside in tradition" (McPherson, 1967, p. 34). 
Without necessarily addressing the justifications for obeying any 
particular leader, adherents of traditional authority might defend their 
acceptance of rule on the basis that what is must be, or that what one 
trusted to work in the past will work in the future, or that acting in 
an unorthodox manner will cause unwanted instability. 
There are two responses to paternal resources of authority 
which anarchists and liberal theorists might agree upon. Firstly, 
that in "sophisticated" societies, turning to paternalism is ignorance 
of, or flight from, responsibility. If people are deemed to be beings 
capable of rational choice then they are likely to be the best judges of 
where their interests lie. By conforming to the will of a charismatic or 
traditional authority individuals forsake their own judgement, and thus 
their moral autonomy. Secondly, that while it may prove of utility to 
obey, without recourse to some form of rational-legality, there is 
nothing in the paternal resources that obligates the rational individual 
to obedience. 
The rational-legal resource of representative democracy (as 
opposed to direct democracy) is also subject to the criticism of 
anarchists as a more sophisticated way of depriving individuals of their 
autonomy. In simple terms, if voluntarists wish to suggest that 
representative democracies are legitimate whereas the divine right of 
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kings is not, they must prove that they have the right to rule. The 
defence of the legitimacy of the rational-legal resource of authority 
boils down to the concept of consent. Anarchists do not believe that 
people consent to be ruled in representative democracies, nor that they 
are ever realistically given that option, nor that if they were, they 
should be obligated in any case. 
People in representative democracies do not, in their age of 
majority, explicitly consent to the removal of their moral autonomy and 
agree an obligation of obedience to the state. They do not sign a 
compact which accords them fair and equal treatment vis-a-vis other 
citizens in return for an agreement to suffer punishment graciously for 
contravening the laws of the land. The Enlightenment's social contract 
never existed, and if it had, would mean nothing to those of following 
generations. Nor is the electoral process an indicator of explicit 
consent. As Lysander Spooner pointed out in 1870, people do not vote to 
register support for the institution of the state, but rather for any 
number of economic or political reasons (D. Miller, 1984, pp. 37-8). 
As there exists no explicit method of obtaining consent, 
voluntarists have sought to defend rational-legal authority by varying 
strengths of tacit consent. Some, like Plamenatz, see the electoral 
process as the best way to explain political obligation. This suggests 
that obligation to obey the state comes from the regular recourse to 
changing one's political representatives. That some might abstain from 
the electoral procedure is no matter. It is suggested that the very fact 
that such a procedure is open to use is sufficient to oblige obedience 
(Gewirth, 1962, p. 138). Yet more removed from any form of actual 
consent is the voluntarist suggestion that the simple use of the 
benefits of society demands political obligation. Liberal theorists are 
not happiest in defending political obligation. The argument of tacit 
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consent by electoral participation is, as Goodwin notes, "a very strong 
theory of obligation resting on a very weak act of consent" (1992, p. 
308). 
Anarchists in any case find unacceptable the idea of even an 
explicit compact. The surrender of individual sovereignty - for any 
period of time - to political obligation is a constraint on moral 
autonomy. For anarchists it can never be rightful. They do not dispute 
that it may seen to be rightful by the subjects themselves, but argue 
that they have been fooled, or manipulated, or are subconsciously 
running away from a responsibility which is theirs and theirs alone to 
shoulder. 
Naturally the state does not rule by the whim of authority alone, 
though it is certainly a most efficacious way of obtaining compliance. 
For those not fully inculcated into the myth of authority the state 
maintains other means of procuring compliance: coercion, bribes, 
manipulation, and force. 
Anarchists believe that not only do governments have no right to 
govern, but also that they govern to the detriment of their subjects. In 
the first place their claim to authority is, as stated previously, 
considered to be restrictive of individual moral autonomy. It abridges 
people's freedom to arrive at conclusions by their own reasoning and to 
act on these. Proudhon's often quoted diatribe against the functions of 
the state remains a useful indicator of anarchist attitudes towards it: 
To be GOVERNED is to be .•• spied upon ... enrolled, indoctrinated, 
preached at, controlled ... valued, censured, commanded, by 
creatures who have neither the right nor the wisdom, nor the 
virtue to do so ... To be GOVERNED is to be at every operation, 
at every transaction, noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, 
authorized, admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, 
punished .•. It is under the pretext of public utility, and in the 
name of the general interest, to be placed under contribution, 
trained .•. exploited, monopolized, extorted •.• then, at the 
slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be 
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repressed, fined, despised ... disarmed ... imprisoned, judged ... shot, 
deported. That is government; that is its morality (1989, p. 294). 
The state coerces or forces people into doing things they may not 
necessarily want to do, or is not in their interest to do. It punishes 
them when they contravene laws in which they probably had no hand in 
creating. Its capacity for belligerence is enormous. Its taxes are 
exploitative. It is the holder or protector of monopolistic capital. For 
Bakunin this adds up to "break apart the solidarity of mankind" (19S3, 
p. 140). 
This is not to say that anarchists necessarily believe that all 
functions of the ,state are harmful, nor that they could be done more 
efficiently under anarchy (though Kropotkin argued this). The point is 
that morally autonomous beings should be capable of ordering themselves 
and organising all the same beneficial services and industries without 
the exploitative, punitive, restrictive side-effects that go with the 
most benign social democracy. Nor do anarchists consider this a 
rhetorical conclusion. Spain in 1936, Hungary in 1956, and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 are regularly cited as empirical examples of the 
spontaneous development (that is, in the absence of stratified 
authorities) of order where a goal was shared by the community (Ward, 
1982, pp. 28-37). 
Anarchists do not accept in theory that any form of government is 
desirable, even one touted as preparatory for anarchy. Philosophical 
anarchists, whose credentials and self awareness as anarchists proper 
are dubious, 4re the possible exception. William Godwin, commended by 
anarchists for his criticism of government thought that a National 
Assembly might initially be called to arbitrate in parish disputes. It 
seems theoretically inconsistent to suggest that permanent government 
has no right to rule but that temporary government can rightfully act on 
"behalf of the people." Certainly the anarcho-syndicalist participation 
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in the Republican government in Spain from November 1936 was a triumph 
of opportunism over idealism, given the C.N.T. pronouncements in the 
preceding months. Provisional governments are a development of a 
political rather than a social revolution; they are an indicator of 
incomplete change. This point is further examined in Chapter 5. 
Anarchists think that if government is restrictive of the 
citizenry, it is corruptive of the rulers. No one should be trusted to 
make decisions affecting other people's lives; no one is considered to 
be beyond co-option. Even should there be some feasible way of defending 
the foundation of a temporary revolutionary government, the belief is 
that it would become a permanent fixture. Governments, anarchists 
believe, do not legislate themselves out of existence. State power is 
self-perpetuating if not self-aggrandizing. Bakunin saw that Marx's 
proposed "popular state" was very much in this mould (Bakunin, 1983, p. 
140). Nothing is more of a warning to anarchists of the state's tenacity 
than the marked absence of any withering away in the state socialist 
experiments. 
Individualism and Communalism 
One of the most intense differences between fractions of the 
anarchist movement derives from considerations of the most desirable 
balance between the rational being's egoism and sociability: between the 
liberty of the individual and the organisation of community; and the 
linked economic question. The influence of socialist and liberal social 
and economic arguments on the basic anarchist anti-state, anti-authority 
stance begins to polarise anarchists. The importance of the social and 
economic factors is such that relations between the hyphenated groupings 
of anarchists are often at best tenuous. Benjamin Tucker and Murray 
Rothbard would probably find they had more in common with Adam Smith on 
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the question of markets, and John Stuart Millon the question of 
individual liberty, than they would with Peter Kropotkin or Errico 
Malatesta. 
According to Alan Ritter individualism and communalism are, in 
"full fledged anarchy ... mutually reinforcing." He puts forward the 
powerful argument that: "Individuality and community, understood as 
self-development and reciprocal awareness .... and not freedom, are the 
goals anarchists really seek" (1980, p. 3). Freedom is a complicated 
concept, and the goal of anarchists has been maximisation of a kind of 
individual liberty rather than achieving a nebulous complete state of 
"freedom". Indeed, beyond propaganda and primitive sloganeering there is 
little demand for freedom from restraint in the sense of the moral-free 
egoist's licence, or the survivalist's total self-reliance. Autonomous 
man is a responsible and responsive creature, whose moral restraints are 
internalised. From differing emphases of this self-imposed restraint 
develop alternative conceptions of preferable human organisation, 
chiefly between anarchist traditions developed primarily from either 
liberal individualism or socialist communalism. The United States is a 
good example of competing social theories. In the nineteenth century 
there were to all intents and purposes two separate anarchist entities: 
the "home-grown" anarchist individualists like Josiah Warren and 
Benjamin Tucker; and the foreign-born libertarian socialists of German, 
Italian, East European and Jewish stock. 
Before a further examination is made of the fractions of anarchist 
theory, a note must be made in relation to the to attempt to divide 
anarchism into left- and right-wing varieties. Traditional left-right 
spectra are inadequate when it comes to anarchism. They allow the 
confusion that may label a Warren, Tucker, or Bool both right- and left-
wing individualists (Individualist Anarchist Pamphlets, 1972; Schuster, 
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1970). While communalism con,:a~r:s :':'.a:::/ '::::-a:.':s of n:.ef':-· .... :.::g" soc:.a::'s:,:", 
and individualism of "right-wing" libe:::-a::.sm, ':~e d:.vergence :.s best 
illustrated on dual axes rather than the con':entior:al left-:::-:'g~t 
spectrum (Fig. 1). This helps to illustrate both what separates 
anarchism from socialism and liberalism, and what forces are acting to 
widen the distance between individualist and communalist anarchism. 
III SOCIAUSM -- L..lcE~ALISM 
f1UruOR'i"~IAN lSI" 
FASC, IS M 
Fig. 1 Two-Dimensional Political Spectrum 
It is important to remember that while individualist anarchists may feel 
a close kinship to radical liberals, and anarchis': communists to 
revolutionary socialists there is a line which signifies the border 
practically all political commenta~ors. The mos~ radical liberal ~ 1': 
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want to cut the state to minimal protective and judicial roles, the most 
revolutionary socialist might work for the eventual withering away of 
the state, but the most moderate anarchist (allowing for the dubious 
philosophical anarchist) wants to see the abolition of the state, and 
without a transitory stage of revolutionary government. 
Individualist anarchists consider the development of self as the 
most important human goal. Only by thorough-going non-dependency may the 
real self become apparent. On the one extreme is full-fledged egoism, 
the social order of which is carefully balanced on the shaky principle 
that it would not normally be to one's utility to deprive another of 
their life, liberty or possessions. To Stirner the only possible social 
connection would be a "Union of Egoists" which could survive only so 
long as it was in the interests of the individual members (1982, p. 
179). It is quite feasible that at some given moment an individual 
egoist might profit by the enslavement of all others, or the institution 
of a dictatorship. To individualist anarchists proper it is incumbent 
that all individuals are entitled to self-development without undue 
restraint. The community envisioned by Warren was a loose one where 
individuals were responsive to others, and associated purely 
bilaterally. 
Communalists form the larger proportion of anarchists, both in '/ 
terms of theorists and activists. For them the destruction of the state 
should in no way be accompanied by the dissolution of society. Ritter's 
reflection of Kropotkin, communal individuality, is a good example of 
the communalist perception that responsible self-development best 
derives from cooperation with others. The communalists from Bakunin to 
Kropotkin to Walter see no contradiction in combining an autonomous self 
with an interdependent community. Decision-making in a communal setting 
might be made by recourse to direct democracy or simple debate and 
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compromise. Direct democracy itself presents a problem to those 
anarchists who rail at the idea of majority rule, or even in the case of 
unanimity of the suggestion of contractual obligation at a later date. 
The debate and compromise option is the most secure position for the 
supporter of moral autonomy: the use of individual reasoning bound by 
the needs of sociability to corne to an acceptable decision for all. It 
is also the most difficult for non-anarchists to believe possible. 
The size of anarchist communities is very much dependent on the 
participants' capacity for cooperation. The more numerous the community, 
the more difficult it becomes for each member to participate fully in 
communal matters, or for the inclusion of individuals who may be 
irreconcilable over organisational matters; the result being harmful 
alienation. Agrarian societies are not the inevitable result of this 
atomisation. The idea of confederations of confederations of basic 
community units was championed at least as early as Proudhon's Du 
Principe Federatir. By such non-hierarchic association regional or 
global communication and economic cooperation become ideologically 
acceptable. 
Capitalism, Collectivism, and Communism 
Intimately linked with the social issue is the divide over 
economic organisation. Individualists opt largely for a form of private 
enterprise, or mutualism. Individualist economic stances may be derived 
from three different sources: from natural rights, from egoism, and from 
utilitarianism (D. Miller, 1980, p. 31). 
The early American individualists' economic ethos is described by 
De Leon as: "The egoism of private property combined with the religion 
of conscience to produce a thorough antimonopolism" (1978, p. 65). 
Josiah Warren's "equitable commerce," not far removed from Proudhonian 
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mutualism, totally rejected the idea of usury, and of profiteering by 
asking a price for a commodity more than its labour value. Distasteful 
work might be accorded a premium, but superior skill of the craftsman, 
as a natural gift, was not for Warren a reason for greater reward. 
Though best applied to the kind of agrarian/artisan community that 
Warren tried on more than one occasion to set up, Warrenites did not 
discount the application of the equitable cost principle to industry. 
Proudhon, examining the question of large industry felt that ownership 
should be shared equally amongst work-force and management, though pay 
be dependent on skill, experience, or position (1989, Sixth Study). What 
mutualists find oppressive about capitalism is the unequal access to 
capital, and inequality of opportunity. Mutualism, or equitable 
commerce, remains attractive because simplicity and equity appeal to the 
back-to-the-land lifestylists of recent years. 
A modern development of anarchic private enterprise is anarcho-
capitalism. The anarchist pedigree of anarcho-capitalism, seen by many 
of its adherents (including Murray Rothbard) as something of a 
philosophical exercise, is another grey area. The anarcho-capitalists 
have a reasonable claim to Benjamin Tucker as an antecedent. Tucker was 
influenced by Warren and Proudhon, though he maintained a more egoistic 
inclination. He derived, partly from readings of Adam Smith, a belief 'J 
that free exchange was self-regulatory when it was free for both labour 
and capital. The religion of conscience had little place for Tucker, and 
has none for Rothbard. Rothbard argues that the state is the greatest 
enemy of liberty, as whatever act it performs is an unnecessary and 
harmful intervention into the harmony that is the free market. Where 
there is a vacuum that needs to be filled, be it production or charity, 
entrepreneurs will fill it. He dismisses the possibility of monopoly in 
the unrestrained competition by interpreting monopoly as only properly 
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possible in the case of "government grants of privilege" (1970, p. 58). 
The accumulation of massive wealth in the face of great poverty is not 
seen by the anarcho-capitalists as inimical to a free society. The just 
rewards of hard labour and fair competition are material riches. 
Anarcho-capitalists do not consider that human nature needs to be 
adjusted in any way to operate a free market without undue conflict. 
Individuals in the free market would set mutual contracts to ensure 
stability, and would quickly come to realise the utility in harmony. 
Anarcho-capitalists do envisage economic disputes in this scenario. 
Contracts which are broken or situations where life, liberty or property 
is invaded may not be settled between the disputants alone. The anarcho-
capitalist solution is best typified by recourse to competitive defence 
agencies, and competitive punitive courts. 
Though the idea of harmony amidst intense competition seems 
incongruous to anarchist communists, there is nothing in the 
fundamentals of anarchism which conclusively denies the possible 
viability of private property and enterprise, or the employment of free 
labour, in anarchy. Only a small minority of anarchists, however, have 
found this a desirable goal. Anarchist communists reject the feasibility 
of preventing the reversion to exploitative monopoly capital and/or the 
development of the. defence agencies into proto-state organs. Minimal-
statists like Nozick are, for anarchist communists, the practical face 
of philosophical anarcho-capitalism. 
Collectivism is large step away from anarcho-capitalism. 
Collectivists like Bakunin take up the Proudhonian industrial proposal 
and set it to all sectors of the economy. Bakunin's central economic 
principle was the removal of individual ownership - seen as necessary 
for social equality - and the placing of property in the hands of 
voluntary workers' associations. He also saw value in the retention of a 
25 
wage system so that individuals were awarded according to their labour. 
In Bakunin's pessimistic view the lazy would not disappear but would 
have to learn to be productive or else would not eat. 
The mongrel combination of wage system and collective property was 
described by Kropotkin as "incomprehensible, unattractive, and bristling 
with difficulties in practical application" (1970, p. 126). Anarchist 
communists in the tradition of Kropotkin, Reclus and Berkman regard 
collectivism as an incomplete expression of human solidarity in anarchy. 
It suggests a lack of trust between individuals in a community. They 
argue, moreover, that the individual payment "according to deed" is 
impossible to calculate in a collective enterprise. The communist 
society is one where freely associating individuals maintain collective 
ownership of property, where the labour and rewards reflect the ideal 
"from each according to their abilities, to each according to their 
need." If a stable community supports a policy of remuneration according 
to need, the individuals of that community must have confidence that 
none will waste produce, or take what they do not need, and also be 
responsive to the needs of others where scarcity arises. 
Individualists dispute the idea that anarchist communism would 
maintain the sovereignty of the individual as a primary organisational 
principle. Communist organisation, they f~ar, leads to overbearing 
social-control and/or economic control/monopoly that takes on many 
characteristics of the paternal state. They fear that individuals 
outside of the communes would not be allowed to employ free labour, or 
that they would be refused trade, or that they would be forcibly 
incorporated. 
Communists believe that few individuals will deny their sociable 
inclinations and want to remain outside the benefits of the commune. 
Individualists believe that individual sovereignty is best preserved 
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when people are allowed to function as separate economic units. Both 
positions fear that the other will lead to a return to statist 
tendencies. To some extent these positions argue in different 
directions. There can be little compromise between such wildly differing 
expectations. Yet it may be pointed out that individualist/communalist 
economic fractions need not be mutually exclusive. The Spanish anarchist 
experiments early in the civil war were instructive examples of the 
cooperation possible between individual production, collectives and 
communes. Communists may hope that individual producers will slowly 
drift into collectives which then turn to communes; individualists may 
hope that commune dwellers see greater liberty in the arena of 
individual enterprise and dismantle them. 
The last major area of disagreement between anarchists concerns 
the method of effecting change, or the anticipated development of 
change. On the one hand there are the coercive or violent techniques of 
rebellion or insurrection in the expectation of rapid or staccato 
movement to anarchy. On the other hand there are arguments for pacific, 
rational, and persuasive techniques giving a more gradual change in 
society. There are moral and pragmatic reasons for extolling both of 
these positions, and indeed severe problems. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 
investigate the question of anarchism's relationship to violence and 
nonviolence. 
There is no paradigm form of anarchism. The adherents of 
anarchism, whether they hyphenate their appellation or not, may only 
agree that the present society is faulty, and that the abolition of the 
state is one of the key factors to remedying that fault. Anarchism is 
subject to forces of division both internally and from the direction of 
those ideoloqies to which it is closely related: socialism and 
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liberalism. Anarchists fail to agree the relative importance of 
individual sovereignty and voluntary association. They do not concur 
over the best form of post-revolutionary social or economic 
organisation. Nor do they agree, as will be seen in later chapters, on 
the strategy and tools of effecting social change. Yet while differences 
between anarchists are conspicuous, these should not be emphasised to 
the exclusion of all else. Anarchism is capable of maintaining great 
diversity within its borders. The demand for the abolition of the 
institutionalised power - where other revolutionary or radical doctrines 
simply wish to devolve it or defer dissolution - sets anarchi~ aJart . 
Because anarchists hold this main principle other prominent differences 
between them have rarely excluded familial interaction and debate 
between them (where they have co-existed). Anarchists of all hues see 
kinship with other anarchists. They themselves assert that there is a 
separate anarchist axis rather than just a grey area between the 
socialist and liberal axes. 
Violence and Nonviolence 
Options for a Definition of Violence 
Violence is an emotive term, describing, as it does, something 
that is considered by most to be a kind of wrong. It is defined in a 
wide variety of ways, often in such a way as to indicate the agenda of 
the user. The aim of this section is to survey briefly the options for a 
definition of violence, and then to develop a definition which will not 
only be effective for the study, but will also be to some degree 
reflective of everyday use. This is useful both in contextualising the 
use of the term in the study, and as a contribution in its own right to 
28 
'/ 
the definitional debate. At the end of the section the usage of the 
terms nonviolence and pacifism is discussed. 
Academic definitions of violence fall roughly into the trichotomy 
that Coady labels "wide," "restrictive," and "legitimate" (1986, p. 4). 
Restricted definitions of violence are potentially the most politically 
neutral interpretations. Theorists of the wider definition might stress 
that this political neutrality simply aids to preserve the status quo, 
but this is only partially true as I hope to show in my final 
definition. 
A comprehensive restricted definition is given by Ronald Miller 
An act of violence is any act taken by A that 
1) involves great force, 
2) is in itself capable of injuring, damaging, or destroying, and 
3) is done with the intent of injuring, damaging, or destroying 
B (a being), or 0 (an inanimate object), 
a) where the damage or destruction of an object by A is only 
an act of violence when it was not done with the intention 
of doing something of value for the object's owner (1971, 
pp. 25-6). 
In comparison, Wolff's loose definition, "bodily interference or the 
direct infliction of harm" (1969, p. 608), and Freeman's, "willful 
application of force in such a way that it is physically injurious to 
the person or group against which it is applied" (R.B. Miller, 1971, p. 
13), are more aesthetically pleasing, but far less analytically 
rigourous. Restricted definitions.identify four factors which, pooled 
together in one way or another, attempt to separate what is an act of 
violence from what is not. These are: actors, intention, vigour, and 
physicality. 
The wide definition corresponds to the idea of the need to equate 
violence with its etymological twin violation. Galtung (1969), Garver 
(1981), and Holmes (1971) all display signs of wishing to widen our gaze 
from the violence of a kick or a punch to that of "covert or quiet 
violence" (Garver, 1981, p. 222). This form of definition has the 
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potential to find practically any act or process as one of violence: 
"violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that 
their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential 
realizations" (Gal tung , 1969, p. 168). Peace is equated with justice, 
and therefore injustice - unfulfilled potential - being beyond the realm 
of peace, equals violence. Somewhat more circumspectly Holmes' 
"violence2" ("violence1" being the kick or punch variety) considers: 
the debilitating effects of prolonged and intensive brainwashing, 
or of ghetto schools upon young children, or the continual 
humiliation and debasement of a child by his parents (1971, p. 
110) . 
Holmes's "violence2" unashamedly mixes all instances of psychological 
violation from the "structural violence" of institutional racism to 
personal psychological abuse. 
"Structural violence," where no actor has conunitted an 
identifiable act, is the institutional paradigm of psychological 
violation (Gal tung , 1969, p. 170). The usual purpose of those who wish 
to include this psychosocial violation in their definitions, is, as 
Coady points out, radical reformation (1986, p. 4). The popular 
perception of violence is as a wrong, and a worse wrong than a 
nonviolent violation. The answer for Garver or Galtung is the 
subsumption of psychosocial violation with the narrow definition of 
violence into a greater catch-all Violence. There is little doubt that 
they do this with the best of intentions. However, the sum of two 
reasonably recognisable concepts is a nebulous creature of little 
analytical value, and easy prey to restrictionist critique. 
On the borderline between restricted and wide definitions comes a 
synthesis which accepts the possibility of personal non-physical 
violence, where there is a recognisable assailant. Audi for instance, 
includes in his definition "the highly vigorous psychological abuse of, 
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or the sharp, caustic psychological attack upon, a person or animal" 
(1971, p. 59). The vigour of any given psychological attack is paramount 
in order for Audi to concede its inclusion as an act of violence. Others 
may de-emphasise the vigour but stress the intention of "psychic 
violence" (Wrong, 1979, pp. 27-8). 
There is a further definition for violence based on the desire of 
supporters of the existing economic-political system to reinforce their 
legitimacy. Political violence is defined by Honderich as: "a 
considerable or destroying force against persons or things, a use of 
force prohibited by law and directed to a change in the policies, 
personnel, or system of government, and hence to changes in SOCiety" 
(1989, p. 151). This legitimist stance side-steps the wide/restricted 
continuum by making the claim that violence is wrong by definition. This 
is rather more a political adjudication than the moral one it first 
appears to be. Betz's Deweyan critique of Garver begins by denoting 
force as a constructive authorised use of power/energy, and violence its 
destructive unauthorised use (1976, pp. 342-7). Nieburg observes that 
political violence is used in order to change "the very system of social 
norms which the police power is designed to protect" (1968, p. 17). The 
significance of this is best illustrated by Betz's example of a robber 
shooting his victim, and then in turn being shot by a policeman who sees 
no other way of limiting further innocent casualties. For Betz the 
robber's act was one of violence, and the policeman's one of force. 
Intention to harm or type of act is not important. Interestingly, 
legitimism is for Grundy and weinstein (1974, pp. 11-2) the "narrow" 
definition of violence. In their view a definition based on physical 
harm by unauthorised members of society must be more sharply defined 
than one based on physical harm committed by any member of society. 
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Thus far the legitimist definition works entirely to preserve the 
status quo by suggesting the impossibility of legitimate government's 
sanctioning of violence. Wolff's strict definition, "the illegitimate or 
unauthorized use of force to effect decisions against the will or desire 
of others," follows this pattern (1969, p. 606). However, he turns the 
stance on its head by suggesting that as no government is legitimate, 
acts which Honderich or Betz woul~ describe as acts of authorised force, 
are still in fact acts of violence. Flexible legitimism, a kind of 
Wolffian development, contends that: 
Violence is the capacity to impose, or the act of imposing, one's 
will upon another, where the imposition is held to be 
illegitimate. Force is the capacity to impose, or the act of 
imposing, one's will upon another, where the imposition is held to 
be legitimate (Macfarlane, 1974, pp. 44-6). 
In accepting this one posits that the object is as qualified to 
determine legitimacy as the subject. 
Towards a Definition of Violence 
In order to produce my own useful definition I will now examine, 
accept, and reject some elements from the trichotomy. First of all is 
the question of who or what can be the perpetrator of violence. Whilst 
volcanic eruptions or hurricanes can be very vigorous, violent affairs, 
I do not think they can be said to do violence. Firstly, 
adjective/adverb and noun are not synonymous; secondly, there is no 
intention (Audi, 1971, p. 50; Miller, 1971, p. 19). Betz would have us 
believe the breathing of coal dust by miners, which may have future 
deleterious effects on health, is an act of violence (1976, p. 345-6). 
Not only is there no intention, but also there is no positive act. 
Both Audi (1971, p. 50) and Miller (1971, p. 15) accept as a 
matter of course the idea that violence can be done to inanimate 
objects. Whilst not a crucial point, the inclusion of property in a 
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definition does, to some degree, bother me. It suggests that damage to 
property should be considered in the same breath as harm to persons. I 
believe it devalues the concept of violence to let this stand. The use 
of such phrases as "malicious damage" or "violent destruction" gives a 
more proportionate tone. It is more a question of intention o£ harm (or 
negligence in avoiding harm) to persons than the type of act itself that 
determines whether the perpetrators of a bomb attack are "men of 
violence" or not. 
Again, whilst not crucial to my study I would argue for the 
inclusion of non-human beings as potential objects of violence. There is 
a more tangible difference between animate and inanimate, than between 
human and non-human beings. There are convincing arguments for the 
recognition of sentience and, varying degrees of self-consciousness in 
animals (Singer, 1979, pp. 48-71; Regan, 1983). Harris (1980, pp. 3-6, 
19-20) sees no need to include inanimate objects as objects of violence, 
but does go some way to entertain the notion of consideration of some 
animals not simply as animals, but as persons. 
Some theorists suggest that it is feasible to have unintented 
violence. ~example used by Audi of a pilot unintentionally dropping 
his bombs on a crowded city as violence, is only partially convincing 
(1971, p. 52). If this act were a complete accident it would be 
equivalent to the erupting volcano or hurricane. Violent tragedies, yes; 
but violence? For the sake of conceptual coherence it is advisable here 
to opt for Miller's argument for the need for intention, or where the 
harm "does not seem to have been accidental" (1971, pp. 16-7). Under 
this provision, had the pilot of Audi's plane simply been negligent of 
checking over where he was flying, there would be some argument for his 
to have been an act of violence rather than an accident. 
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It has been argued that while remaining physical an act of 
violence need not be vigorous or sudden (Betz, 1976, p. 345; Harris, 
1980, pp. 16-8). Harris notes the "intuitional" argument that violence 
involves vigour, but then gives examples of acts he considers ones of 
violence, and would expect others to. Some, like piping poison gas into 
a house, do seem to fit the bill because while the act is not vigorous, 
the effect is immediate. But others, like locking someone up to die of 
starvation seem to fit the concepts of cruelty or torture better because 
neither the act or effect are violent, vigorous, or sudden. 
One area where act and effect are separated by a long time-lapse 
where it does seem reasonable to describe the act-to-effect as an act of 
violence, is where a bomb has been timed to go off in the distant 
future. The violence of the act is delayed but none the less apparent 
when the bomb explodes. I would agree here with Harris's implication 
(and thereby disagree with Coady, 1986, p. 16) that the act on its own 
is not a violent act, but the act and effect together are an act of 
violence. After all, if the potential bomber removes the bomb before it 
explodes, where is the act of violence? Vigour, immediacy, suddenness, 
of either act or effect is a necessary qualifier for the concept of 
violence. 
From the above it becomes apparent I reject the notion of 
"structural violence." This notion demands the acceptance not only of an 
enormous degree of linkage, but more importantly the possible total 
absence of intention or perpetrator, or anything violent in the act (if 
there can be said to even be an act) or effect. Galtung (1969, p. 171) 
refers to the condition of war-free structural-violence-intact as 
"negative peace" or social injustice. Social injustice and psychosocial 
violation, are exactly what he wishes to re-name. The justification for 
this is minimal given that he himself admits this "may lead to more 
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problems than it solves" (1969, p. 168). Galtung sees that there is less 
concern about oppression than there is about violence, and notes that 
peace without justice is a hollow goal. Hence by labelling injustice as 
violence he aims to boost injustice's credibility. Neither violence, nor 
social injustice gain from this agglomeration. It is society's concern 
for social injustice that needs to be changed, not the terminology. 
With greater scope for criticism I feel that "personal 
psychological violence" is also a misnomer. The "savage verbal attacks" 
in Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf are given as examples of personal 
psychological violence by Audi (1971, p. 54). The vigour is present, the 
intention to hurt feelings is there, but there is no physicality. The 
anguish deriving from verbal abuse can be more than from a mild physical 
assault, but I believe physicality is another crucial factor which helps 
to solidify my concept of violence. Malicious destruction of one's 
property in front of one contains some degree of physicality, as does a 
madman thrashing at air. However, no matter how disturbing or 
threatening they may appear, if they are not directed at harming a 
person they are not acts of violence. 
Other examples of "psychological violence" sometimes given include 
brain-washing and threats. Brain-washing that does not include an 
element of physicality is an extreme form of manipulation, rather than 
violence. Threats that involve no physicality are a form of coercion, 
not violence. Again, along with social injustice, I do not want to 
suggest that by excluding verbal abuse, brain-washing, or threats, I 
make these automatically more morally acceptable than violence. Quite 
the contrary, I believe these are neglected forms of harm/violation 
which deserve consideration alongside the concept of violence. 
There is some confusion between the ideas of force and violence. 
In the political context force may be described as the use of physical 
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strength to overpower something which resists (R.B. Miller, 1971, pp. 
29-31). Force may be used against animate or inanimate objects: a 
policeman pushing a demonstrator away, or kicking-in a locked door. 
Force need not involve violence; indeed it may be argued that force only 
begins where violence ends, but I will not pursue that argument. 
Given my position on actors, intention, vigour and physicality I 
must reject the legitimist definition that violence is unauthorised or 
illegitimate use of force. To accept the idea that the intentional 
shooting of a person may not involve violence so long as it is supported 
by the latter's claim to legitimate authorisation falls victim to 
Wolff's challenge - the question of legitimacy. Betz's aforementioned 
policeman may be authorised and justified, or not, either way his act 
was one of violence. 
When everything is drawn together I am left with a restricted 
definition close to that of Pelton (1974, p. 4). An act of violence is: 
any act by person A in which there is intention (or at least reasonable 
expectation) of physical harm to person(s) S, the act or effect of which 
is vigorous or sudden. This definition is, inevitably, not watertight, 
but it is sufficient for the purposes of my study. 
Nonviolence and Pacifism 
"Nonviolence" does not refer to the simple absence of violence, as 
"immoral" does not refer to the simple lack of morals. In pursuing 
social change nonviolence is a tool, like violence. The term refers to 
the deliberate refrainment from violence as a means to a desired end. 
What then does nonviolence encompass if its prime exclusion is the 
rejection of the use of violence? A good account of the divisions within 
the concept of nonviolence is given by William Miller (1964, pp. 46-70). 
He finds three types of "generic nonviolence": 1) nonresistance, 2) 
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passive resistance, and 3) active nonviolent resistance or nonviolent 
direct action (1964, p. 47; also Holmes, 1971, pp. 113-5). 
The early Christian martyrs are models of nonresistance. 
Nonresistance is exemplified by Jesus asking his disciples to turn the 
other cheek. In this surrender to a persecutor's physical power is an 
affirmation, and not an abandonment, of one's own spirituality. Unlike 
other forms of nonviolence which tend to be means to an end, 
nonresistance can be seen as an end in itself. There is no tactic or 
strategy in nonresistance, rather it is primarily "conserving spiritual 
integrity": an act of witness, the physical result of which (execution 
of the nonresistant, or repentance of the persecutor) is immaterial. 
There is little revolutionary potential in nonresistance because by 
definition it can have no ulterior motive. 
Passive resistance has a historical basis in weaponlessness rather 
than religion. It has been used primarily by the unarmed or underarmed 
to express displeasure at some policy or action. Where nonresistance 
exhorts one to go the extra mile, passive resisters refuse to go the 
first. Boycotts and strikes are the paradigm techniques of passive 
resistance. 
As the flip-side of passive resistance, nonviolent direct action, 
aims to actively effect a desired change, and places the opponent in the 
position of having to either accept the de facto change, or take steps 
to react against it. The sit-in is an assertion which, if all things are 
equal, is more difficult to ignore than a boycott. Gandhi argued that 
the sat ya grah a movement's brand of nonviolent direct action should not 
be considered a weapon of the weak (1958, p. 3). The potential for 
social change arising from nonviolent direct action as well as passive 
resistance is well documented (Gregg, 1960, pp. 15-42; Hare and 
Blumberg, 1977; W.R. Miller, 1964, pp. 224-364). 
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Nonviolence may be used expediently on three different levels: 1) 
spontaneous or subtactical, 2) the tactical, and 3) the strategic (W.R. 
Miller, 1964, p. 64). Spontaneous nonviolence is irrelevant in the 
context of this study. The best explanation of the difference between 
the remaining two is to paraphrase Clausewitz: tactics are the way of 
using troops to win battles, and strategy the art of using battles to 
win wars. Nonviolence may be expedient due to military weakness, or the 
belief that nonviolent means would prove least costly in achieving the 
desired goal. 
This study is more interested in the moral commitment to 
nonviolence as expressed in pacifism. According to Craig Ihara a 
pacifist is one who: 
1) aspires never to resort to violence. 
2) is characteristically non-violent even in circumstances which, 
historically, most others would use violence. 
3) vividly appreciates that violence is a moral evil. 
4) acts consistently from a moral point of view, rather than out 
of fear or from self-interested motives (1988, p. 269). 
There are three main resources of the pacifist ideal: absolutist, quasi-
absolutist, and strategic. The absolutist pacifist believes that the use 
of violence is an irredeemable moral evil, morally justified in no 
circumstance. The quasi-absolutist believes that the product of violence 
is on balance always negative, and hence its use is unethical. The 
strategic pacifist accords with either of the previous, except in the 
context of self-defence and/or other-defence. The moral and practical 
validity of these is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Ethical nonviolence· may easily be accompanied by the rejection of 
other power concepts such as coercion and manipulation. Holmes' wide 
definition violence2 takes with it the baggage of nonviolence2 (1971, 
pp. 115-7). Gandhi believed that ahimsa (or nonviolence) and satyagraha 
(soul force or power of truth), the foundations of his movement, not 
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only rejected certain modes of behaviour, but also lmpliej the 
involvement of agapaic love and persuasion (W.R. Miller, 1964, ~.~ p. ~"t; 
Horsburgh, 1970, pp. 34-9). Horsburgh believes that coerClon is not 
Gandhi's aim "in so far as the struggle is a means of pursuing truth, 
for the power to impose a settlement does not justify one's object1.ves" 
(1970, p. 56). 
In practice Gandhi did accept a negative side to ahimsa as well as 
his positive one (Merton, 1965, p. 75; W.R. Miller, 1964, p. 25; 
Bondurant, 1965, pp. 23-4). Coercion may be unintended but unavoidable 
in any campaign. For William Miller the simple maximisation of the 
intention of good will may be all that is possible or necessary. The 
road to an acceptance of the part coercion has to play in nonviolence, 
Ronald Miller refers to as the "moderate theory of nonviolence" (1971, 
p. 41). Going one step further, Cady argues that there may not be any 
contradiction in the planned inclusion of force or coercion in a 
campaign of ethical nonviolence (Cady, 1989, pp. 61-2). Manipulation or 
coercion without physical harm certainly appear available to Ihara's 
pacifist. A campaign of nonviolence where the activists accept intended 
or unintended use of power concepts acknowledges the division of 
violence from other means of effecting injustice/harm by type rather 
than degree (i.e. x degrees of violence is worse than x or 2x degrees of 
coercion), a stance hotly disputed by non-pacifists later in this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY 
Triangulating the Study 
Triangulation 
In order to extract informative and valid data for any analysis, 
it is necessary to devise an appropriate methodology for the purpose. A 
pertinent methodology is determined by a balanced equation of, on the 
one hand what the goal of the research is, and on the other, time, 
expense, and capability. Few researchers can be unaware of the 
restrictions placed upon them by limited research funding and looming 
deadlines. Similarly, it is a foolhardy researcher who enters a field 
without any conception of their capability. If there is any question 
that the restrictive side of the equation outweighs the goal the 
solution is a trading-off between constriction of the goal and dilution 
of the method. Too constricted a goal and the research loses 
comprehension, too dilute a method and the research fails to achieve 
depth. 
Given that the aim of this study is a comprehensive investigation 
of the relationship between anarchism and violence, the use of a single 
method could at best cover only a fraction of the subject. A single 
method necessitates the choice of which form of anarchism or anarchist 
to study; in simple terms, one cannot study theory, propagandism, and 
activism with a single method (though all three may be present in 
varying degrees in any particular anarchist). Each element adds a vista 
on the whole, the absence of which may be all too obvious. Theorists do 
not deserve absolute attention. They may have planted the seeds of 
ideas, but they have little say in their germination, indeed may be 
entirely abstracted from the concrete movement. Propagandists inform and 
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persuade but their emotional and charismatic appeals may be distinctly 
selective. Activists breathe life into theories, but may hold a tenuous 
grip of the significance of ideas, or act from circumstance and impulse 
rather than from doctrinal merit. If one seeks a eh· compr enS1ve picture 
one needs to address all three, with added emphasis on anarchist 
activists and propagandism which have been so infrequently and 
inadequately studied by academics in the past. 
The researcher believes that the maximisation of applicable data, 
given comprehensive aims, demands the use of multiple method 
triangulation. If a single method is employed there is no positive means 
of assessing the bias. Each method employed in research, "reveals 
different aspects of empirical reality." (Denzin, 1970, p. 6) 
Integrating a number of methods does not eliminate each method's degree 
of individual bias. However, as Webb et al. suggest, when successfully 
employed, triangulation may reinforce any argument: 
... the most fertile search for validity comes from a combined 
series of different measures, each with its idiosyncratic 
weaknesses, each pointed to a single hypothesis (1966, pp. 173-4). 
Whilst triangulation has the capacity to provide the greatest validity 
to research from areas where a single method might result in 
questionable levels of bias, it is not without risks. As Patton (1987, 
pp. 161-2) points out, triangulation is. frequently more time-consuming 
and rarely as straightforward as a single method. Problems may arise 
including the difficulty in integrating different methods. Whilst this 
is more likely with mixed qualitative/quantitative research, it may also 
playa factor between qualitative methods. Secondly, different 
conclusions may arise from different methods, thereby not pointing to 
the confirmation of a single thrust of hypotheses at all. In this event 




This chapter details the different methods of investigation that 
the researcher chose. The reasoning behind the initial choice of a 
triangulation of three qualitative research methods - self-completion 
questionnaires, face-to-face interviews, and document analysis - is 
given. Given that methodological fault is most likely in field research 
rather than literary review, the bulk of this chapter is given over to a 
detailed examination of field methods. The reasoning behind the choice 
of field methods is given, and the decision to discard one after 
tentative pilot research is discussed. The questions of validity, 
reliability and bias are broached. Such elaboration is not only helpful 
within-study, but also useful to those who may seek to pursue 
qualitative interviewing with radical political subcultures in the 
future. 
Document Analysis and Questionnaires 
Document analysis is the most common and accessible form of 
qualitative research. Vast arrays of methodological explanation are less 
necessary for this than for original field methods because the material 
to be explored is extant, the analyst interprets but does not create. 
The most controversial factor in document analysis is not how one 
interprets the data - for subjective manipulation is visible to those 
who with access to the documents - but which documents are chosen. 
Chapter 4 might be seen as an attempt to view anarchism on 
violence from the propagandist perspective. The chapter examines the way 
violence is dealt with in periodicals and pamphlets. These two written 
forms are the vehicles of inter-anarchist propaganda (given the 
unpopularity of public meetings in the present day). Constraints of both 
necessity and choice were put on the study of the periodicals and 
pamphlets. One necessary constraint was that of language. Periodicals 
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consulted were, owing to the researcher's linguistic incapacity, written 
either in English or Danish. This meant the failure to consult the 
living propaganda of Southern and Eastern Europe, and South America. 
A second constraint was the accessibility to periodicals. It 
proved impossible to examine all those English-language periodicals on 
Nursey-Bray's (1992) impressive list. Such publications are often 
ephemeral, and the most accessible libraries tend not to collect 
extensively in this field. Nevertheless, a broad spectrum of opinions 
were gathered from the publications consulted, which included some of 
the oldest, most popular, and most renowned periodicals in the English-
speaking world. One may question whether such severe constraints do not 
restrict the relevance of this part of the study. The answer must be: to 
some degree, but not fatally. This optimistic appraisal is based on a 
belief that if a broad enough spectrum has been consulted - and this was 
available - major excursions abroad, or linguistic studies, would not 
only be totally impractical, but also provide greatly diminishing 
returns. 
The chosen constraint was to mark the farthest boundary of the 
examination of periodicals somewhat flexibly around 1980. Given that the 
intention of this study was not only academic interest, but also the 
stimulation of the study group it was felt that Chapter 4 should deal 
with current and easily absorbed issues rather than concentrating too 
heavily on entrenched past arguments. Making the beginning of the 1980s 
the boundary of the "modern era" may appear somewhat arbitrary given the 
absence of any landmark event. However, certain undercurrents in western 
subculture suggest this point as defensible. The circumstances 
surrounding the activists of the 1960s are only x degrees more relevant 
to today's activists than those of the 1860s. The resurgence of 
anarchism in the West in the 1960s, marked as it was by radical 
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optimism, societal wealth, and anti-Vietnam war zeal, had by the 1970s 
collapsed into the shadows behind the "red terrorists". The 1980s 
signified (for western European and North American anarchism at least) a 
new wave characterised by poverty, alienation, anarcho-punk, and the 
"greening" of politics. 
The emphasis of the periodicals' propagandistic immediacy is 
balanced by the Chapter SiS reflection on past events and earlier 
literature. What has gone before is not irrelevant, simply less 
immediate. The ideas of Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin are themselves 
regurgitated in revamped form by latter-day anarchists (who may not 
acknowledge, or even be aware of their intellectual debt). There is not 
much new under the sun for an ideology which, while having the capacity 
for complex theory, has at the same time a highly organic nature. 
Analyses are developed and revised to cope with the shifting societal 
facade, but modern anarchist propaganda relies on the same highly 
flexible anarchist fundamentals as used by the earlier theorists. 
Two of the research methods, postal questionnaires and personal 
interviewing, aimed to approach the study group - anarchists - at 
grassroots. It appeared unjustifiable to the researcher to pursue a 
study of anarchist attitudes without attempting to approach the 
individual activists and propagandists. Of all political and religious "; 
persuasions anarchism is perhaps the most insistent on the participation 
and contribution of all individuals; the doctrine which least desires to 
leave comment to spokesmen or representatives. Academics studying 
anarchism have, in the past, failed to grasp this interesting 
incongruity. 
In a study that seeks to discover the way that anarchists view 
violence and social change it would be paradoxical to start out by 
failing to consider those who might not have the ability or the desire 
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to express their thoughts in writing. Their literary incapacity does not 
make their opinion deserving of any less attention. As long as some 
viable means of uncovering individual anarchists and recording their 
opinions could be determined it was considered critical that this be 
done. 
Both postal questionnaires and personal interviewing were expected 
to throw up different, if correlative, data. The one method allowed the 
respondent a greater degree of reflection, and the second demanded 
immediate response, which might either come out as gut reaction or well-
rehearsed dogma. In this respect it was hoped that the postal 
questionnaire might plug the gap between freshness of interviewing and 
the depth of document analysis. Additionally, the theoretical time and 
cost efficiency of postal questionnaires was considerable in comparison 
with face-to-face interviewing; massive amounts of data could feasibly 
have been collected at a fraction of the inconvenience. A pilot mailed 
questionnaire study was initiated to discover problems with possible 
questionnaires and to determine response rates. The sample was 
constructed from those contacts who were either unavailable or unwilling 
to participate in personal interviews, and those who were a considerable 
distance from the researcher's base. 
The problems inherent in the postal questionnaire rapidly appeared 
while at this pilot stage. The set questions, no matter how well 
formulated, tended to emphasise the areas that the researcher thought 
important, rather than the respondent. If the aim of the grassroots 
studies was insight, then little of this could be gained while the 
direction of the questioning was determined in advance and fixed; the 
questionnaire left no room for the researcher to respond to the impulses 
of the informant. When a respondent did not appear to feel much interest 
in a question, the resulting response was brief and usually very 
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uninformative. A second possible cause of brief or seemingly 
inapplicable responses was confusion over a particular question _ a 
typical problem in the mailed qualitative format. A further cause for 
concern was that while the researcher had absolute control with the 
questions, he had absolutely no way of gauging how the questionnaire was 
approached by respondents: whether they spent a minute or several hours 
over it; whether they took it seriously or not; whether they wildly 
exaggerated responses or deliberately held back. While some of these 
problems might have been ironed out by further pilot studies, perhaps 
the most discouraging factor behind the decision to discontinue postal 
questionnaires was the extremely low response rate. Of twenty three 
questionnaires sent to ten different locations or groups, only three 
were returned. 
Interview Method 
Issues in the Choice of a Qualitative Interviewing Strategy 
The remaining field method was that of primarily semi-standardised 
and semi-directive qualitative personal interviews. The use of the 
qualitative interview in this field was both a necessity and a 
preference. Without becoming too embroiled in the theoretical merits of 
the quantitative interview - which can be found in more detail elsewhere 
(Mostyn, 1985; Bryman, 1984; McCracken, 1988) - the value of the 
qualitative interview to my purpose was apparent. As Kirk and Miller 
point out: 
Technically, a "qualitative observation" identifies the presence 
or absence of something, in contrast to "quantitative 
observation," which involves measuring the degree to which some 
feature is present (1986, p. 9). 
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This is not, as they point out, the real value of qualitative methods. 
Qualitative methods provide the researcher with the opportunity to 
exploit a flexible approach to work for greater depth and meaning in 
seeking attitudes. The interviewee responds to a flexible approach with 
greater insight than can be achieved by the rigid dictates of a 
quantitative method. In the words of McCracken, "Qualitative methods are 
most useful and powerful when they are used to discover how the 
respondent sees the world" (1988, p. 21). The benefits of qualitative 
methods are carefully balanced by its handicaps. While it provides depth 
and detail (or intensity), it has no expectation of determining 
frequency and proportion (or extent). This must be the sole domain of 
quantitative methods. In effect the interview study trades off the 
precision of quantitative methods for the "complexity capturing ability" 
of qualitative methods (McCracken, 1988, p. 16). 
There is no argument for a substantial quantitative element in 
this virgin study. The quantitative element is not immaterial, rather it 
cannot be a goal of the present researcher considering expense and 
incapacity. Quantitative and qualitative studies may be seen as 
different stages in a research field. For without initial qualitative 
research, a quantitative researcher will not know what to ask. The 
foundation must be laid before further development may commence. 
Therefore I ask "what?" and "why?" rather than "hoW much?" or "to what 
degree?" . 
In common with other fringe "subcultures" any future quantitative 
researcher will have great difficulty identifying the population from 
which to take a representative random sample. Even in more mainstream 
social identities such as divorcees (see Hart, 1976) there are seen to 
be immense obstacles in creating a sampling frame that will provide an 
unbiased random sample. It seems unlikely that anything approaching an 
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unbiased random sampling frame could ever be designed given the diverse 
nature of anarchism and the wide scattering of the adherents of its 
various forms; no national or international organisations predominate, 
no national registers of anarchists exist, and police files are no doubt 
quite incomplete. 
The value of field research depends on a combination of its 
validity and reliability. The emphasis of my qualitative method must 
stay deCisively on the validity side of this "objectivity equation." As 
in any initial study into a field there is need to set precedents. 
Comparability is "within study," or set against the findings of the 
document analysis. Reliability, meaning primarily replicability, lies 
with the quantitative side of the objectivity equation. As Kassarjian 
argues, "the reliability coefficient cannot be the sole criterion for 
the quality of a study" (1977, p. 14). At best one can assuage Kirk and 
Miller's (1986, p. 72) worries about the dismissal of reliability by 
qualitative researchers, by thorough documentation of research 
technique. 
Given the relative lack of stress that can be put upon the 
reliability element of the objectivity equation, attention is drawn to 
the validity element. The approach of the qualitative interview to the 
maximisation of validity is quite different to the quantitative method's 
dependence on attempting to make each interview procedure identical, 
from the wording of the questions to the physical distance between 
interviewer and respondent (Hyman, 1965, pp. 30-1; Kidder and Judd, 
1986, pp. 267-8). 
The qualitative interviewer, seeking to avoid the sterility of the 
laboratory con~rolled-experiment style, maximises validity by aiming at 
greater depth. This is achieved by making the interviewer/respondent 
relationship more balanced: by lessening the control of the interviewer. 
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Addressing interview effect is important, but not without weighing its 
minimisation against the development of rapport. 
The potential benefits of qualitative semi-standardised face-to-
face interviews over other methods of eliciting qualitative data _ even 
before this was confirmed in the pilot postal questionnaire study _ are 
decisive. Gorden (1975, pp. 75-6), and Kidder and Judd (1986, p. 225) 
outline similar conclusions: against the mailed questionnaire the semi-
standardised personal interview retains the important advantage of great 
flexibility. The questionnaire has fixed questions which maintain the 
asymmetrical relationship of interviewer and respondent; interviewees 
are given no opportunity to direct the interviewer into areas which they 
think might be relevant, so already a degree of insight is sacrificed. 
Secondly, the mailed questionnaire leaves no opportunity to notice and 
correct misunderstandings, to probe vague or confused answers and allay 
concerns. The personal interviewer in the semi-standardised interview 
notes the direction the interview is taking and if the informant 
digresses to the point of total irrelevance is at liberty to alter it. 
Thirdly, the interviewer may evaluate the validity of the interviewee's 
claims: whether they are expressing what they really feel, or whether 
they are trying to shock or impress. 
Whilst the telephone may, as Kidder and Judd (1986,_ pp. 226, 230) 
suggest, be the modern "method of choice," I am convinced that face-to-
face contact remains the most effective motivator for a respondent whose 
views might prove interesting to Special Branch's anti-subversion "Fn 
division. In this sense the reassurance of personal contact resembles 
that required by ethnographers who must tread very carefully to avoid 
total rejection (Spradley, 1979; Hyman, 1965, p. 25). unlike 
ethnographers, no minimally obtrusive participant- or nonparticipant-
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observation would have uncovered the attitudinal data the researcher 
sought. 
Interview Formats and Interviewer Effect 
The structuring of the interview study was the next consideration. 
Standardisation of the interviews was never really considered to be an 
option; full non-standardisation (non-directive interviewing) appeared 
likely to produce copious amounts of unusable data. The fully 
standardised interview best relates to quantitative research in that it 
aims to maximise reliability by making each questionnaire identical, and 
telling interviewers to follow set procedures to the letter. This is an 
attempt to minimise interviewer bias, and maintain the effect 
consistently at degree x. At the other end of the continuum the fully 
non-standardised interview is a voyage of discovery. Every interview 
develops as the interviewer sees fit both in terms of questions and 
schedule. The value of this maximal flexibility is enhanced detective 
powers to produce a "full" picture. Inversely commensurate with this 
flexibility is comparability. 
In recent years the most noticeable trend in qualitative styles is 
the individualisation of technique. Van Maanen et al. comment that, 
"increasingly fieldwork is regarded as a highly and almost hauntingly 
personal method for which no programmatic guides can be written" 
(Warren, 1988, p. 5). The interviewing technique of Measor, for 
instance, "developed intuitively and without methodological rigour." 
(1985, p. 55) There is nothing wrong with this technique as long as it 
is fully documented. However, I found it most helpful to enunciate some 
ground rules as quickly as possible. The most desirable format for the 
interview study was a synthesis of styles with as few constraints as 
deemed necessary to furnish the relevant data. Some degree of 
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comparability was desirable in order to make the study fluent. Given the 
due content analysis there was no reason why this should not be possible 
(Phillips, 1966, pp. 110-1). Certain questions told in slightly 
differing ways at different points in the interview may be adjudged to 
give comparable answers. Just so long as the variations are picked up in 
analysis and given weight in the report, if deemed pertinent. What this 
form of comparability cannot provide is any kind of quantitative 
conclusion. 
An awareness of how the interviewee liked to be questioned was 
rapidly apparent. Some respondents liked to answer questions directly 
and concisely. This may have made post-interview analysis easier, but it 
also have meant the overlooking of valuable insights. Others who 
rambled, treading outside the parameters of the question, made analysis 
more problematic, but at the same time provided greater richness, and 
gave the interviewer an idea of what was central to the informant. 
Allowing this rambling should not necessarily be seen as a control 
failure on the part of the interviewer. Limits were imposed on those 
informants whose interview agenda - the expression of their hyphenated 
form (particularly one pacifist and one syndicalist) - was barely even 
tangential to that of the interviewer. Leads suggested by informants' 
li~e of speech were on occasion not followed, and questions more 
relevant to the study were proffered. 
The initial interviewing strategy was to allow the use of a non-
directive style with unstructured questions, to be supplemented by semi-
structured questioning to mop-up specifics. The initial use of 
unstructured questions, a non-directive style, uses the interviewer as a 
prompt rather than an interrogator (Kidder and Judd, 1986, pp. 277-8; 
Merton, Fiske and Kendall, 1956, pp. 12-5). This style was most likely 
to produce the "Grand Tour" of a subject, linking aspects in the way 
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that the interviewee saw best (Spradley, 1979, p. 86). Non-directive 
interviewing is used extensively in psychological or anthropological 
investigations where the most client-centred techniques are required to 
produce, "psychological studies in human motivations and satisfactions 
with a culture" (Rogers, 1945, p. 282). It was hoped some respondents 
might be both disciplined and expressive enough that an essentially non-
directive interview eliciting pertinent data with the minimum of 
interviewer stimuli might take place. However, given the limited data 
goals of the research there was never any doubt that a back-up of semi-
structured questions would need to be carefully prepared. It seemed 
probable that many respondents willing to share their attitudes would 
require a foundation upon which to build. It would have been equally 
pointless to continue along the non-directive lines of "What feelings do 
you have towards the use of violence?" to a respondent who cannot grasp 
this abstraction, as to present a more eloquent interviewee questions 
requiring "yes" or "no" answers. 
It was clear from an early stage in the interviewing that a non-
directive approach was not producing nearly enough of the "right ll kind 
of data. A primarily semi-directive interviewing style, prepared in 
anticipation of such an eventuality, took over in order to encourage the 
unengaged or reticent majority to expand, and those with a strong urge 
to discuss wholly removed subjects to return to more relevant areas. The 
primary tools of the interviews were, then, semi-structured questions. A 
semi-structured question may be either response free or stimulus free 
(Merton, Fiske and Kendall, 1956, p. 15-7). The researcher used a set 
chiefly of stimulus structured, response free questions; for instance, 
"Where do you stand on the use of violence as a political tool of 
anarchists?" This allowed the respondent to answer however they please 
in a specified portion of the subject area. 
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The consequence of pursuing a policy of semi-directive response 
free questioning is that the interviewees remain responsible for the 
relevance of their responses. Kidder and Judd describe the responses to 
open-ended questioning as, "frequently self-contradictory, 
incomprehensible, or irrelevant" (1986, p. 249). This is undeniable, but 
even an interview riddled with self-contradictory, incomprehensible or 
irrelevant responses may be valuable to a qualitative study. It suggests 
a number of possibilities. The respondent may have no logical way to 
express his argument, or misunderstood the questions, or is perhaps 
expressing a logical line of thinking which the analyst simply fails to 
understand. Interpretation of confusing data is part and parcel of 
content analysis. Having said this, the researcher found no alternative 
other than to use some structured questions, for instance "Can mature 
anarchy develop within one generation?", when no opportunity arose to 
initiate the subject by indirect means. 
It is common to decry the use of leading questions in qualitative 
research: "Questions should be phrased so that they contain no 
suggestion as to the appropriate response" (Cannell and Kahn, 1953, p. 
346). Leading questions are seen to indicate to the respondent a 
preferred answer. One context where this might not be so is where 
interviewees possess what they consider to be controversial attitudes or 
behaviour (paedophilia, race prejudice, etc.) and are reluctant to 
acknowledge this for fear of the interviewer's disapproval (Gorden, 
1975, p. 358-65; in all other cases Gorden concludes that leading 
questions can at best have a neutral effect, and at worst create major 
distortion). The very nature of being a self-proclaimed anarchist means 
an express acknowledgment of an intellectual position outside of 
accepted political norms. Therefore, only when a respondent cannot 
understand what is needed and the researcher cannot immediately conceive 
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of alternative wording for a question does it seem justified to proffer 
suggested answers. In practice leading questions were only used as 
motivators, and never in any areas of crucial significance. 
The scheduling of the interviews in order to fit the semi-
directive semi-structured questioning could not be made too rigid. 
Without being too dogmatic, the way I sought to initiate an area of 
attention was by 'funnelling down' from general to specifics. Questions 
on specifics might already have been covered in more general 
questioning, in which case there was no need to repeat them. However, 
even the most expansive conversationalist may not have covered all the 
specifics, for instance, on the role of terrorism. Mopping up these was 
a necessity to aid comparability (Phillips, 1966, p. 118). An 
alternative, thought useful by Kahn and Cannell (1957, p. 160) and 
Gorden (1975, pp. 417-20) in "warming-up" respondents, is an inversion 
of the funnel. This was not found to be of tremendous value by the 
researcher. 
The final style of questioning considered to be of possible value 
was, for want of a better word, challenging. This technique involves the 
introduction of a challenge to the interviewee when there is need for 
clarification of confused data, or an apparent glaring inconsistency 
either between responses or with external fact. This was only done at 
the end of interviews. Clearly data obtained after the challenge could 
not be viewed in the same light as that obtained beforehand. To do so 
would be to completely ignore massive interviewer stimulus. 
Challenging may be intrusive, but should be seen firstly as an 
attempt to clarify contradictory and irrational testimony and not as an 
attempt to change an informant's consciousness. Challenging is also an 
attempt to ascertain how strongly respondents hold their position when 
faced with common arguments against their assertions. These take the 
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form of "What about the argument that says ... ," rather than 
confrontation. The point here was not to be clever, to score points 
against the respondents, nor to persuade them to take a different 
stance. The point was merely to uncover the depth to which their 
convictions were held. For a respondent to refute the challenge without 
logical reply was as valid as retorting with a secure defence, or 
capitulation to a revision of position. As Lummis notes, respect for 
one's informant involves treating them as people "capable of debate and 
discussion and not as ... oracle[s] whose message cannot be queried" 
(1987, pp. 68-9). This style was used progressively less through the 
study as the interviewer became less confident that data it was 
providing was of value. 
The emphasis of the qualitative method used is very firmly on the 
validity side of the objectivity equation. However, it is necessary, for 
the sake of not only of reliability but also validity that interviewer 
effect be addressed. A thorough examination and explanation of possible 
interviewer effect is as useful as concrete attempts at standardising 
interviewer bias. 
An advantage of the researcher as sole interviewer is that the 
researcher understands fully what is to be gathered and how he intends 
to procure it. ~rthermore there is no inter-interviewer variability 
such as found in Riches' 1929 study on the causes of poverty (Kidder and 
Judd, 1986, p. 271; though this is not to say that the researcher will 
act the same way at each interview). The down-side for the multi-role 
researcher is an inability to stand back, and a possible tendency, 
unconsciously or otherwise, to be blind to data contradictory to his 
hypotheses. 
A prevalent problem in interview effect is the imparting of too 
much of the interviewer's knowledge to a respondent. This may not only 
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be, as Gorden suggests, a "temptation to impress" (1975, 5) p. 1, but 
also in order to facilitate by giving examples which the respondent may 
be more familiar with. Even in this way, it was considered best kept to 
a minimum as it ran too high a risk of intimidating the respondent. 
Given that the capture of the logic and terminology of the interviewee 
is important to qualitative research, the interviewer had similarly to 
avoid "active listening" (McCracken, 1988, p. 2~). This is interpreting 
the words of the respondent and running it past them, as in, "what 
you're trying to say is .... " This, as MCCracken points out, is trying to 
make the respondent conform to the logic and terminology of the 
interviewer. 
The significance of the effect of the interviewer's appearance or 
style of speech in research of this nature was not considered to be as 
important as in studies on racial prejudice or social class, nor as 
insignificant as a survey on biscuit preference. Respondents had to be 
confident that the interviewer was not from Special Branch, nor someone 
attempting a hatchet-job. The interviewer stressed before the 
commencement of each interview that it consisted of questions of 
attitude rather than behaviour. This emphasis was found to be very 
important in gaining the full cooperation of at least one respondent, 
who had stated over the telephone that he might have to refuse to answer 
certain questions. 
Appearance is likely to raise certain expectations, if not 
prejudices, in any slightly controversial qualitative study (Gorden, 
1975, pp. 215-28; Hyman, 1975, pp. ~38-70; Measor, 1985, pp. 58-6~). "A 
degree of self-consciousness over self-presentation" is encouraged by 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1983, pp. 78-80). Dressing or acting to please 
one's informant (or what one expects one's informant will like) can 
produce otherwise hidden information (Measor, 1985). At the same time 
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mistaken dressing-up or down can have negative results. Whyte (1955) 
found that attempts to bring himself in line with one group of subjects 
by swearing were seen as transgressions from someone who was not 
expected to swear. 
It was considered a prudent policy in this study to appear and 
talk as one normally would. This precluded any need to create a front, 
and avoided the risk of condescension to prejudices of what the 
anarchist interviewee would like. The interviewer appeared, then, as a 
casually dressed male in his mid-twenties, of oriental appearance, with 
a southern English accent. 
Crucial to the awareness of potential bias is the accurate 
recording of the interview. The most accurate method of recording is by 
tape-recording. Providing the interviewee has no objections, the tape-
recorder provides a verbatim account. In defence of tool-free 
interviewing Kidder and Judd (1986, pp. 173-5) say "you will probably be 
surprised how much you can remember," from an hour-long interview. 
Equally surprising is what you may have forgotten. In addition the tape-
recorder allows the interviewer to concentrate on interviewing rather 
taking notes or trying to remember the details. This is not to say that 
use of tapes was problem-free. Softly spoken interviewees were often 
practically inaudible, and on more than one occasion the tape ran out 
and had to be turned in the middle of significant responses. 
Interpretation, as the major factor in content analysis, is a 
greatest source of possible bias. One could simply report interviews 
without interpretation, but this, as Mostyn argues, very much handicaps 
the qualitative approach's claim to profundity (1985, pp. 139-41). On 
the one hand the use of a multi-role researcher does mean that it there 
is only one intervention on the data. On the other confidentiality may 
57 
-j 
require that no other primary interpretation be made of the interview 
data. 
Protecting the Interests, Confidentiality, and Anonymity of the 
Informants 
In a qualitative interview setting it is valuable for the reader 
to possess a certain degree of knowledge about the subjects as scene 
setting, or, as Hymes has it, as a mark of respect for the culture of 
the subject (1981, p. 124). Balanced with this is a concern for the 
protection of the informant. Any interview involves what Boruch and 
Cecil describe as "a depreciation of privacy" (1979, p. 3). Researchers 
are obliged to treat data they obtain, both about the respondents and 
their opinions, with respect and caution so that it is not used to the 
detriment of the sources. Not only is the misuse of information likely 
to be harmful to the respondent but also to the researcher who may 
lessen the likelihood of later research subjects responding, or 
responding truthfully. 
An assurance of some degree of confidentiality is one way of 
minimising the concerns of respondents. Boruch and Cecil's overview of 
this ethic concludes that: 
the data support the idea that an explicit promise of 
confidentiality is typically influential for a minority of 
respondents in social research, that a promise will at times be 
insufficient condition for obtaining respondents' cooperation, and 
that if an assurance is breached and the fact becomes well known, 
the quality of research data will be degraded (1979, p. 90). 
Mishler argues that confidentiality is sometimes not in the interest of 
informants, especially in ethnography and social anthropology, as this 
maintains the researcher/researched asymmetry by decontextualising the 
data from the informant. By this informants are "deprived of their own 
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voices" (Mishler, 1986, p. 125). Indeed the option of identification 
be seen as a right of the subject (Paget, 1983; Hymes, 1981). 
Absolute confidentiality, then, is not of overriding importance in 
access to data and the respondents' best interests. Rather, it is the 
creation of confidence in the respondent that information should not be 
used against them. The most effective ways found to reassure respondents 
were a guarantee that the study did not cover behaviour, and commitments 
to protect their identities to whatever degree they felt comfortable 
with. 
Full assurances were given as to the nature of the study such that 
all respondents appeared generally confident that there was nothing 
underhand about the interview and the aims of the research behind it. A 
number appeared prepared to cooperate with the barest of information: 
that the researcher was an academic, and the interview inquired into 
their attitudes towards anarchism, violence, and social change. Such 
keenness indicates either a belief in the lack of sensitivity of the 
information to be dispensed, or a degree of naivety as to the extent to 
which security services will go to collect information. 
Most were quite keen to be identified to a large degree, though 
few were keen to be referred to other than by their first name. Had 
there appeared a problem in eliciting a free flow of information from 
the interviewees full anonymity would have been necessary. As it was, 
only one respondent considered it a prerequisite of full cooperation. 
From the respondent's point of view there is no way of ensuring 
absolute confidentiality and anonymity. The respondent should be aware 
that if he or she has been approached, that the researcher could well be 
lying about their motive and intent. Restricting the kind of information 
gathered (i.e. to all intents and purposes non-incriminating), combined 
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with honesty, reassurances, and rapport is the only effective means of 
allaying concern. 
The actual nature of the questioning makes the process less 
threatening to the interviewees. While the answers to behavioural 
questions could obviously be used against an identifiable individual, 
most respondents recognised that expression of political ideas had less 
likelihood of police attention. All of the anarchist respondents were 
openly acknowledged anarchists, and their attitudinal responses on paper 
are little more incriminating than thoughts expressed in the pub. This 
is not, however, to say that there is no perceived risk in expressing 
anti-state sentiments. 
The American Association of Public Opinion Research's Code of 
Professional Ethics and Practices states: 
We shall protect the anonymity of every respondent, unless the 
respondent waives such anonymity for specified uses. In addition 
we shall hold as privileged and confidential all information that 
tends to identify the respondent (Bower & de Gasparis, 1978, p. 
23) . 
It is on this basis that biographical information about the respondents 
will be given. Unfortunately, given that some anarchist groups are very 
small, even minor biographical information, such as that the respondent 
writes for a certain periodical may identify the individual to fellow 
members. No study dealing with a such a small fraction of society, can 
avoid this without omitting all biographical information (and this, as 
stated above, produces a rather sterile result). No respondent claimed 
to be concerned about this, though one thought there might be some minor 
embarrassment if comments he made about a different anarchist group were 
attributed to him. On the whole there was little concern about being 
identified to fellow anarchists, the public, or the police. Two 
informants actually encouraged the use of their real names, one 
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apparently because he felt safer being known to the public and the 
police, rather than just the police! 
From the researcher's point of view it is always wise to err on 
the side of caution. In this case it is not outside the realms of 
possibility that in a time of unrest anarchists should be interned for 
words rather than deeds. For this reason, biographical information that 
has some bearing on identification is revealed on a need-to-know basis. 
Informants are identified by first name, most of which are pseudonyms in 
any case. No indication as to the location of the respondents is given, 
but information as to their group membership is given. 
The Infor.mants 
It must at this point be reiterated that the point of the 
interview study was not to produce some kind of consistent replicable 
overview of anarchists' stances in relation to violence and social 
change. The aim was to gain an insight into the way that individual 
anarchists think about these issues, what they think, and what they 
don't think. The sample, even at the pilot size that was within the time 
and financial capacity of the researcher, renders details about 
grassroots attitudes which no amount of document analysis by previous 
students in the field of anarchism has been able to. 
The small sample of apparently diverse interview subjects was made 
up by what can best be described as haphazard methods (in terms of 
possible bias), as employed by such as Bott (1971), Boulton (1983), and 
Leonard (1980). Bott, studying family networks, gained the majority of 
her contacts by liaising through maternity and child welfare clinics, 
G.P.s, schools and friends around London. Boulton's study of mothers 
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sampled from two areas, one working class and one middle class, in 
London. Leonard took her sample of married couples from ministers' and 
registrars' registers in Swansea (her home town) for reasons of finance 
and convenience. 
In deciding who to interview the major consideration was less the 
accumulation of large numbers as the covering of as wide an arc of the 
anarchist spectrum as possible. This consideration seemed most likely, 
given time and financial factors, to give the widest divergences of 
opinion. Thus the researcher hoped to come across willing anarchist 
communists, anarcho-pacifists, anarcho-syndicalists, anarcho-punks, 
green anarchists, anarcho-pacifists and anarchist individualists. In 
covering the wide range of stances it was expected that borderline 
anarchist/socialists and anarchist/liberals would present themselves. 
These, along with those who were ex-anarchists, and fellow-travelling 
non-anarchists were to be regarded as important sources. 
There were several ways of acquiring interview subjects. The 
first, and most likely to produce the greatest diversity was an attempt 
to detect the national and regional anarchist organisations and 
interview at least one active member. The British possibilities were: 
Direct Action Movement (D.A.M. is the British affiliate of the 
International Workers' Association), Anarchist Communist Federation, 
Class War Federation, Anarchist Workers Group (later Socialism From 
Below), Federation of Anarcho-Pacifists, Class Struggle Anarchist 
Network, and South West Anarchist Network. The American possibilities, 
given the expense of widespread contact, were fewer: Anarchist Youth 
Federation, Industrial Workers of the World (the I.W.W. is not so much 
an anarchist organisation as an organisation with anarchist elements), 
and North West Anarchist Collective. Each organisation was contacted 
initially by post, for them to cooperate by proffering candidates as 
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they saw fit. Anarchist periodical publishers and their contributors, 
and pamphlet propagandists were also approached. The papers approached 
were (avoiding replication of papers produced by national 
organisations): Black Flag, Green Anarchist, Freedom, Wind Chill Factor, 
Profane EXistence, and Ego. Thirdly, anarchist bookshops were contacted. 
Fourthly, contacts were established with anarchists in various cities by 
personal enquiry. 
The sample size of seventeen is not impressive compared to those 
found in survey research. However, it must be kept in mind that this 
pilot qualitative work aims at capturing particular detail rather than 
quantity. Boulton's sample of fifty, Bott's of twenty families, or 
Leonard's of fifty couples, are insignificant in percentage terms, but 
this is irrelevant to the goals of their studies which were to produce 
internally valid analyses, not replicable representations. 
One need not, in any case, be too worried by the size of the 
sample. The quasi-anarchist Class War has in the past claimed a 
readership of up to 12,000 (This is Class War, 1991, p. 4), Green 
Anarchist something around 2,000, Direct Action has 500-1000. At a 
generous guesstimate there are perhaps 20,000 people in Britain today 
who might call themselves anarchists (though for many this might be 
little more than an attractive label). Estimates for North America are oj 
more difficult to ascertain. One of the few reasonably reliable figures 
I could find being the I.W.W.'s membership of 1,200 in 1989 (Loving, 
1989, p. 27). Given such small numbers seventeen is not an negligible 
sample. 
The sample that eventually emerged contains the diversity 
necessary to justify it. At least one member of each of the existing 
British national organisations was a source, and several of the 
informants sought to be interviewed as representatives of their 
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organisation rather than solely as individuals. Of the fifteen self-
declared anarchist respondents, there were two anarcho-syndicalists 
(Albert and Alan), one class struggle anarchist (Rob), one anarchist-
communist (Kevin), four were anarcho-pacifists (Tom, John, Eric, and 
Seamus), and one a green anarchist (Phil). Six did not hyphenate 
themselves (Ian, Biff, Harvey, Jim, Brendan, and Neil). In addition 
there were two ex-anarchist informants, one having drifted towards a 
more Marxist oriented libertarian communism (Alex) and the other firmly 
ensconced in egoism (Stan). The respondents varied in age from the 
veteran (Albert), to the middle-aged (Kevin, John), to twenties (Alan, 
Brendan), to teens (Neil, Ian). Due to financial constraints all of the 
respondents came from Britain or the u.S. Unfortunately neither of the 
two female contacts were eventually interviewed, one because of 
unavailability and the other because she did not think she had much to 
say on the issue. 
One can only provide an informed guess as to how representative 
this combination is. The preliminary report of a Freedom readership 
survey (9/1/93; keeping in mind the more high-brow/stuffy reputation of 
Freedom) found that of the 79 respondents who deemed themselves 
anarchists (out of the first one hundred), 21 called themselves 
anarchist-communists, 14 green anarchists, 7 anarcho-pacifists, 12 
anarcho-syndicalists, and 13 individualists. Only 5 were women. My own 
experience would lead me to believe that an over-representative number 
of anarcho-pacifists and an under-representative number of anarchist 
communists have been consulted for the present study. But again, this 
has only a minor bearing on the production of the qualitative data 
sought. 
Out of those I hoped to be able to contact and interview there are 
a few notable omissions. The Class Struggle Anarchist Network collapsed 
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in the course of the research through lack of activism. The leading 
activist, while initially keen to cooperate, moved out of active 
anarchist politics before an interview was finalised. The South West 
Anarchist Network, Anarchist Youth Federation, and Industrial Workers of 
the World failed to respond beyond initial contact. The most Significant 
failure was successful contact with individualist anarchists. Given 
their tendency not to identify with groups, plus their minority status 
and a particularly low profile in Britain, the procuring of an 
individualist had not seemed very likely at the beginning of the search. 
No British periodical that the researcher came across took an 
individualistic editorial line (the producer of the small irregular 
Minus One and Ego had actually abandoned anarchism for non-anarchist 
egoism); a less thorough investigation of American series found none 
that did not fit more comfortably with philosophical anarchism, green 
anarchism, or anarcho-capitalism. One self-proclaimed individualist 
anarchist did agree to be interviewed (one of only two females 
contacted) but was unavailable at any convenient time. 
The two most notable (i.e. published) anarcho-pacifists approached 
refused to be interviewed for different reasons. One felt that 
interviews left "far too much scope for misunderstanding"; the second 
was chronically ill and thus unavailable. The producers of Freedom and 
staff of the Freedom Bookshop although proving helpful in other ways, 
did not render any interviews. Several letters produced no reply, and on 
a personal visit to the books hop one of their veterans refused on the 
grounds that a subsection in one of his books said all that he had to 
say on the subject. The only philosophical anarchist approached also 
declined because, as might be expected, he felt he didn't have much to 
say on the matter. 
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From the omissions that have been forced upon the interview study 
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perhaps the most valuable observation is that the most intellectual, 
literature-minded anarchists have been the least willing to be 
interviewed. They have been able to point to their own writings on the 
subject as substitute, and some have expressed perhaps justified anxiety 
about corruption of these expressions in interviews. Faced with these 
omissions, the researcher must estimate how compromised the interview 
study is. In order to calculate the importance of the omissions one goes 
back to the two purposes of the interview study: to cover as broad a 
swathe as possible from the anarchist spectrum to provide the 
opportunity for insight from as many positions as possible; and also to 
give expression to those anarchists whose views are not normally aired. 
Inevitably one has to say that the fullest coverage of the 
anarchist spectrum has not been achieved. This refers not only to 
individualist anarchists, but also to other permutations such as pan-
destructionists. In defence it must be remarked that only massive 
resources of time and money, unavailable to the present researcher, 
could have changed this situation. The reader must be aware of this 
flaw, but also that it is not a fatal one. 
The interview study as a snapshot of contemporary anarchist 
opinion gives a taste of what exists at the grassroots level. The 
shortcoming that this snapshot does not get everyone in the picture is 
ameliorated by the probability that the linkage to primary literature in 
the shape of periodicals and pamphlets will go some way to covering the 
missing areas. It is perhaps lucky that the least easy to find are 
(though not exclusively so) the more cerebral anarchists who have 
produced a healthy amount of literature. 
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CHAPTER 3 INTERVIEW STUDY 
The Basis of the Infor.mants· Anarchism 
When asked to summarise what anarchism signified for them, the 
themes that emerged from the respondents polarised around the areas of 
environmentalism, working class empowerment, and social and economic 
justice. The initial two themes maintained extremely partisan support 
between on the one hand the "greener" interviewees, and on the other the 
workerists. These two tendencies did not appear to share their 
supporters to any significant degree. Indeed there was a noticeable 
degree of mutual disapproval. The environmentally-minded respondents 
berated class-minded workerists for maintaining an ideology based on the 
expectation of progressive economic expansion and infinite resources; 
the workerist informants chided green anarchists for turning their back 
on capitalism rather than confronting it, and trying to return to a 
mythical harmonious rustic past. 
Recent years have seen a considerable degree of intellectual and 
activist traffic flowing both ways. between anarchism and 
environmentalism. Interest in environmentalism may be a relatively 
modern anarchist phenomenon, but easily follows in the more idealist 
anarchist tradition. Many of the mid to late twentieth century social 
questions have drawn in anarchists not entirely convinced by the 
workerist argument that class struggle is the essence of anarchism. 
Anarchists have been heavily involved in the anti-nuclear movement from 
the 1950s to the 1980s, in feminism, and the animal rights movement. The 
most recent hyphenation, green anarchism, is a combination of anti-
consumerism, environmentalism, and lifestylism, with the belief that the 
eco-crisis is best resolved by a devolved anarchist mode: 
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As I see it, at the moment, everything revolves around 
... compell~ng :veryone to work for forty hours a week. Many are in 
rather men1al Jobs and there's no satisfaction in the work that 
they're doing. And the end products, really, is a lot of mass-
produced rubbish .... And I really think that people's talents and 
energy ought to be sort of utilised into an area that creates 
things of real worth and value (Tom). 
Basically I don't see a society which is hierarchic ... and which 
sees thing~ as, like, objects to be exploited, whether they be 
people, an1mals, or the earth, is a viable or sustainable one 
(Phil) . 
The particular anarchist solution expressed by the green interviewees 
was vocally divergent from that of the workerist mainstream. Capitalism 
was not to be seen as the root of all evil, rather, any form of mass 
society: 
I think that ... for me it's a case of perhaps going back in time 
slightly ... to an era or some sort of period when people were 
valued more than they are today (Tom). 
. .. by maintaining a system of mass production you maintain a 
system of mass, and that means you have to maintain a system of 
hierarchical control over it. That's simple, basic, and obvious 
managerial fact. We have to get rid of the mass society that makes 
exploitation inevitable. And basically that's where Green 
Anarchist would differ from the majority of other perspectives 
advanced in the anarchist milieu today (Phil). 
. .. a lot of the classic anarchism is derived from nineteenth 
century myths of progress and technological advancement which 
necessitates a broad base of resources to maintain it and maintain 
the diversity of goods available to it. Clearly such production 
has to be coordinated, and that requires coordinators, and that in 
turn requires a hierarchy. And· that is intrinsically anti-
anarchist (Phil). 
... the assumption is that t~e only problem with the existing 
society is that capitalists control it. That's not good enough. As 
I say, you're looking at irrevocable changes in the atmosphere 
within the next decade. That's a direct product of the existing 
means of production, whether controlled by capitalists or not 
(Phil) . 
The workerist respondents, anarcho-syndicalists and class struggle 
anarchists, perceived their anarchism as part of the historic tradition 
of that part of anarchism which parallels revolutionary socialism. Alan, 
who moved from a Labour Party background to anarcho-syndicalism, and Rob 
who drifted from the Revolutionary Communist Party to Class War shared 
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the eventual goal of revolutionary socialists and communists 
, but 
rejecting their vanguardism as patronisingly unnecessary. The 
workerists, then, saw anarchism as the best solution to working class 
subjugation under capitalism: 
Class struggle means you ... look at the distribution of wealth 
and power in society .... Some people are very rich and powerful, 
and some are very poor and have no power and control over their 
own lives (Rob). 
I think nowadays I'd see my attachment to anarchism as being more 
to do with the insistence it puts on workers themselves making 
social change, rather than my attachment to anarchism as 
previously, simply being an expression of far-left politics 
(Alan) . 
The workerist informants caricatured the more environmentally-
minded anarchists as Luddites trying to turn back the hands of time: You 
get people like the green anarchists who are virtual fascists, who want 
to destroy machinery" (Rob). To some extent this criticism reflects the 
embarrassment the workerists feel at the Marxist characterisation of the 
anarchist as a backward-looking petit-bourgeois. 
The appeal of anarchism as a means of redressing social and 
economic injustice encompassed the range of respondents, not least those 
whose agendas were not ultimately tied to environmental or class issues. 
Anarchism was seen by the respondents as a solution to practically all 
the asymmetries existing under the present order of things, be it 
economic imbalance, lack of educational opportunity, racism, sexism, or 
speciesism: 
I'm an anarchist because I've always looked round the world and 
there's a lot of things wrong with this place (Rob) . 
... it's a loose commitment to social justice, a commitment to the 
idea of community, a commitment to the idea of equality - though 
that needs to be qualified - and freedom (Kevin). 
Why I'm an anarchist is because I want to see a world in which 
human beings can achieve their full humanity, in the sense 
of ... being fully formed (Kevin). 
I was brought up ... I suppose, with a strong leaning towards social 
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justice. That is, the rights of the working class, the poor, to 
take what they could to improve their lot (Alan). 
The desire to see a just end is tempered, at least in one case, by an 
appeal to love of fellow being, and persuasive and just means: "I think 
the essential components of anarchism is .•. are the areas of compassion 
and caring" (Torn). 
The Informants' Expectations and Goals 
With the failure of the researcher to interview a self-proclaimed 
philosophical anarchist, it was no surprise to find that all the 
respondents registered a belief in the feasibility of a mature anarchic 
society (mature in the sense of conforming to an acceptable degree to 
the ideal form of the respondent). The one interviewee who expressed 
mixed opinions on this question was also, inconsistently, sceptical 
about the capacity of human sociability. The failure of conscious 
revolutionaries to maintain their level of commitment permanently, and 
the apparent lack of concern amongst ordinary people about issues of 
global importance meant to him an uncertainty over the ability of 
humanity to throw off the shackles of irresponsibility and selfishness. 
All but one of the respondents who expressed an opinion believed 
there was value in discussing the necessary pre-conditions for social 
transformation (the process of massive societal rearrangement). The one 
dissenter dismissed such discussion as idle speculation. Otherwise there 
was agreement that the kind of major dislocations that have sparked the 
principal twentieth century revolutions would produce only more 
disappointment unless the people favoured anarchy. People would want 
anarchy when they came to a "realisation," became "conscious," or were 
"educated." There was an informal idealist/materialist division over 
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whether consciousness could best be raised by example or experience. The 
differences mostly formed over whether people's realisation would come 
more from the acceptance of anarchist ideology regardless of the 
material conditions, or from material conditions forcing people to look 
for a better way of living. The people who needed to undergo this 
realisation were variously described as "the working class, II lithe poor," 
lithe vast majority,lI or "people." In all circumstances the respondents 
indicated that the vast majority of the population - on a global if not 
national scale - required a change in consciousness if revolutionary 
change was to be secured. 
The most positive appraisals of the likelihood of social 
transformation were heard from the partisans of environmental necessity 
and working class potency. The argument posited by Phil that anarchy was 
likely within a definite timescale was tempered by his belief that 
humanity faced the choice of anarchy or chaos: 
Interviewer: Do you see the development of a social revolution 
within your lifetime? 
Phil: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, as far as I can see it, either 
we're going to have a situation of complete social chaos when the 
resources ... sorry, allocation of resources breaks down and becomes 
blatantly inegalitarian, or people are gonna take control of the 
production of their own resources as a way of preventing that. One 
way or another it's gonna happen within the next thirty years. 
This view was consistent with Phil's belief in the auto-destructiveness 
of the prevailing economic norms. With the above exception, none of the 
other respondents looked at present conditions and found anything to be 
particularly positive about. Even the two other respondents hopeful of 
change in the foreseeable future were optimistic only in as much as they 
could marginalise present material indicators. Two supporters of the 
D.A.M. gave positive responses: 
I think it's always been possible within a year or two. It's 
always been possible (Albert). 
I think in my lifetime it's quite practical we'll have a social 
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revolution; we'll get rid of capitalism, and we'll live in a 
society that is run by the workers (Alan). 
No explanation was forthcoming from Alan for his optimism. His statement 
simply reflected a tacit faith in the working class that is apparent 
throughout his responses. Where several respondents sought to e~hasise 
their pessimism because of the obvious present weakness of anarchists, 
or working class disinterest in revolutionary issues, Alan put forward 
an optimism founded not on material conditions, but rather on the 
revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Similarly, the reason why 
revolution has always been possible for Albert is because the working 
class has been, and still is, in a constant struggle with the ruling 
class. 
Several of the respondents who could not foresee a move towards 
the development of anarchism noted that their judgement was based on the 
likelihood of continuity between present and future conditions. While 
hoping to appear realistic in the face of empirical evidence, they did 
not close the door entirely on the possibility of rapid unforeseen 
circumstances taking a hand in creating massive instability. Three of 
the respondents noted the possibility of economic crisis. Unlike Phil 
they did not express this crisis in terms of an inevitable environmental 
time-bomb. Rather, they saw it as part of the boom-slump cycle gone out 
of control: 
Interviewer: Do you foresee the development of a social revolution 
in the near future? 
Kevin: If I was to be honest I would say no .... No ... who can say? 
I mean, Lenin himself - I think - said in 1916 that he didn't 
expect to see a revolution in his lifetime, and fortunately -
perhaps unfortunately - he was wrong. I don't know. I think how we 
perceive the situation is ... is a real deepening of economic, 
social, and political problems in Britain .... Whether that would 
bring about the social revolution is difficult to say. 
Interviewer: Do you foresee the development of a social revolution 
in the near future? 
Rob: Ooh. It depends how bad things get .... Revolutions only 
happen when people are literally having bread riots. It's only 
then that they've realised that theY've got nothing left to 
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lose .••• Things aren't near bread riots in this count.ry, but they 
are getting pretty run down here. 
While they dare not believe that revolutionary social change will begin 
in their lifetimes, they are careful to peruse local and global events 
for evidence of the emergence of revolutionary conditions. While the 
traditional indicator, economic stability, predominates the discussion, 
one informant cast the net somewhat wider: 
Interviewer: Do you foresee the development of a social revolution 
leading to anarchy in the near future? 
Eric: Only if things get much worse. Nuclear catastrophe, severe 
energy crisis, AIDS •.. 
Eric's anarcho-pacifist stance toward imminent revolutionary change was 
very negative. In the foreseeable future, given that people were 
unlikely to have been persuaded of the rationality and compassion of 
anarchism, only massive dislocation, death, and destruction could herald 
primitive anarchy. The tenor of his responses indicated he did not look 
on any such accelerated path with relish. Although anarcho-pacifists 
eschew the traditional conception of revolutionary upheaval, this does 
not mean that they all reject entirely the possibility of the 
commencement of a path of radical change presently. One anarcho-pacifist 
respondent did not discount social revolution - the gradual supersession 
of state by counter-culture, as he saw it - in his lifetime (John). 
The remaining respondents expressed no doubt that the social 
revolution was not going to happen soon: 
Interviewer: Can you foresee the social revolution in the near 
future? 
Biff: Yeah definitely! No! 
Interviewer: Can you foresee the social revolution in the near 
future? 
Harvey: No. Not in the near future ... being realistic about it. 
Interviewer: Do you foresee the development of a ... of anarchy, in 
the positive sense, in the near future? 
Tom: No I don't. I'm extremely pessimistic. Because the really 
influential people obviously have no desire to have things 
altered .•.. And the tragedy and irony of it is ••. is that ordinary 
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people at the grassroots level, they just accept all the shit 
that's given them ... 
Interviewer: Do you foresee the d 1 f 
J eve opment 0 a social revolution in the near future? 
Ian: I see the development of revolutionary elements, and I see a 
lot of unrest among large urban working classes which has 
revolutionary potential. 
Interviewer: Do you see an actual social revolution coming about 
in the near future? 
Ian: A full social revolution? No. 
These interviewees responded both to the failure of anarchist movements 
to make a significant enough impact on current thinking, and the absence 
of global popular unrest by totally discounting the idea of significant 
change. It is important to note that unlike some of the earlier 
respondents, they found no need to make their statements conditional. 
Their stance was to their mind being thoroughly realistic. 
As the anarcho-pacifist informants agreed that stable anarchy is 
the result of the persuasion of more or less everybody of the value of 
that condition, they all concluded that the completion of the process of 
change was not likely within the lifetime of the initial instigators: 
Interviewer: Could a full anarchist society emerge in the space of 
one lifetime? 
Tom: No, I don't think it could. Because it's taken centuries to 
achieve what we've got, and what we've got is pretty horrendous! 
So, no, over several generations. 
certainly not in my lifetime. New paradigm thinking takes 
time to fructify (John). 
None of the anarcho-pacifists thought that there was any chance of them 
witnessing anything resembling a stable anarchic society except in 
localised communities. They were not alone in this belief. Four of the 
other respondents rejected the idea that mature anarchy (as they defined 
it) could emerge in one generation: 
It's gonna take hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of years, you 
know. It's like one of those things that has to go on forever. And 
then maybe a couple of centuries down the line all of a sudden we 
have a really beautiful society, you know. I'm never gonna see a 
beautiful society (Brendan). 
I have a feeling that it will take at least two or three 
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[generations]. Just because the social ... the awakening of people 
toward anarchy will be a slow process (Neil). 
Anarchy, in t~e sense of the absence of state, if that's how you 
define it - s1mply as that - could come about in the space of one 
lifetime. I don't think there's any doubt about that .... What we 
woul~'t.achieve is ... in a lifetime I don't expect, is the full 
real1sat10n of people's desires (Kevin). 
In effect these informants deny any prospect of their participation in 
the type of society that they see as just and ordered. No matter how 
much these respondents worked for social revolution, they believe they 
could never benefit from the anticipated fruits of it. 
Four fellow non-pacifist interviewees believed to the contrary 
that mature anarchy could be developed within a generation of the 
initial revolutionary insurrection. The reasoning behind their stance 
arrives from two perspectives of the effects of the elimination of the 
state. Three informants felt that the key was humanity's capability of 
rapid change. They pointed variously to the Industrial Revolution, the 
Russian Revolution, the inter-war period, and the recent collapse of the 
Soviet Bloc, as periods where great demands for individual change had 
been met. The social revolution would demand the greatest personal 
revolution: people's anti-social tendencies would effectively cease when 
they realised their responsibility for the post-insurrectional society. 
The fourth informant emphasised the need to remove the taint created by 
criminalisation of certain acts and the preservation of private 
property, rather than expect great changes in people themselves: 
For me the whole point about an anarchist society is you're not 
trying to change people's behaviour ... generally people are social 
beings. At the moment we've got all this crap imposed upon us 
about how you've got to work for a living, earn money, do shit 
things. All sorts of rubbish imposed upon us because the system's 
all distorted so a small group of people can run it for their 
benefit. By removing all these distortions hopefully ... it'll help 
people get along together (Rob). 
Present day anarchists participating in direct action or 
propagandising do so for some reason. Those who remain optimistic about 
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approaching social revolution might be thought likely to be channelling 
all efforts into preparing or fomenting it. The two most optimistic 
interviewees made very clear that their long-term practical goal was the 
initiation of revolution. They were also quick to address their short-
term goals to preparatory work. In the case of Phil this meant attacking 
the material support of the state system, and in the case of Alan, the 
creation of revolutionary unionism: 
In the short term we see our goal here is to cause as much 
disruption and destruction of the existing economic infrastructure 
as possible (Phil). 
In its place - instead of rank-and-files - D.A.M. suggested 
putting forward a strategy of building industrial networks of 
people who had a firm belief in anarcho-syndicalist politics ... 
the aim being to build up support for a revolutionary form of 
unionism, which at some point in the future, given mass strikes, 
mass disillusion with the bureaucracy, would then be in a position 
to call for a break with social democratic unions (Alan). 
Of the less optimistic informants, five gave responses as to what 
they thought they could do as anarchists. Four respondents expressed the 
desire to expand the influence of anarchism, be it on an individual or 
mass scale. Minimally this connoted engaging friends and acquaintances 
in debate with the aim of converting them: 
I think basically that's all you can do, the average person that's 
all they can do is simply try and change the circle of people 
around you, your most immediate contacts (Tom). 
Maximally this referred to the creation of a serious purposeful 
anarchist movement and a stronger sense of community amongst people 
generally: 
[I want] to revive the F.A.P. and network with similar 
organisations in other countries into some sort of International 
Federation of Anarcho-Pacifists ... (John). 
I think what we'd like to create is a credible, strong, and fairly 
large anarchist, well, Anarchist Communist Federation, ~resence in 
British society, British labour movement, whatever (Kev~n). 
Two of the interviewees talked specifically about their interest 
in resisting the present encroachment of the state. One saw this as a 
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struggle to maintain the small foothold of influence that anarchists 
possessed: 
If you are doing any sort of anarchist activities now, you have to 
face the violence of the state. And in facing the violence of the 
state you need organised resistance (Ian). 
The second was most insistent that he saw no value in organising for a 
speculative future when there were so many more concrete issues to deal 
with. If people were struggling to keep their jobs, or against racist 
violence, this deserved his full attention, and some abstract revolution 
none: 
I mean, I'm not working towards it [anarchy]. I'm working towards 
things being better today (Harvey). 
Other informants mentioned only reformist goals. 
The Informants and Violence 
Because most of the respondents saw a future revolution and the 
present day circumstances as two distinct things, it seems a fair 
reflection to present their arguments in two sections. The first deals 
with the respondents' position on the use of violence during revolution 
(as the respondents themselves saw it). The informants' stance on the 
use of violence in pre-revolutionary conditions is surveyed second. Then 
the way that anarcho-pacifists and non-pacifist anarchists view each 
other and each others' stance on violence will be examined. 
Violence and Revolution 
Social change is received either harmoniously when the population 
as a whole desire it (or do not care enough about it to stand in its 
way), or inharmoniously with a resistant proportion. The more drastic 
the change the greater the scope for debate or conflict. Beyond 
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fictional caricature there is no anarchist tradition of seriously 
suggesting that violent confrontation would be preferable to the 
peaceful dissolution of the state. OUtside of the anarcho-pacifist 
milieu, however, anarchist propaganda has primarily suggested the 
impossibility of ever securing general agreement for a change to 
anarchy. Vested interests either in the state or capital would, they 
believe, always fight to preserve asymmetric power/property relations. 
Unsurprisingly, only those four respondents who declared 
themselves pacifists refused to express any positive link between the 
use of violence and achieving anarchy. None doubted that a massive army 
of anarchists armed to the teeth could vanquish a severely weakened 
state (though one expressed a belief that no government would have 
allowed anarchists to gain military advantage). In terms of what 
anarchists really wanted - anarchy - as opposed to what violence could 
bring about - the elimination of a government - the anarcho-pacifist 
opinion was clear: " ... violence won't achieve anything for anyone ... " 
(Seamus). The point put across was that violent revolution would always, 
no matter how successful, sustain the idea that use of might is the way 
to get what you want. 
Even should it be possible to achieve a state of anarchy through 
violence, such a path was not ideologically open to the anarcho-
pacifists. Three of them stressed the overwhelming importance of 
ideological parity between means and end. Two expressed the belief that 
violence or the intentional harming of any being was self-evidently 
wrong. If an act of violence was wrong, then it was wrong no matter who 
perpetrated it. If anarchists wanted a society based on mutual respect 
and rational persuasion then they should prove their commitment to this 
by practicing what they preached: 
Interviewer: In your opinion are the ruling class capable of 
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giving up power peacefully? 
Eric: Only if they are not threatened with reprisals and can be 
shown that losing ~heir power could make them happier. 
The opposite view was given by another interviewee who believed 
violence-free revolutionary social change could only occur if the 
violence was replaced by coercion: 
I can't visualise any ruling class is ever going to say "Oh well, 
you've taken over. Good luck!" I mean sorry. Unless, of course, 
they were ... they felt quite terrorised (Albert). 
The anarcho-pacifists differed by degree on how they should approach the 
conversion of non-anarchists. One gave the impression that self-
motivated self-realisation was the real engine of social change. While 
accepting the concept of realisation, another anarcho-pacifist 
emphasised a role of positive reinforcement for anarchists: 
..• we all have different .•. we.all have different political 
beliefs, and although you might not agree with someone's views, I 
suppose for the sake of ••• relative peace, you've got to ... well, 
give an impression that you respect their views .... And then, like 
I say, try and change them •.• (Tom). 
For Tom, even in an overwhelmingly pro-anarchist society, allowance had 
to be given to those who clung to the idea of the value of authority and 
property. The gap between persuasion and coercion became considerably 
narrower with a third anarcho-pacifist informant suggesting a role for 
"perhaps a nonviolent general strike/occupation coupled with pacifist 
social defence" (John). 
Beside the anarcho-pacifists, two of the other interviewees noted 
- with airs of some doubt - that nonviolent revolution was theoretically 
possible: 
A social revolution. could be nonviolent, but I can't work out how 
it would run (Rob). 
I think it's extremely unlikely you could have a social revolution 
with no violence at all. I mean, if you showed me a world Cup 
where you could have no violence taking place, well, I think you 
could have a world revolution without [it] itt (Albert). 
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Of the others there was resigned agreement that violence was inevitable. 
Inevitable but not desirable. None of the respondents indicated any 
desire for retribution. This may be accounted for by the fact that none 
of the interviewees came from countries where state repression was 
intolerable to anarchists let alone the population at large. The general 
concept of revolutionary social change was that the change itself came 
from peaceful means - this being consistent with the earlier claims that 
the pre-condition for change was general desire for it: 
Once you feel that you have gone beyond what you did, that you've 
used the violence for what its worth, you still have the same 
problem and you still have to work on it, so it's like, in the end 
it all has to come out in nonviolence, anyways. It really does 
(Brendan) . 
Well, I think obviously a social revolution must in itself be 
peaceful ... (Albert). 
However if these respondents concurred with the anarcho-pacifists that 
persuasion and desire are the engine of social change, they, and the 
other respondents added that those belligerently intransigent in the 
face of this change had to be overcome by force. If the ruling class 
defended social injustice (or "structural violence"), then violence 
became justifiable: 
... when we talk about violence it becomes a largely meaningless 
term. What we really have to talk about is what use of force is 
appropriate to the strategy you're advancing (Phil). 
I think violence is justified to end violence .... Violence is 
justified in opposing state violence - which is always greater 
(Kevin) . 
This utilitarian reasoning gave Kevin only partial satisfaction, 
reflected in a later contradiction which he himself noted as such: 
... [we] try to make our ends and means compatible. And that is a 
problem often .... And we try and resolve it in terms of letting 
people make their own decisions (Kevin). 
In the revolutionary context reactive and pro-active (offensive) 
violence were not seen as equally valid. One was justified primarily on 
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moral grounds, the other primarily on tactical ones. Two of the 
respondents emphasised that when the revolut;onary event " 
.. was ~nc~pient, 
it would be the state that would initiate violence: 
... the powerful ruling class will start shitting themselves and 
they'll call in the army, the S.A.S., the police, the Territorial 
Army, whoever they can grab their hands on (Rob). 
To counter this the revolutionary forces had to be ready with their own 
reactive defence: 
Our justification for violence is it's necessary to defend 
ourselves. Self-defence basically (Rob). 
The moral responsibility for any violence was held by the state for 
initiating it. Moreover, the revolutionaries were not morally guilty of 
provocation by committing injustices to the ruling class, because they 
were only seeking to correct the injustice sanctioned by the state. 
The one respondent who expressed a belief in the likelihood of 
pro-active revolutionary violence was the only one who plainly referred 
to the Malatestan insurrectionary tradition. For him pro-active violence 
in the form of spontaneous armed uprising was organically linked to 
revolutionary social change. He also made the point that the necessary 
violent phase of revolution would only occur when the revolutionary mass 
was a "great majority," and that success was practically inevitable: 
... I'd be fearful that it [a minority insurrection] wouldn't 
accomplish enough .... It wouldn't go far enough and so it would 'J. 
also slow down the revolution (Neil). 
Pre-Revolutionary Violence 
The clear but unenthusiastic endorsement of violence in revolution 
by the informants (excepting the anarcho-pacifists) does not allow any 
automatic conclusions of how they might view the use of violence in a 
pre-revolutionary situation. "Pre-revolutionary" might refer to either 
of two conditions: that situation where activities are planned with no 
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expectation of revolution; or the scenario in which undertakings are 
made in the belief that revolution will follow. When questioning the 
respondents the interviewer sought to make some distinction between the 
future and the present. Only two of the interviewees considered the 
present period in the second sense of the term, the rest relating the 
questioning automatically to the first interpretation. Given the lack of 
immediate prospects for revolutionary social change new emotions come 
into the cost-benefit analysis of violence, including resignation and 
frustration. 
The appeal to pre-revolutionary violence that came up most 
frequently amongst the interviewees was that of self-defence. The 
concept of self-defence held by the informants stretched from the 
straightforward to the unorthodox. The most conspicuous case of self-
defence is reaction to direct violent threat: "I think violence on the 
picket line is, I mean if the police are attacking you, like Orgreave 
for example, you have a right to resort to violence" (Kevin). The use of 
violence to counter violence was accepted as a legitimate response even 
by two of the anarcho-pacifists. Both conceded that self-defence was a 
morally acceptable (or instinctual and therefore amoral) option -
insofar as it was unpremeditated. A third felt that he could make no 
judgement on others' use of violence in self-defence, drawing particular .~ 
reference to women hitting back at their brutal husbands. 
The anarcho-pacifists would not countenance the endorsement of the 
concept of self-defence where there was no clear and present danger 
of physical violence. This despite the view accepted by them that 
structural injustice also equalled violence. The other informants, with 
greater or lesser degrees of enthusiasm, accepted that self-defence did 
not end with the removal of immediate danger to self or others. 
Initiation of conflict with those who regularly attacked anarchists - or 
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the working class, or the people - could still be considered as self-
defence: 
"self-defence is no offence" has often been 'd sa1 .... Certainly we 
support anyone who sought to defend working class people who 
sought to defend their own communities from being attacked (Alan). 
The police are a violent manifestation of the state, so beating 
them shitless seems fine (Rob). 
Other pretexts for violence were based around the idea of 
political expression for a largely voiceless constituency. Those who 
were normally victims of repression needed to show to their oppressors 
that they were not to be regarded as helpless prey. This display was 
empowering for the repressed as well: 
At the point of impact, when you get hit in the face by a 
policeman, then, it brings together every political argument 
you've ever thought about in terms of violence and nonviolence; in 
that you think of somebody who's got a lot of power invested in 
them by the state and by the government, and they are ... they are 
bringing it all to a small minuscule point, where they're just 
punching you in the face, and as soon as that happens you realise 
that ... that you are totally powerless and the only power you've 
got is ... to hit them back harder than they've hit you ... (Biff). 
The feeling was strong amongst a number of the informants that when it 
came down to it, the only way of demonstrating opinion to the determined 
state was pro-active violent protest: "I think in this society, when 
you've got such a repressive and violent state, the only way you can 
show any protest is through violence" (Ian). The failure of recent 
nonviolent protest organisations to maintain high profiles or provide 
dramatic successes (here the respondents pointed primarily to C.N.D.) 
gave the informants the justification for this assessment. The reason 
why the anti-poll tax movement and the miners had been so strong was 
their willingness to show violent resistance: 
... they (the miners] are a reactively violent sort of community. 
And I think that's why they were powerful. (Biff) 
The analysis given was somewhat selective in its evidence. The miners' 
power dissipated as the mining industry was obliterated from above; the 
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poll tax failed to survive more because of its great unpopularity and 
mass non-payment than because the government was terrified by the poll 
tax riot or the isolated inner-city no-go zones for poll tax enforcers. 
If several of the respondents found violence empowering, only one 
explicitly referred to the insurrectionary tradition having an educative 
function: "I guess that I believe that violence can accomplish a lot of 
things in raising consciousness ••• " (Neil). 
The opinions covered so far referred primarily to open acts of 
resistance. Of greater contention was that area defined popularly as 
"terrorism," a term usually laden with value, as recognised by one 
interviewee: liThe media would describe anything that's effective action 
against the state as terrorism" (Phil). Being such a value-laden word, a 
number of the interviewees refused to refer to what anarchists might 
have been involved in in the past, or could be in the future, as 
terrorism, one alternative being "revolutionary violence." It is 
unhelpful in this context to use a term that typically refers to any 
violent act carried out by a group one dislikes. Better instead to 
identify two crude varieties of clandestine (as opposed to overt) 
violence: discriminate acts which are primarily an end in themselves 
(such as assassination); and indiscriminate acts (such as bombings) 
which are either a means of alerting/terrorising a wider audience, or 
are meant to be discriminate but are clumsily performed so as to 
endanger others. 
Three of the seven respondents who endorsed the use of clandestine 
violence only did so where it specifically referred to discriminate 
assassinations: 
.•• if, for instance, the king of Italy ordered the troops to fire 
on a demonstration and killed a hundred people, somebody came and 
shot him. That is one thing of terrorism which I think is 
perfectly logical (Albert). 
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Indiscriminate clandestine violence was forcefully rejected by 
most of the informants. Among the reasons cited was the value of the 
innocent life lost and the overshadowing of any intended positive 
message by general outrage. Only one informant came out in partial 
favour of indiscriminate clandestine violence: 
Terrorism is a way of lashing out at things you don't see end to. 
You don't see a mass movement, right. If there was a mass movement 
I don't think there would be any terrorism (Brendan). 
With such a glaringly small anarchist constituency facing the gargantuan 
state Brendan accepted the rationale of taking out frustration on the 
infrastructure of an indifferent society not in order to convert, but 
firstly to achieve practical successes (emphasising animal exploitation 
targets), and secondly to make people less disinterested. His disgust 
with heedless humanity was balanced on a knife-edge: "I wake up some 
days, I feel like ..• I think everybody ..• I feel like going around 
shooting people" (Brendan). 
The main objection that the informants had with revolutionary 
"terrorist" organisations was that the structure of these groups tended 
to be alien to anarchist concepts of organisation. The informants 
mentioned the Angry Brigade and the Red Army Fraction (RAF) as typifying 
the aloof mentality of the vanguard elite, operating "on behalf of the 
people" without gaining their consent to do so: 
I could put a bomb in Tory headquarters ••. and issue a press 
release saying it was done by, I dunno, the Black Hand Gang in 
support of the striking miners •..• The miners might sit there and 
think, "Well, we didn't really want this guy to blow up a Tory MP, 
it doesn't really help us" (Rob). 
The importance of this organisational critique was such that two of the 
respondents believed that discriminate acts of clandestine violence were 
justifiable if performed by "non-elitist" groups with the sanction of 
their community. The possible mechanics of such groups were not 
discussed. For the remaining respondents actual community involvement in 
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the process of change remained the only really ideologically sound 
method of organisation. Where clandestine activities distanced the 
struggle away from the community and encouraged dependency, involving 
the community required people to take responsibility for their battles. 
Beyond the organisational criticisms were the more functional ones 
on the improbability of positive effects resulting from even 
discriminate acts. Two informants pointed out that clandestine violence 
was either hopeless frustration, or the mistaken attempt to by-pass the 
drudgery of mining the foundations of the state by ripping away the 
surface stratum - only to find a myriad layers beneath. One informant 
recognised the futility of suggesting that an attentat (assassination, 
or attempted assassination) could bring about social change. For him its 
purpose was purely deterrent: 
.•. obviously it wasn't meant to change anything. It was meant 
to discourage. (Albert) 
None of those interviewees who supported clandestine violence commented 
on deleterious effects that might result from attacks - not least 
further repression on a community by the state. 
While attentats were not regarded by most of the respondents as a 
justified tool for anarchists in most circumstances, several felt the 
need to defend the Attentater: 
I personally wouldn't go out and shoot a policeman. I can't see 
any point in doing that, right now. But if someone does, then we 
report it in the paper [Class War] and say, "Yeah! Nice one, you 
got one!" (Rob). 
This sub-Kropotkinite defence of a deed one would not perform, but 
understand the reasoning for, extended amongst some of the respondents 
to acts accomplished by the IRA or the RAF. 
The Pacifist/Non-Pacifist Divide 
Both the anarcho-pacifists and the non-pacifist 
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anarchist interviewees tended to regard each other as well-meaning _ i: 
obstructive - people not fully aware of the facts of the situation. Only 
one non-pacifist voice denied that anarcho-pacifists should be 
considered as anarchists at all: 
What they [anarcho-pacifists] really mean is that theY're liberal 
they're advanced liberals. They're not really anarchists because' 
they don't believe in the overthrow of the state (Albert). 
The non-pacifist interviewees largely rejected the quasi-
absolutist aphorisms of nonviolence: that the use of violence tends to 
self-perpetuation, that revolutionary violence maintains a culture of 
violence; in the pre-revolutionary situation violence leads to 
reprisals, in the post-revolutionary situation the victors were those 
who had learned to rely on violence and coercion. Most of the non-
pacifist respondents, sidestepped these axioms by indicating that 
nonviolence could only be so effective in the face of a determined 
violent state, and thus in its own way nonviolence aided in the 
preservation of a violent culture. 
The tendency of the non-pacifist interviewees was to concede that 
a lot could be achieved by nonviolence, and a number pointed to the 
example of Gandhi's partially successful advocacy of satyagraba: 
I respect people who ... if they genuinely believe in pacifism. And 
if they want to be active in that way it's good .... I think it's 
good that people question violence (Ian). . j. 
But the respondents believed there were definite limits to what 
nonviolence could achieve in the face of a determined foe, the 
alternative historical example here being Hitler: 
They [nonviolent protests] will raise people's awareness: but I 
don't think they will actually bring about some of the f1nal 
stages of the revolution (Neil) . 
.. . there's a lot of people that don't, you know ... it [love and 
rational persuasion] doesn't affect them (Neil). 
I think nonviolence is a nice idea .... Unfortunately, I don't 
think it ... can work all the time .... I would like to be a 
87 
pacifist, but at the same time ... given the fact that violence is 
actually concentrated in the state, in the armed forces, in 
nuclear weapons, and so on and so forth, it's not possibl t 
'f' ( ') e 0 pac~ ~st Kev~n. be 
For the violent solution to be valid it had to secure 
more justice and 
peace, in the eyes of the informants, than nonviolent methods. Given 
that government was manifestly wrong, their disbelief that nonviolent 
methods could effect the elimination of the state, led to the reasoning 
that recourse to violence had to be the better answer: 
If you want to stop and counter violence, you have to do it with a 
fist. If people are attacking and are violent they have to be 
stopped. By being pacifistic you're giving people a free hand. By 
countering them with our own weapon, you're creating a peaceful 
situation (Ian). 
The assumption of the non-pacifist interviewees was that 
revolutionary forces could overcome the gargantuan might of the state, 
and at not too high a cost. One of the respondents pitted the full might 
of the state's armed forces against a swift and canny revolutionary 
mass. The other informants who expressed an opinion tended to believe 
that desertion and low morale would be the decisive factors. Two of the 
respondents pointed out that nonviolence does not mean "no violence": 
... the thing about Gandhian techniques of resistance is in fact 
that they're incredibly violent, but that violence is directed 
against those undertaking acts of resistance as a way to curry 
public sympathy ... (Phil). 
The denunciation of nonviolent techniques went further. For one 
respondent they were at best unlikely to be able to maintain any effect 
on the state whatsoever. With the same reasoning that persistent use of 
violence desensitises the user to violence, one interviewee suggested 
that persistent contact with nonviolent resisters desensitised the 
agents of the state to moral appeal. At worst he suggested that the 
agapaic brand of nonviolence could actually strengthen the state: 
I'd say that an attempt to appeal to the oppressor, rather than 
empowering oneself to resist the oppressor, maintains that 
structure of violence ... (Phil). 
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"I. 
In the clearest refutation of the pacifist axl.'om ha t t violence begets 
violence Phil proffered an alternat' " ' l.ve: ... reSl.stance begets violence!" 
Aside from the practical criticisms of nonviolence, a number of 
the respondents found themselves unwilling to sacrifice their 
livelihoods or lives without having the theoretical opportunity of 
attacking the state: 
... if you're having a social revolution, and they decide to send 
in the army, what are you going to do if you're nonviolent? Just 
sort of lie down and get shot? Not only am I not prepared to lie 
down and get shot saying, "I'm a nonviolent person, so it's OK to 
shoot me," I wouldn't call for anyone else to (Rob). 
There is little rational force behind such an argument. The respondent 
incorrectly parodies nonviolent protesters as willing victims rather 
than the determined resisters that they can be. The interviewee rejects 
the perceived passivity of nonviolent activists. He himself does not 
want to die without hope of seeing victory, but is prepared to if the 
sacrifice leaves an opportunity to show resistance and possibly damage 
some fraction of his foe (which is the state, rather than the individual 
soldier). However, the nonviolent resister also shows resistance, but 
would prefer to morally and emotionally challenge the foe rather than 
hurt them. The parallels between nonviolent and violent concepts of 
resistance are actually quite close. Neither wish to believe that their 
sacrifices have been for nought. Consequently neither side benefits from '~ 
belittling the other's perception of sacrifice, for their real argument 
is in how successful their technique is. 
The anarcho-pacifist informants were isolated not only physically 
(the Federation of Anarcho-Pacifists being moribund), but also in 
temperament. A great deal in their testimonies was self-regarding - much 
more so than that of the non-pacifist anarchist interviewees. 
Consequently, their attitudes towards other anarchists was benign and 
unemotional. The anarcho-pacifists appeared not to desire debate with 
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fellow anarchists more than with non-anarchists. The one interviewee who 
tackled the area head-on addressed the non-pacifist anarchists much as 
he might have any other socialist revolutionary: 
I can't see anyone who seriously wants to abolish government per 
se, resorting to terrorism [or violence] •.. (Seamus). 
While the anarcho-pacifists either explicitly or tacitly distanced 
themselves from condemning the violent anarchist, they were concerned 
that their violent acts were no more justifiable than others'. 
Anarchists took equal responsibility for the deaths in any conflict in 
which they participated (Eric). 
The informants shared with each other a desire for a kind of 
social justice that they believed could not be created under the 
auspices of the state. For some this meant just deserts for one 
particular fraction of society, the working classes. For others, justice 
for all creatures was linked with the idea that devolved anarchy 
provided the only realistic organisational basis for sustainable 
society. These were the primary concerns of the informants and not, 
interestingly, the desire for individual liberty, which was not 
mentioned by a single respondent (besides the egoist, and ex-anarchist, 
Stan) . 
While some of the informants clearly anticipated the advent of 
social revolution, the general pessimistic tenor regarding the 
likelihood of imminent social transformation is evident. To many of the 
d t i i b equated Wl.' th "bel.' ng reall.· stic." Nor were respon en s pess m sm was· e 
any inclined to suggest that the movement toward anarchy was inevitable. 
The goal that most of the informants aspired to was not fomenting 
revolution, but rather encouraging people to regard government 
critically and anarchism positively. Most ambitiously this meant 
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creating credible anarchist organisations, but practically it referred 
to spreading anarchist propaganda and resisting the free rein of the 
state. 
There was a clear gap between pacifist and non-pacifist 
respondents when it came to the question of violence in the revolution. 
The non-pacifists could barely conceive the defenders of 
institutionalised power giving up that power without a fight. This is 
not to say that they equated violent insurrection with social 
revolution, only that rapid social transformation necessitated violence. 
The benefits of anarchy justified both the social revolution and the 
attendant violence. In further justification, most denied that the 
revolutionaries would be the ones to initiate violence, and held that 
the acts of revolutionaries would, for the most part, be acts of 
defence. The anarcho-pacifist informants believed that obtaining 
societal rearrangement by violence was either self-evidently wrong, or, 
indeed, was incapable of bringing about a qualitatively different kind 
of society at all. 
Sharp delineations were easy while the question was academic to 
the majority of the informants. Fractions only really began to appear 
among the non-pacifists when the issue of pre-revolutionary violence was 
broached. Self-defence remained the primary justification, but other, 
less accepted, motives became apparent: empowerment, punishment, and 
deterrence. Acts of resistance justified on these grounds expressed not 
only a willingness to react to provocation, but also to use violence as 
an assertive tool. 
While the informants agreed on the disavowal of indiscriminate 
clandestine violence, discriminate clandestine violence received a 
deqree of qualified approval. As acts of resistance assassinations were 
certainly considered spectacular - if ineffective at much more than 
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spectacle. Some, however, were critical of the nascent vanguardism of 
the attentat, particularly when in reference to the clandestine self-
contained "terrorist" cell. 
The non-pacifist informants took the question of violence as a 
serious issue; little of the macho posturing that often accompanies the 
advocacy of violence was observable. The glorification of blood and 
destruction commonly associated with anarchists was also notable by its 
absence from the content of their statements. The non-pacifists were, 
generally speaking, conciliatory towards anarcho-pacifism - nonviolence 
being seen as a morally valuable, but practically ineffective method. 
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CHAPTER 4 RECENT PROPAGANDIST LITERATURE 
The periodical and pamphlet have been isolated as propaganda 
source literature in this study because of the immediate currency that 
they hold in anarchist circles. The pamphlet is a vintage method of 
communication between anarchists. Unarguably its influence is less now 
than in earlier decades of the nineteenth or twentieth centuries (see 
Dubois, 1894, pp. 65-6), but it remains the weapon of the propagandist 
seeking a format allowing greater length than is normally possible or 
appropriate in the anarchist papers, or whose opinions are not shared 
with, or desirable to, the publishers of those papers. The pamphlet 
allows the author to indulge in pursuing a desired argument, and the 
reader to take up a manageable length of text, (usually) avoiding the 
padding and mixed-bag of subjects often found in books. The pamphlet's 
ease, speed, and economy of production, not to mention its inexpensive 
retail price continues to make it a useful means of rapidly spreading a 
theoretical point in a way that books tend not to. Much of Murray 
Bookchin's Post Scarcity Anarchism first emerged in pamphlet format, and 
Chomsky is to be found in anarchist bookshops most often in pamphlet 
format. 
Excluding those countries where government repression makes 
publication impractical - and these have become fewer since the collapse 
of the state socialist governments of Eastern Europe and beyond - the 
quality or quantity of anarchist periodicals is a reasonable indicator 
of the vigour of anarchist movements. In the last decade both Black Flag 
and Freedom have been produced fortnightly, monthly, and irregularly. In 
Britain and North America appeals for financial help to decrease 
production deficits are a constant reminder of the movements' frailty. 
93 
The size or wealth of the readership is not, however the sole 
factor in the quality, or shelf-life of a perl.·odl.·cal. F h 
or t e majority 
of anarchist publications - given their chosen method of production _ 
longevity depends upon the maintenance of a workable collective. The 
death or migration of vital collective members can effectively kill an 
otherwise healthy and popular periodical. This was the reason for one of 
only two dissolutions - or indefinite suspensions - in Britain, of a 
publication of national stature in the last decade, Black Flag (the 
other being the second series of Anarchy). A combination of financial 
strictures and organisational imperfections has seen the rapid 
appearance and disappearance of numerous locally produced papers in 
recent years (for interesting examples see Leamington Spa's Land and 
Liberty or Bristol's Stuff It). 
Anarchist Periodicals 
The Nature of Anarchist Periodicals 
In common with any paper with an agenda of propagandism or 
advocacy - and one might include daily newspapers - the anarchist 
periodical has to develop a format and style with which its audience is 
happy. The periodical may aim to reflect the mood of its audience, or 
press an agenda which it believes needs an audience. The nature of 
anarchist periodicals may be assessed by whether they follow a 
predominantly activist or theoretical line, and the degree to which they 
promote the editorial line. 
In simple terms an anarchist periodical leans towards activism 
when it concerns itself with the events of the day, attacking the 
government and ruling hierarchy, encouraging action amongst anarchists 
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(be it organisational or physical), and propagating the idea t~at s~c~ 
action is important either in defence of a position or in nrcmot:"::::-
. ~ 
change. In contrast is the purely theoretical anarchist periodical wt~c~ 
concerns itself with anarchist history, history from an anarchist 
perspective, anarchist theory, and critiques of rival socio-political 
theories. The nearest anarchists come to producing theoretical journals 
in the English language are the American Anarchy and the British Raven. 
In contrast, Class War tries very hard to eliminate theoretical 
consideration from its pages. Most anarchist papers have steered a 
course between the two, from the primarily activist Profane Existence to 
the predominantly theoretical Black Flag Quarterly. Two (Green Anarchis: 
and the second series of Anarchy) moved significantly away from their 
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Unsurprisingly the theoretical periodicals allow debate to go 
largely unhindered in their pages. The existence of a permissive 
editorial line, however, is not confined to the more theoretical 
periodicals. Punk anarchist and class struggle papers such as Chicago's 
Wind Chill Factor and Minneapolis's Profane Existence have allowed 
readers to express criticism without editorial post-scripts. The 
ultimate activist paper, Class War, has proved itself less shuttered 
than the "serious" Black Flag. 
In countries where the anarchist press is widely dispersed (U.S., 
Canada and Australia), or very weak (Denmark) there is little in the way 
of inter-periodical conflict. In contrast, the densely packed British 
papers have had a tendency to snipe at each other at the least 
provocation. The uncrowned champion of intolerance was Black Flag. As 
its nearest rival, Freedom came in for considerable criticism both in 
terms of personalities and style. After perceived attacks on itself and 
the Direct Action Movement, a Black Flag commentary declared Freedom's 
style as that of the "lone heroic understanding voice against the 
brutally ignorant anarchist masses," and went on to charge it with 
outright abandonment: "it was milk-and-water liberalistic pseudo-
anarchism: now it is anti-anarchist" ('Best of the ... " 1984, p. 3). In 
1987 a supplement was produced which concentrated accusations on the 
quietism of Freedom - quietists being defined as "those who are not 
pacifists but are opposed to any action" ('Liars and liberals,' 1987, 
pp. 1-4). Green Anarchist, originating from the Freedom stable, came in 
for similar bile, Black Flag scoffing that it sought: "to be a more 
pacifistic version of Freedom. Few thought it possible" ('"Anarchist 
squabbles"', 1984, p. 6). Though Freedom largely ignored the attacks, 
their periodic retorts were subtle, but often no less snide. Black Flag 
Supplement 3 drew the comment that it could be seen "either as a 
96 
powerful satire on anarchist propaganda or as a rather alarming symptom 
of abnormal psychology" (' As others ... ', 1987, p. 2). 
Neither Black Flag nor Freedom could accept affinity with Class 
War. Black Flag declared that "at the crunch it is council communist and 
opposes organised anarchism" ('Best of the ... ', 1984, p. 3). Freedom 
commented on Class War's pursuance of a controversial media profile: 
"[Anarchism] is not about becoming famous/l.·nfamous db' an el.ng childishly 
self-indulgent at other people's expense" (Stuart, 1985, p. 5). Stuff It 
produced perhaps the most eloquent criticism of Class War's self-
declared ruthless approach: 
They look grim, think grim, they are grim. With a grim 
determination they turn revolutionary practice into a straight 
jacket, they chaff off the useless, unnecessary bits like desire, 
subjectivity, love, happiness, consideration for other 
revolutionaries ... (Iron Mask of Freedom, 1984). 
The Periodicals on Social Change and Violence 
The anarchist periodicals, as both products and influences of the 
movement, may to some degree provide a barometer of the optimism for 
change. In the more activist papers this translates to opinion on what 
is to be done. The general shift in the British papers in the 1980s was 
of increasing optimism over popular unrest. This was reflected in inner 
city disturbances, labour struggles, the anti-poll tax movement, and 
awareness of ecological issues. Into the 1990s this optimism has been 
tempered with questions over why the anarchist movement, though capable 
of short-term capitalisation of popular disaffection, has failed to 
maintain a consistently increasing momentum over the entire period. 
Of all the papers, Green Anarchist has had, since 1986 and the 
rejection of its strategic pacifist beginnings, the most positive agenda 
for revolution. While others may talk primarily of building up support 
for a revolutionary movement, Green Anarchist talks strategy and 
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tactics. Its ideological statement, first enunciated in the Oct./Nov. 
1986 issue, states that revolution would begin in the third world, but 
that the metropolitan countries could experience their own centres of 
rebellion "on the periphery." What ld cou actually be done remained vague 
from 1986 to 1990: "Actions in the t 'd coun rys~ e, at military sites, land 
squats, industrial targets"; building a "culture of resistance from 
festivals, gigs, fanzines .... " By the Spring 1991 issue the supportive 
role of revolutionaries in the industrialised nations had become much 
more specific. 
Other equally activist periodicals do not anticipate and plan for 
revolution anywhere near as seriously as Green Anarchist does. The 
media-perceived fanaticism of Class War or Xtra! is not based on their 
starry-eyed talk of revolution but their greater appeal to violence of 
the mob-riot variety. The one-off Attack outlined numerous violent and 
nonviolent acts, but acts of resistance rather than revolution: 
today's struggles have deep roots in the past. We're not the first 
to fight back - and we probably won't be the last. If we're really 
going to pull apart this world, we need strategy for years, not 
just tactics for tonight ('Dropping bombs?', n.d., p. 14). 
Class War's regular ideological statement makes it plain that its aim is 
"the destruction of the ruling class by the working class ... class war." 
However, references that the paper makes to the future (and not-too-
distant-future) tend to be directed at a somewhat permanent-sounding 
class struggle rather than the more final-sounding social revolution. 
Interest in more obviously constructive work such as 
consciousness-raising and the encouragement of "parallel institutions" 
in preparation for an indeterminate future revolutionary period is the 
theme of other activist and semi-activist papers. In anarchist 
communist/punk anarchist papers like Land & Liberty, Profane Existence, 
or Toronto's more cerebral Kick It Over, the emphasis is on establishing 
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cooperative ventures such as food stores. In the anarcho-syndicalist and 
syndicalist Direct Action and Industrial Worker the aim is the creation 
of a commanding revolutionary industrial union from the tiny core of 
D.A.M. or Wobbly activists. 
Despite their mutual antagonism and differences in pretension, 
both Freedom and Black Flag have provided more of a commentary on events 
rather than a prescription - hence the fusion of myopia and utopian 
vision, but with nothing in the middle. Frustration with this is obvious 
from those with a prescriptive agenda, such as Nigel Fox, writing in 
Socialism From Below regarding the miners' strike: 
Black Flag was almost entirely given over to the latest news from 
the frontline of the struggle. However, news was all it was[.] 
There was woefully little attempt made to provide any sustained 
anarchist analysis, still less a political lead or the tactics 
needed to win (1989, p. 7). 
Black Flag and Freedom aim to keep anarchists informed, interested, and 
involved, rather than providing them with solutions which they feel they 
should be providing for themselves. 
The resigned indignation expressed by some non-pacifist 
interviewees over my interest in the violence issue was not often 
reflected in the propagandist literature. Nicholas walter does, however, 
give a formula response : 
Despite popular prejudice, anarchism is not necessarily violent in 
principle; and despite received opinion, anarchists are not 
particularly violent in practise - less so than most of our rivals 
on the left or right (1983, p. 4). 
While this may be so, the medium-intensity interest on the subject in 
the periodicals in the 19~Os and early 1990s would appear to suggest 
that the question of whether and how activists should use violence as a 
political tool is not unfairly attributed in the media and academia to 
anarchism, but rather that it is unfairly unattributed to other 
revolutionary or reactionary doctrines. 
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As with the interviewees there is no discord in the periodicals 
with the idea that violence in itself is not revolutionary, and that 
anarchy will not magically spring from violence and coercion, but from 
education, persuasion, and realisation: "The essence of revolution is 
not armed confrontation with the state but the nature of the movement 
which backs it up" ('You can't blow ... ', 1990, p. 8). Even the 
belligerent Class War and post-1986 Green Anarchist admit' to the 
inefficacy of relying on violence alone in effecting change (Albon, 
1986, p. 6; Class War, 41). Nevertheless, a strategic or tactical use of 
violence is not automatically dismissed by this admission. Alan Albon 
maintains that "Agreement between anarchists on the subject has never 
been reached" (1982, p. 3). This is hardly surprising given the highly 
disparate premises that are produced in defence of entrenched positions: 
the debate has remained at a high level of abstraction. one side 
speaks of "ethics" or "ends and means", while the other considers 
violent action an a priori necessity (Gambone, 1990, p. 5). 
The most extensive debate in any recent periodical was the war of words 
which took place in the pages of Freedom from May to December 1992. 
Although this did not by any means cover all of the associated issues, 
it is an interesting exploration of argument and counter-argument which 
make glancing blows upon each other. 
In addition to the ethical/theoretical division is the inability 
of anarchists to settle on a linguistic compromise for a terminology of 
agreed value. MH in Freedom argues that the debate over terrorism "can't 
even begin until everyone recognises that terrorism by anarchists is 
still terrorism" (1986, p. 18). What MH fails to appreciate is that the 
propaganda battle between the state and would-be revolutionaries does 
not allow concessions which can later be used against them. It is, for 
instance, inconceivable that a government would freely admit to pursuing 
a policy of terrorism. It is hardly surprising, then, that the Black 
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Flag Collective took umbrage at the labelling of armed anarchists as 
terrorists. In response to a Daily Telegraph "expose" defining Black 
Flag as an "international link with revolutionary terrorism," they noted 
that discriminate assassinations of agents of government repression were 
"acts of resistance" rather than terrorism. The property-based bombings 
performed by the Vancouver 5 or Angry Brigade were not terrorism, 
rather: "terrorism is indiscriminate killing. It is dropping a bomb on 
Hiroshima ... " (1985). Similarly, criticism of violence at a Stop the 
City demo in 1984 brought the indignant retort: " ... the only violence I 
saw came from the pigs - don't confuse vandalism with violence - don't 
fall into the media trap ... " (' A personal viewpoint ... ', 1984, p. 4). 
In the periodicals, as with the interviewees, something of a 
distinction needs to be made about revolutionary and pre-revolutionary 
violence. Protagonists argue either that violence, be it pro-active or 
reactive, is practically inevitable for a successful revolution, or that 
violence makes a successful revolution impossible. The acceptability of 
pro-active violence in the pre-revolutionary scenario is asserted by far 
fewer anarchist sources. Justifications for violence tend to be based on 
the idea of defence against oppression and, less frequently, in terms of 
vengeance and confidence-building. 
The Propagandist Debate on Revolutionary and Pre-
Revolutionary Violence 
Propagandist Literature and Revolutionary Violence 
It is clear from many of the non-pacifist sources that revolution 
is seen as a thing that cannot be accomplished without recourse to 
violence: "It will be an armed revolution, but only because it has to 
be" ('Backlash', 1984, p. 4). The reasoning behind the belief in 
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inevitability is evident from Class War's clarion call in issue 41: 
" ... we advocate the use of force to take on the class 
enemy because they 
will never give up power peacefully" This conclus' . d . 
. 10n 1S er1ved from a 
basic anarchist belief in the nature of institutionalised power, but is 
usually defended less from a theoretical stand-point than from anecdotal 
historical evidence. This is an uncomfortable argument on which to base 
a sine qua non. Contrary anecdotal evidence can point to instances where 
governments - for instance the Marcos administration - have fallen 
through popular (and elite) pressure rather than popular violence. The 
argument for the inevitability of violence is finely balanced on the 
belief that entire ruling classes do not voluntarily dissolve _ e.g. the 
French or Russian aristocracies - and the extrapolation of this to 
universal principle. A retort is that as all precedents for historical 
analysis pf "successful" revolutions have been authoritarian ones, it is 
a little premature to deny the value of a nonviolent approach. 
Those writers who do express a belief in the inevitability of 
violence on the occasion of the social revolution must logically believe 
that it is possible to overcome the military might of the state. While 
this seems, given the present conditions, a somewhat impractical if not 
insane proposition, some supporters of this argument put up a spirited 
defen~e of it. Supporters note from historical evidence such as Indo-
China/Vietnam and the FSLN in Nicaragua that military inferiority of the 
revolutionaries does not predetermine failure (Birrell, 1992a, p. 7; 
Borrows, 1992b, p. 3). While the obvious can be said (and has, see IRSM, 
1980, p. 1; CUllen, 1992b, p. 8), that such successes were based on 
topographical, political, and economic factors not generally replicable, 
the precedent stands that militarily weak can overcome militarily 
strong. The more considered proponents of this position do not in any 
case see the military factor as the main one. It is not the quality of 
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weaponry, but the quality of commitment and understanding not only of 
those prepared to fight, but also of the general population (IRSM, 1980, 
p. 1). 
The advocates of a nonviolent strategy emphasise their not 
inconsiderable doubt that revolutionary forces are really capable of 
conquering the military machine of the industrial nations (Cullen, 
1992a, p. 8). The other question they ask of the non-pacifist anarchists 
is whether the calculated (but not assured) end is worth the millions of 
casualties, combatants and non-combatants that they believe are likely 
in a head-on conflict (Gambone, 1990, p. 5). 
Supporters of a revolutionary strategy involving violence do not 
(except with overt bravado) promote head-on military conflict as an 
initial tactic. As Clark (1981) or Gambone (with great scepticism; 1990, 
p. 5) suggest, other factors such as popular disillusionment with the 
system, prolonged economic crisis, and increasing decadence of the state 
are vital before any hope of an uprising involving violence could hope 
to be successful. The question of casualties is a very thorny issue for 
the advocates of a violent approach, which they tend to pass over. 
The most sustained opposition to approaches involving violence 
come from anarcho-pacifists stressing both the immorality and futility 
of violence. The pacifist half of anarcho-pacifism may assert that 
violence is a bad act, that no good can come of a bad act, and that even 
with the best of intentions its use maintains the pattern of violence. 
The anarchist half argues that violence, being related to power, is 
doctrinal anathema to those who seek human relations founded on rational 
persuasion. Also, that power tends to self-preservation, if not 
accumulation, such that organised militias will invariably tend towards 
the status of the proto-state: 
Violence cannot destroy the State because the State is more than a 
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ser~esdof institutions and their servants: it is above all an 
att1tu 7 of mind .... A violent revolution may succeed in 
des~roY1ng the State in its present form, but the state will rise 
aga1n from the ashes (Anark, 1987, p. 5). 
Similarly: "If 'political power comes from the barrel of a gun' then 
equally it is from the barrel of a gun flows the will to power ... " (, The 
futility of ... ', 1992, p. 23). The failure of past socialist revolutions 
to lessen violence, power, authority, and soc;al t 'f' , 
4 S rat1 1cat1on is given 
as empirical proof of this (Cullen, 1992a, p. 8; Fisher, 1992, p. 8). 
Historical evidence is, of course, anecdotal, and cannot rule out 
violent revolution producing a peaceful, anarchist outcome. 
While non-pacifist anarchists remain sensitive to the idea of 
creeping militarism in revolutionary forces, it remains rare for there 
to be an exposition of the form and function of popular militias, and 
the dif'ferentiation of these from regular units, One of the most 
effective instruction manuals on military preparation by an anarchist, 
notes that anarchists are bound by "social and political beliefs," which 
required that their "means cannot, must not, be separated," from their 
ends (IRSM, 1980, p. 2). While the manual outlines the positive nature 
of affinity groups and organisation from the base, it concedes that 
"people engaged in armed combat have little time for a summit meeting" 
(1980, p. 3). This seems very much to suggest that prescribed ideals 
must play second fiddle to practical needs. The inference of most 
advocates of violent revolution is that ends are not definitively 
corrupted by means, and that a little doctrinal ambiguity may be 
justified for actual victory: 
Means and ends are [interdependent]. Moral judgements cannot be 
suspended; but as the war hots up they become more relative ... 
(McArdle, n.d., p, 11). 
The problem of a relative argument is the question of where to draw the 
line. If ends and means are not definitively linked then there is 
W;th using violence to destroy violence, But nothing intrinsically wrong 4 
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by the same token there is nothing wrong per se with the use of 
government to abolish government. If one desires to justify violence but 
not revolutionary government, one cannot rely on a relative calculation 
alone. 
While it is common to talk of the inevitability of violence in the 
social revolution, less is written on further speCUlation as to which 
side is likely to be the aggressor. The right to take the offensive has 
been upheld in activist papers: violence being inevitable because in 
order for the revolution to succeed it has to conquer the state 
(Marcone, n.d., p. 8; 'Class War - Macho?', n.d.). However, the emphasis 
more often than not is on the defensive nature of anarchist 
revolutionary violence: violence is inevitable because the state will 
attack the revolution ('When will they ... ', 1987, p. 5; Albon, 1986, p. 
6) • 
One Freedom correspondent suggests that the majority of anarchists 
view "a distinction between violence in self-defence, and other forms of 
violence" (Birrell, 1992b, p. 8; also JS, 1992, p. 8). This does not, 
however, mean that they agree on where to draw the line. The concept of 
self-defence, used widely to justify anarchist violence in revolutionary 
or pre-revolutionary conditions, is a nebulous one: from the lashing-out 
of a individual under personal attack to pro-active defence - that is, 
attack as a means of defence. Strategic pacifists, who accept that 
unpremeditated violence in self/other-defence is justifiable (CUllen, 
1992c, p. 8; 'The futility of ... ', 1992, p. 24), are, as Birrell notes, 
always in danger of having to justify much more violence than they 
thought they would (1992c, p. 7). 
One very powerful argument that did emerge from the anarcho-
pacifist side in the long-running debate in Freedom was that self-
defence was only morally justifiable if it actually defended. In the 
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opinion of anarcho-pacifist Ernie Crosswell, the response of the 
militarily weaker revolutionaries to the aggression of the state's 
forces simply added up to higher net casualty figures (e . 11 spec1a y among 
civilians). Better then for the revolutionaries to face death unarmed 
and minimise those casualties (l992c, p. 8). Birrell scoffs that "that's 
the first strategic theory I've come across which advocates suicide as a 
means" (l992c, p. 7). Disturbing to the non-pacifist anarchists though 
it may be, there is a logic in the Crosswell scenario, in that defiantly 
laying down one's pea-shooter in the face of the state's cannon is no 
more suicide than defiantly using it (Crosswell, 1992d, p. 8). 
Propagandist Literature and Pre-Revolutionary Violence 
The acceptance of the inevitability of violence in the 
revolutionary scenario should not indicate the automatic desirability of 
violence in the pre-revolutionary scenario. Birrell for one sees little 
justification other than self-defence for violence today (1992a, p. 7). 
Besides self-defence, violence in the pre-revolutionary scenario is 
vindicated in some of the activist literature in terms of 
vengeance/punishment and confidence-building. Jack McArdle asks 
bemusedly: "Why is there this aversion to using political violence 
against people who deserve it, in a proper and discriminating way?" 
(n.d., p. ll). Discriminate acts of clandestine violence such as "clean" 
assassinations of oppressors (i.e., by rifle rather than car-bomb) are 
similarly defended by the Black Flag Collective as "legitimate acts of 
resistance" (l985). There is little moral or doctrinal reasoning behind 
such statements; the acts they refer to are best maintained by an 
expected positive effect. "Deserving" a bullet sounds suspiciously like 
retribution (a judicial concept which anarchists cannot happily accept), 
whereas an "act of resistance" is functional only insofar as it lessens 
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oppression or heightens conscious rebellion. Critics of "acts of 
resistance" - meaning in this context pre-revolutionary acts of 
clandestine violence - challenge its promotion on the levels of 
indiscriminacy, inefficacy, and vanquardism. 
In neither the primary anarchist literature covered, nor the 
interviews, were there to be found positive portrayals of indiscriminate 
violence in the style of the I.R.A. at Enniskillen, or E.T.A.ls 
Barcelona supermarket bomb. Their cause may (or may not) be seen to be 
valid, their assassinations applauded, but their less discriminate acts 
are denounced or ignored. Apologists of the self-declared anarchist 
bombers argue defensively, and with some justification, that they aimed 
to be as discriminate as possible (such as the Angry Brigade, Weir, 
1985, pp. 10, 20), or calculated on property damage only (such as the 
Vancouver 5, Hansen, 1984, p. 4). The advent of a modern Emile Henry 
would undoubtedly bring far more cries of "misguided or crazy," and 
"agent provocateur," than claims of kinship from the English-speakinQ 
anarchist press. 
It is noted that past anarchist experiences with acts of 
clandestine violence have not proved particularly healthy in terms of 
propaganda or consequent repression (Hill, 1989). Discriminate 
assassinations by anarchists, while removing individual oppressors, have 
not significantly lessened repression or increased rebelliousness. 
Violent propaganda-by-the-deed has not proved a very effective method of 
communication with the populace at large partly because of state media 
manipulation and partly because of the ease with which it is 
misinterpreted anyway: 
Because people have not been convinced, through education and 
their own experience, that anarchism is desirable, they cannot 
interpret terrorist activities in the way guerrillas would like 
(Hill, 1989, p. 7). 
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In addition, many anarchists are concerned that previous massive state 
repression has helped crush budding anarchist movements: for instance 
the Haymarket Massacre and the decline of American anarchism, or the 
nineteenth century German experience. 
Policies such as the strategy of tension that was behLnd much of 
the theory of the rightist and leftist European terrorist movements in 
the 1970s and 1980s (of which the anarchically-influenced 2nd June 
Movement and Action Directe appeared to take part) are condemned across 
the board as counter-productive. The principal challenge is that in 
industrialised countries terrorism leads to the (expected) repression, 
but very little else. The anti-terrorist argues that popular rebellion, 
in the unlikely event that it is stoked by the repression, is also apt 
to be crushed by it, along with the parallel legal movement: take the 
Tupamaros' and the elimination of the left in Uruguay (CUllen, 1992b, p. 
8; 'You can't blow ... ', 1990, pp. 8, 12-4). Moreover, policies such as 
the strategy of tension are extremely cynical tools: 
It is the ultimate in manipulation - an intentional attempt to 
create suffering among the people for the ends of the guerrillas 
who assume that they know best and that the people will be better 
off in the long run ('You can't blow •.• ', 1990, pp. 13-4). 
The cynicism of the strategy of tension is one symptom of the 
greater doctrinal criticism of acts of clandestine violence: that they 
are the methods of vanguardists. The allegation of vanguardism, or 
elitism, is a highly charged one. It suggests that the group assumes 
responsibility to act on behalf of the people, without their consent, on 
the basis of higher political consciousness: a complete rejection of 
anarchist organisational theory ('YOU can't blow •.. ', 1990). It is not 
easy for any clandestine group to refute the accusation. No matter how 
noble their aims might have been, Brown notes of the Angry Brioade that 
"in direct contradiction of their spoken ideals they were tryino to act 
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as an elite vanguard leaving ordinary people as passive spectators" 
(1984, p. 1). Editorial teams of periodicals (such as Black Flag) which 
condone the actions of the clandestine anarchist groups do not focus 
clearly on their elitism. Jean Weir is unusual in arguing for the 
recognition of the role of the individual (or group) conscience in the 
mass movement (1985, p. 7). The routine argument diverts attacks by 
lambasting the timidity of the open anarchist and leftist movement 
(Weir, 1985, pp. 9-10). 
A third instance of pre-revolutionary violence that requires 
attention is mass civil disorder or riot. Politically motivated rioting 
does not suffer the elitist potentials of clandestine violence, but 
neither is the mob as easily coordinated as the tight-knit cell. A 
number of anarchist periodicals have printed riot tips (see Wind Chill 
Factor 7; Autognome 4; xtra! 7) and espoused the idea that rioting is a 
positive way of "gaining confidence and experience" ('Backlash', 1981, 
p. 4). One of the most expressive positive appraisals for rioting comes 
from Attack: 
Seeing the cops tremble is a sight never to be forgotten. REVENGEl 
Exhilaration and pleasure! But we can go further. We can try to 
make our areas permanent no-go areas for our enemies, and build up 
our strength as communities. A riot is a step towards this. A 
practical lesson in community power ('Dancing in the ..• ', n.d., p. 
8) • 
Apart from the observation that in a riot it is quite difficult for 
anarchists to distinguish politically motivated activity from 
"gratUitous violence," riots "give the state an excuse to [portray) 
themselves to the mass population as their protectors" ('The futility 
of ••• ', 1992, p. 23). The rioting anarchists (or for that matter terror 
groups) have, in the prevailing pre-revolutionary conditions, neither 
the medium of disseminating the reasoning behind the violence, nor a 
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population "conscious" enough to interpret such acts positively in the 
face of the contrary message of the state's media. 
Propagandist Literature and Nonviolent Revolution 
The arguments for a nonviolent method of securing social change 
range from the tactical preference of the non-pacifist to the 
deontological moral principle held by the absolutist pacifist. There is 
little natural affinity between these two extremes, but they are linked 
in the steps from absolutist to quasi-absolutist, to strategic pacifist, 
to non-pacifist tactical supporter of nonviolence. While strategic 
pacifists may appear to have a closer affinity to those whose actions 
are determined primarily by practical considerations rather than ethical 
ones, the fact that they view themselves as pacifists points to their 
inclusion within the sphere of those for whom no violent "short-cuts" 
could appear attractive. 
Some anarchists argue (interviewee Rob for instance) that it is of 
paramount importance to expose the negative attributes of the state by 
the act. However, in all of the periodicals which approached the 
subject, opinions were expressed - explicitly or tacitly - that the 
population have to know not only that present governments are bad, but 
also that anarchism is good. The first s~ep of the anarchist is always a 
personal one: recognising one's own capacity for self-government. Ronald 
Sampson notes that, 
one person who is not controllable by "authority", who answers not 
to externally imposed discipline but to the discipline of his or 
her own conscience, is a very potent threat to those who dominate 
others (1985, p. 12). 
Where strategists of violent revolution see this as a first step to a 
conscious revolutionary mass, anarcho-pacifists tend to promote 
110 
individual conscious acceptance of anarchism as the sole means of 
change. 
Anarcho-pacifists may counsel both a proselytory role and 
practical action. The most straightforward are persuasion by education 
and argument (Cullen, 1992a, p. 8). A further step 1'S the attempt to 
sideline the state not just consciously, but also practically. Pike 
(1990) advocates the passive method of refusing to cooperate with 
certain functions of the state. Clark (1981) encourages the creation of 
parallel organisations (such as food cooperatives), to prepare people 
actively for the practicalities of the post-state world. The idea that 
normative and prescriptive lifestyles should be as indistinguishable as 
possible - lifestylism - is robustly asserted (Pike, 1990, pp. 41-8; 
Sampson, 1985, p. 24) 
Anarcho-pacifists in the Tolstoyan tradition forego all explicit 
recourse to violence, force, coercion, or manipulation. While this is 
congruent with elementary anarchist ideals, the true resource is 
Christian deontological morality (Sampson, 1985, p. 6). Non-pacifists 
tend to respond with consequentialist and judicial arguments over the 
justifiability of violence: the beneficial utility accruing from killing 
a homicidal oppressor; the greater justice in the death of oppressors 
rather than the oppressed (Borrows, 1992b, p. 3). Non-pacifists also 
detest what they see as the unnecessary degree of introversion in 
anarcho-pacifists. Anti-nuclear demonstrator Jonika Mountainfire writes: 
"I found that the more committed people were to pacifism, the less 
committed they were to a meaningful social transformation" (1984, p. 6). 
Anarcho-pacifists maintain other more consequential reasons for 
refuting violent revolution. Pike notes that: 
h b ha badl ften say that the ends )'ustify the People woe ve y ... 0 
means. But this is impossible because the means we use determine 
the ends we reach (1990, p. 18). 
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Pike uses a rather poor analogy to illustrate this: that in order to 
make a car one carefully constructs, one does not destroy (the simple 
reply being that anarchists are not making the car from scratch, but are 
given an armoured vehicle which requires deconstruction). CUllen 
postulates that "you don't make anarchists by killing people, you make 
killers and dead people" (1992c, p. 8). Sampson notes further 
complications of playing with power: 
It is from this element of force, of coercion, that all the 
resentment and counter-irritants and desire for vengeance - in 
short, evil - are triggered off. It is previous power - a legacy 
of countless acts of power - that has made the present oppressors 
or aggressors what they are ... (1985, p. 11). 
The sum of these aphoristic arguments, then, is that violence does not 
incline one's opponents to anarchism, rather it stokes up hate in them, 
and brutalises the supposedly loving and caring revolutionists. 
Not a great deal is said in the literature by the strategists of 
violent revolution on the question of the resentful ex-ruling class in 
the aftermath. The assumption seems to be that they will be dead, 
exiled, or re-educated. In response to the proposition that violence is 
corrupting, Birrell quite simply answers that it is not (1992c, p. 7). 
Again, this is a point debated upon largely with anecdotal evidence, of 
which there is plenty. 
The other side of nonviolent revolution is the grey area of 
nonviolent direct action. A first point is that for some activists 
nonviolence is a strategy to be pursued until such time that anarchist 
revolutionaries can face the state with arms. A second is that for those 
committed to a nonviolent strategy, this may mean strictly "not 
violence." 
Coercion and manipulation are not shunned in many instances of 
nonviolent campaign. Indeed, it may not be possible to avoid them; hence 
anarcho-pacifists like Pike (1990) and Sampson (1985) refrain from 
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advocating nonviolent direct action. The general str1'ke 1'S a nonviolent 
method which does not expect to persuade capitalists of the 
righteousness of the strikers. Vandalism of the economic infrastructure, 
advocated spiritedly in Green Anarchist, ' d 1S expecte to cause hardship, 
confusion and expense, not enlightenment. Even Gandhi would have been 
disingenuous in suggesting that, in practice, his non-cooperation 
campaigns achieved more from truth force than coercion. Strategists of 
violent revolution have not stressed the moral ambiguity of a 
manipulative, destructive, or coercive, but decidedly nonviolent 
strategy - perhaps because they are themselves on similarly anomalous 
ground. Rather they accent the insufficiency of nonviolent direct action 
to overcome governmental resistance. In emphasising nonviolent policy 
Class War asserts: "A possibly powerful and effective group make 
themselves .... a nuisance not a threat" ('Class War - Macho?', n.d.). 
One of the main objections to nonviolent direct action in the 
propagandist literature is that it provokes the state to respond, yet is 
ill-equipped to deal with a repressive backlash: "Pacifism doesn't stop 
violence, it simply leaves the stage clear for those who wish to indulge 
in it" (Birrell, 1992b, p. 8). However, part of the argument for 
nonviolent direct action is that it is not seen by the populace to 
justify violent repression, which, if it occurs, tends to increase 
sympathy with the victims. As noted above, if the state uses its 
overwhelming military superiority, the choice between tactical violence 
or nonviolence is most logically decided on the basis of which is likely 
to produce least repression, or the best propaganda, not the most 
glorious or costly martyrdom. 
The avoidance of violence alone may be religiously or morally 
based, but nonviolence is often touted on the tactical basis of the 
expected ineffectiveness or unacceptable cost of a violent campaign 
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(Gambone, 1990, p. 5). If it could be shown that the state's armed 
forces would crumble at the first violent assault, and that such an 
assault would undoubtedly cause fewer deaths and less suffering than the 
state would have generated in the near future, tactical nonviolence 
should logically be supplanted by revolutionary violence. 
For anarcho-pacifists of the Tolstoyan tradition there can be 
neither bartering with other people's lives, nor postponement of 
enacting anarchist precepts of the hideousness and irrationality of the 
use of power. Anarchists interested in anarchy rather than bravado, 
glory, or struggle cannot fail to accept the desirability of social 
transformation by the awakened consciousness of all. However, many non-
pacifist anarchists contend that such is impossible, not least because 
economic and political power is seen to be intoxicating and addictive. 
They accuse the anarcho-pacifists of reformism and "militant liberalism" 
('Anarchism and pacifism', 1987, p. 4). 
Anarcho-pacifists in the propagandist literature do tend to 
suggest that for the foreseeable future, anarchy is more a state of mind 
than a possible social reality. On the other hand non-pacifist 
anarchists leave the door open for accelerated movement to anarchy, 
whether by violent insurrection, reactive defence, nonviolent direct 
action, or a combination of these. They predicate this on the 
consequentialist basis of a calculation of the means being justified by 
the end (though this seldom appears a seriously considered calculation) . 
The anarcho-pacifists utterly reject this as doctrinally anomalous and 
morally unacceptable. 
The study of propagandist material does not only address a 
different (though not exclusively so) subject group, it also gives a 
different slant on issues concerning violence, nonviolence, and social 
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change. Where the interviews ascertained how activists deal with the 
issues when faced with them, an analysis of the periodicals and 
pamphlets indicates to what extent propagandists approach such issues 
when unsolicited by a researcher. 
While violent incidents involving anarchists were frequently and 
assiduously reported, this was rarely accompanied by moral or 
ideological analysis. In periodicals not specifically pacifist in 
outlook debate both over the process of social transformation, and the 
acceptability of violence as a tool of anarchists, occurred (regularly, 
if not frequently) primarily at the instigation of pacifist 
correspondents. The prompting of discussion over the ethics of violence 
by pacifist contributors certainly made it the most consistent topic of 
debate over the 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, such matters could 
hardly be described as top of the agenda for the non-initiating non-
pacifist propagandists. It does not seem likely that the primary reasons 
for this are because the non-pacifists find the question of consistency 
an insuperable problem that is best ignored, or because they are assured 
of the righteousness of their stance. More likely it is because they 
believe that the pacifists have more inconsistencies with their 
arguments than they do. In any case the non-pacifists are in the happy 
position of knowing that the majority of their readers (in varying 
proportions according to the nature of the periodical) are themselves 
confirmed non-pacifists. Where debate took place in the pages of the 
papers (the best example being the Freedom debate between May and 
October 1992) the various contributors appeared unable to shift each 
other from entrenched positions. Most of the arguments could be seen to 
fly over the heads of the protagonists in barrages of aphorisms and 
empirical observations ever more repetitively. 
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The evidence of the propagandist sources differed from the 
activist statements principally in terms of form rather than content. 
The pacifists were found to be much more articulate and comprehensive on 
paper than when interviewed. The non-pacifist contributors' 
predominantly sober reflections were spiced with occasional tirades in 
the pages of some of the activist-oriented periodicals more brazen and 
bellicose than the most intense respondent. 
When issues concerning the justification of violence were raised 
the drift of the content of the contemporary propagandist material was 
not significantly different from the testimony given in the interviews. 
The pacifists believed either that violence was too unethical to 
contemplate, or that it could not produce the desired end of peaceful 
anarchy. The non-pacifists believed almost without fail that violence 
was a necessity for successful social revolution, but were animated more 
by the question of struggle, resistance, and preparation rather than 
revolution. Indiscriminate clandestine violence was roundly condemned; 
support for defensive and empowering violence was given in varying 
proportions. 
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CHAPTER 5 HISTORICAL AND DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVES 
In this chapter I seek to review some of the relevant issues 
concerning the anarchist view of violence and social change. In the 
first section I examine the ways in which several historical theorists 
of anarchism or proto-anarchism (I do not seek to get involved too 
deeply in the debate of who exactly were the great anarchist theorists; 
see Eltzbacher, 1972; Fleming, 1979, pp. 19-22; Crowder, 1991, pp. 2-3) 
deal with the question of violence and social change. The failure to 
glean great enlightenment from this is reflected in the concern of the 
third section, which addresses logical and ethical problems facing those 
who would procure social change. In the second section I look at how 
anarchists, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
experimented with individual acts of clandestine violence. I find that 
the "era of attentats" experienced in a number of countries was, on 
balance, a source of disutility to anarchist movements. Great lasting 
harm and clandestine violence are not, however, indivisible; the degree 
of disutility experienced is found to be dependent on several other 
conditions. 
Anarchist Theorists on Violence 
An initial impression may be derived from surveying both the 
theorists of anarchism and their interpreters that the issue of violence 
is not an important consideration. For one group of theorists, the 
philosophical anarchists, the development of a sturdy systemic critique 
is the primary concern. In order to encourage popular interest in socio-
political alternatives they determine and advertise the flaws of the 
existing arrangement. The visionaries of new worlds, such as Peter 
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Kropotkin, sketch drafts of the future, and argue the extent of what is 
possible. Neither group is expansive on the question of change that 
links their philosophising and theorising. One should not really expect 
those who delve into the unknown, be they philosophers or SCientists, to 
commit themselves to a particular course which they cannot know to be 
certain. However, criticising and dreaming is sterile unless there is 
some means of bridging the chasm from what is to what ought to be. In 
this section I look at how William Godwin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 
Michael Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin and other theorists have looked at the 
vexing question of violence. 
Godwin's most important contribution to the early formulation of 
anarchism was his Enqui~ Concerning Political Justice, a general review 
and critique of concepts of government, society, and property. Two of 
the eighty-five chapters deal with the ideas of effecting resistance or 
change (1985, Book IV, Chs. 1 & 2, pp. 255-81). Proudhon's critique and 
vision are expanded in the Federal Principle, What is Property, and the 
General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Centu~. His most 
incisive comments on the question of violence are to be found in La 
Guerre et la Paix and on revolutionary violence in the General Idea ... 
(1970, pp. 159-61; 202-14). 
The insurrectionist and arch-conspirator Bakunin's writings on 
violent revolutionary activity are as fragmentary as everything else he 
considered (1964, pp. 372-80). Kropotkin, scientist and propagandist, 
produced the most enduring popular works of the early anarchists: 
Conquest of Bread; MUtual Aid; Fields, Factories and Workshops, and 
others. Consciousness of ethical questions relating to revolution and 
the attentats pervade many of his letters, pamphlets, and articles 
(Xropotkin, 1927, pp. 34-43; M.A. Miller, 1976, pp. 206-7, 174-5; Cahm, 
1989, p. 207). 
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On the ethical justification of the use of violence for political 
and social change William Godwin remained largely congruent with his 
basic humanist concepts. If, as he held, people would one day conduct 
their affairs entirely rationally then it seemed logical that the more 
one aspired to this goal the more change would be effected by rational 
persuasion. The use of force or coercion to effect change was an 
indication of the imperfect rationality of the user. If a rational goal 
encountered resistance which required force to overcome it, this was an 
indication that the resisters were insufficiently prepared for 
interrelationships based on reason: 
No people are competent to enjoy a state of freedom who are not 
already imbued with a love of freedom. The most dreadful tragedies 
will result from an attempt to goad mankind prematurely into a 
position, however abstractedly excellent, for which they are in no 
degree prepared (1985, p. 262). 
Godwin was not, however, by any means a pacifist. On the matter of 
self-defence he maintained a consequentialist stance, both in regard to 
individual assault and collective oppression. A violent or coercive act 
against an individual attacker or government oppression demanded the 
calculation of the "benefit or mischief to result" (1985, p. 265). The 
calculation for a collective case was regarded by Godwin to be far more 
serious than an individual one. Godwin does not accept the idea that a 
population lacking the consciousness of rationality can or should be 
"freed" by the act of revolution. Nor does he see that an act of 
revolution is necessary where the massed population and the ruler's 
putative supporters defect to the side of liberty, for clearly the ruler 
maintaining no popular support could no longer rule. 
Yet while Godwin appealed to the effect of time on ignorance and 
malevolence - even should it take generations of "flux and reflux" 
(1985, p. 279), so pessimistically did he generally view the effects of 
violence - he accepted that, having been so historically important, 
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bloody revolution might prove unavoidable among the impatient. In such a 
case Godwin thought that rational thinkers should not turn their back on 
the irrational acts of their fellows, but capitalise on the positive 
effects and ameliorate the negative ones (1985, pp. 280-1). 
Proudhon lauded the positive influence that war had had on human 
progress: 
War, we greet you! It was war that enabled man to assert majesty 
and valor when he had scarcely emerged from the primeval slime 
(1970, p. 203, from La Guerre ... ). 
Despite his exhortations as to the vigour that war len~ to peoples, 
Proudhon also believed that it was no longer justified between nations _ 
heroic and virtuous struggles for ideals having been superseded by 
grubby economic wars. Proudhon's rather confusing prescription for this 
was the pursuit of economic equilibrium and eternal peace through the 
actions of the workers (1970, p. 214; Hyams, 1979, pp. 246-7). 
In the face of the coming revolution Proudhon's advice to the 
advocates of government was to "give way to it inch by inch so that 
instead of proceeding by leaps and bounds, humanity's eternal evolution 
may proceed imperceptibly and without causing an upheaval" (1970, p. 
159). Given his belief in the potential rationality of all and the 
example of the French Revolution, his personal desire was justice for 
all rather than retribution against former oppressors. He maintained 
that government's best course of action was the gradual acceptance of 
reform so that pressure for immediate and violent revolution should not 
build up. However, he bemoaned the thought that those in government, by 
dint of "vested interest and pride of the government," were not wise 
enough to grasp the best course of action for all and thus the eventual 
result was invariably violent revolution (1970, p. 160). 
The destruction of property and loss of life encountered in the 
act of revolution were anathema to Proudhon. However, the theory of 
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polemical historical progress ascribed to him by de Unamuno (1974, p. 
78) and Edwards (Proudhon, 1970, pp. 20-1) meant that there was, for 
him, no point in moralising against violent revolution. All the 
conscious could hope to do was attempt to awaken agents of . 1njustice to 
their peril. Proudhon's judgement on the act of revolution as a "jolt" 
rather than the essence of systemic change (as he believed Marx held) 
mirrors a great number of the statements from Chapters 3 and 4 which 
subordinate the revolutionary significance of the act of revolution 
itself (Proudhon, 1970, p. 151). 
Unlike Proudhon, Bakunin encouraged aspects of psychological and 
physical preparation for revolution, in some ways a reflection of the 
audience the two men sought. Crowder describes Bakunin's - and 
Kropotkin's - positive conception of revolution as a cathartic necessity 
in the transition from the state to anarchy and contrasts this with 
Proudhon's muted hope for institutional reform (1991, p. 148). Bakunin's 
most infamous comment on revolution was made during the height of his 
involvement with Ruge's radical Hegelians: 
Let us put our trust in the eternal spirit which destroys and 
annihilates only because it is the unreachable and eternally 
creative source of all. The passion for destruction is also a 
creative passion (Carr, 1975, p. 10). 
Given that this was made more than twenty years before his adoption of a 
consistently anarchist line this should not be given the prominence it 
frequently is in determining the anarchist Bakunin. 
Certainly Bakunin remained consistent in the belief that those who 
wished to create a new society would possess a passion for the 
destruction of the old. By destruction Bakunin primarily meant property 
rather than people. If, as Crowder believes, a cathartic effect was to 
be had it would not be at the expense of others' lives: 
A rebellion on the part of the people, which by nature is 
spontaneous, chaotic and ruthless, always presupposes a vast 
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dest:u~tion of property. The working masses are ready for such 
sacr1f1ces (1953, p. 380, from Statism and Anarcbism) . 
Destruction, though necessary, was not revolutionary per see The real 
motive of the urge to destroy was a revolutionary vision of 
constructiveness and a desire for freedom (1964, p. 381). 
Bakunin expected that the act of revolution would cost lives, for 
the supporters of the state would defend their interest. Nevertheless he 
had bemoaned the failure of mankind to develop an alternative means of 
systemic change, much as had Proudhon: "Of course it is a pity that 
humanity has not yet invented a more peaceful means of progress, but 
until now every forward step in history has been achieved only after it 
has been baptized in blood" (1964, p. 372, from the Bear of Berne ... ). 
Again, somewhat to the contrary of Crowder's catharsis argument was 
Bakunin's lack of interest in wreaking vengeance on the bourgeoisie, for 
the revolution "need not be vindictive nor bloodthirsty" (1980, p. 421, 
from Pbilosopbical Considerations). Nor was extinguishing the memory and 
resentments of the bourgeoisie by executing them part of Bakunin's 
blueprint of revolution: " ... after having assured your victory and 
having destroyed the power of your enemies, show yourselves humane 
toward the unfortunate stricken-down foes ... recognize them as your 
brothers ... " (1964, p. 377, from the Circular to Italian Friends). 
Kropotkin also saw the act of revolution as a necessary part of 
the changing the social order, and thought it bizarre that anyone might 
believe that fundamental systemic change could take place "without so 
much as jarring the dishes on their dinner tables" (1972a, p. 113). In 
attempting to lump him in with fellow "later anarchist" Bakunin, Crowder 
sees too much sinister intent in Kropotkin (1991, p. 150). Rather, the 
evidence Crowder presents suggests a theorist resigned to the necessity 
of violent revolution, hoping for the minimum of casualties and 
retribution: "The question is, then, not so much how to avoid 
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revolutions as how to attain the greatest results with the most limited 
amount of civil war, the least number of victims, and a minimum of 
mutual embitterment" (Kropotkin, 1899, p. 77). 
The most touted disparities that are found with Kropotkin are his 
connections with the formulation of propaganda by the deed and 
consequent partial responsibility for the era of attentats. Association 
with propaganda by the deed of the Malatestan kind is not the kiss of 
death, but it does indicate a readiness to use lethal violence just for 
educative purposes. Promoting individual clandestine violence leads 
every Marxian to point out that such a method completely misunderstands 
the nature of the system. 
To what degree Kropotkin should be associated with propaganda by 
the deed is a subject of some disagreement. Martin Miller declares that 
Kropotkin seriously took up the idea. Miller cites as evidence an 
infamous joint article with Brousse in Bulletin in August 1877, and 
Kropotkin's programme enunciated at the Jura Federation congress at 
Fribourg in 1878. To balance this is the cautious hand Kropotkin laid on 
the 1881 London Congress despite the enthusiasm engendered by the Tsar's 
assassination. Cahm tends to give Kropotkin the benefit of the doubt, 
both in regard to the Bulletin article (where she accepts his later 
testimony that Brousse wrote it alone), and his intellectual commitment. 
She suggests that Kropotkin was never particularly interested in 
propaganda by the deed: "For him an act undertaken either as a lesson in 
anarchist ideas or as a publicity stunt was both morally and tactically 
bankrupt" (1989, p. 271). Cahm interprets Kropotkin's ideal pre-
revolutionary activity to be a combination of theoretical propaganda and 
serious insurrectionary deeds (1989, pp. 102-13). If Cahm's is the 
closer assessment it is a very fine thing. Kropotkin's excitability and 
ambiguity on the eve of the era of attentats, may lead to either 
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interpretation, particularly if one looks at the Spirit of Revolt (1927, 
p. 40; see also Avrich in Kropotkin, 1972a, p. 11). 
Kropotkin's flirtations with individual clandestine violence 
reflected firstly an enthusiasm for an apparently successful short-term 
tactic against despots and secondly an apology for its later employment. 
It was never his considered opinion that the attentats could encourage 
wider revolutionary activity. Though he was ultimately disapproving of 
the attentats he, among others, could not condemn the Attentater. 
After flirting with the idea of education as the fundamental of 
consciousness raising, Elisee Reclus, a contemporary of Kropotkin and 
fellow famous geographer, became one of the foremost theorists of 
propaganda by the deed. Reclus' conclusions on the question of violence 
were quite elemental in that he promoted the naturalness of anger and 
violence of a people becoming conscious of the grave injustices to which 
they were subject. Though wishing vengeance could be avoided by the no 
means rational masses Reclus noted: "if whole classes and populations 
are unfairly used, and have no hope of finding in the society to which 
they belong a redresser of abuses, is it not certain that they will 
resume their inherent right of vengeance and execute it without pity?" 
(Fleming, 1979, p. 175). 
Reclus considered the terrorist phase of propaganda by the deed to 
be a part of an era of instinctive rebellion rather than the strategy of 
conscious anarchists (Fleming, 1979, pp. 176, 210). To condemn the 
anarchist Attentater would be to side with the oppressors, and the 
motivation was more important than the act - and to want to be rid of an 
oppressor was a good motive. The more conscious an anarchist a rebel 
became the more that rebel would be able to gauge when to stop using 
force, that is, when it became reactionary. For Reclus the morality of 
propaganda by the deed, judged by act rather than rule, was based on two 
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things: motive and intellectual development. Fleming, Reclus' modern 
English-language interpreter, also notes that Reclus never saw violence 
as desirable, only inevitable (1979, p. 211). Though conscious 
anarchists would see the word as a more effective propaganda tool, they 
might not discount the discriminate use of violence in a revolutionary 
context. 
Two anarchists who represent reasonably well the twentieth century 
non-pacifist anarchist consideration of violence are Alexander Berkman 
and Nicholas Walter. In the seminal ABC of Anarchism Berkman attempts to 
divorce violence from any special connection with anarchism (1942, pp. 
11-7). While denouncing violence as barbaric he explains that anarchists 
are subject to the same socialisation as others, so it should not be 
unexpected that they should at first adopt the barbaric methods of 
others. By this he defends the fin de siecle attentats and bombings with 
which he was involved as having possibly been "justified and useful in 
the pastil as ameliorating or inspirational (1942, p. 14). 
Despite the need to rationalise his past Berkman was certain that 
the attentats were no key to revolutionary social change. He agrees with 
Godwin that "a change must first take place in the ideas and opinions of 
the people" (1942, p. 49). The Russian Revolution had failed because the 
people were insufficiently conscious to desire individual sovereignty. 
Berkman concurs with Proudhon that in revolution lithe fighting phase of 
it is the smallest and least important part" (1942, p. 52). Violence in 
the revolution was to be used only against irreconcilable and dangerous 
statists; the preservation of a martial mentality was counter-
revolutionary. 
Walter's About Anarchism shares with the ABC of Anarchism the 
concept of necessity: "the inevitable violence occurs when the people 
shake off their rulers and exploiters" (1969, p. 14). Walter recognises 
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that violence is not to be eagerly anticipated, for in his opinion it is 
a blight on the consistency of anarchism. "Vl.·olence . h b 
ml.g t e necessary 
for the work of destroying the old system, but it was useless and indeed 
dangerous for the work of building a new system" could be the refrain of 
the mid to late twentieth century non-pacifist anarchist. 
Anarcho-pacifist contribution to the subject is actually quite 
poor. Whilst pacifism is a reasonably well documented subject its 
contributors usually write within the context of opposing war and 
militarism. The anarcho-pacifists appear prepared to subsume their 
anarchist disposition to the pacifist one. When Paul Nursey-Bray's 
excellent bibliography of English language anarchist literature comes to 
pacifism it details mostly the works of, and studies on, Tolstoy and 
Gandhi, who while they shared some anarchist characteristics were not 
professed anarchists. 
Redpath claims that "the mature Tolstoy taught anarchism" (1960, 
p. 23). Actually this was just a by-product. Tolstoy's social thought 
derived from an interpretation of the teaching's of Christ that demanded 
inner harmony and the love of one's enemies. Pacifistic non-resistance 
was at the Tolstoyan core. Tolstoy rejected government as well - but 
primarily because much of the purpose of governments as he saw it was 
the performance of acts of violence, coercion and retribution (Tolstoy, 
1960) . 
The Tolstoyan goal was a personal moral transformation, the 
success of which was marked by one's own inner harmony. The conversion 
of others might be pursued only by methods consistent with an 
individual's inner harmony: example, persuasion and non-resistance. Only 
good was morally equal to challenging evil - evil could not challenge 
evil. To maintain his consistently absolutist line Tolstoy had to oppose 
the violence of liberators as of oppressors. Woodcock, however, believes 
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that Tolstoy viewed popular violence as only partly evil, stemming as it 
did out of ignorance rather than design (Woodcock, 1979, p. 217). 
Gandhi's ideal was "a state of enlightened anarchy in which each 
person will become his own ruler" (1987, p. 602). Yet while he stated 
that he preferred "no rule" to "misrule" ( 1987, p. 595) Gandhi was no 
more an anarchist than Karl Marx. The road to enlightened anarchy was in 
his view best followed by respecting the existing authorities and 
nudging them toward reform: 
A civil resister is ... a philanthropist and a friend of the State. 
An anarchist is an enemy of the State and is, therefore, a 
misanthrope (1958, p. 60). 
Indeed, Gandhi sometimes viewed the term "anarchists" as synonymous with 
"terrorists" (1987, pp. 60, 553; 1958, p. 60). 
Gandhi's disciples in the sarvodaya movement more closely parallel 
anarchism's immediate tensions with government in its encouragement of 
alternative institutions. Ostergaard and Currell find in Vinoba Bhave an 
ideological current on social change comparable to Godwin (1971, p. 39). 
Like Godwin, Bhave found that the ultimate swaraj (meaning, 
approximately, self-government) could only come when people were better 
educated and more conscious of their abilities than they are now. 
Education was the first thing on the agenda of the sarvodaya movement, 
and anarchy the very last. Bhave was critical of Marxism-Leninism for 
its desire to concentrate power before dissolution (Bhave, 1962, pp. 29-
30). Nevertheless it is somewhat of a misnomer to label Bhave an 
anarchist as he, like Gandhi, accepted cooperation with government as 
integral to change. 
Bart de Ligt, one of the successors of Domela Niewenhuis in the 
Dutch anarcho-pacifist movement, produced a milestone in strategic 
pacifist literature in his Conquest of Violence. The small section on 
revolution is unequivocally condemnatory of violent methods: "the blood 
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shed in a revolution is the sign of its imperfection,n and 
the extent that it is badly prepared" (1989, po 163). Full 
nis bloody to 
consciousness 
of the working masses was the key. But rather than the Tolstoyan 
interpretation of nonviolence, non-resistance 
, de Ligt approved of 
syndicalist industrial disruption and Gandhian civil disobedl.0en 
ceo 
Should all the oppressed people in the world consciously apply 
themselves to nonviolent revolution, then the global state system would 
necessarily collapse, without shedding any blood of the defenders of the 
state (though he noted that some revolutionaries might be killed) . 
De Ligt was concerned that the use of violence by revolutionaries, 
whilst possibly "a secondary help," would dehumanise revolutionaries and 
be counter-revolutionary in so far as it was inconsistent with the goals 
of social revolution (1989, p. 162). Like the woodcockian interpretation 
of Tolstoy, de Ligt says that the conscious anarcho-pacifist in a 
violent pre-revolutionary situation supports the revolutionaries rather 
than the reaction (in spirit, but not physically) because they are for 
revolution, though they fail to grasp the most effective means of change 
(1989, p. 171). 
The classical anarchist theorists did not ignore the question of 
the morality and doctrinal validity of the use of violence as much as 
find it irrelevant. They maintained - through examining historical 
precedent, or theorising on the nature of political power or economic 
wealth - that violence in social revolution was inevitable. The ruling 
hierarchy would always defend their position to the best of their 
ability, necessitating the preparation of revolutionists to use violence 
(whether reactive or pro-active). Some theorists (Godwin for instance) 
believed that social transformation itself was a certainty. Given such 
conclusions moralising was thoroughly inappropriate. 
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Proudhon and Bakunin have been seen to glorify violence. Proudhon, 
with little reference to morality, asserted the positive part that 
violence had played in the general scheme of individual and historical 
development - but he did not revel in the idea of death and destruction 
in pursuing the path of revolution. In his capacity as a man of action 
and propagandist Bakunin did not shirk from the violence he considered 
inevitable. However, the murderous intent which it is suggested he 
displayed in his association with Nechaev is more than matched by his 
more sober concerns for fraternity and compassion. For all of the 
anarchist theorists violence was not seen to make the revolution -
rather it was considered an unpleasant necessary by-product. Latter-day 
theorists have not embellished much on the classical conclusion of 
unfortunate necessity of violence in revolution. 
Anarcho-pacifist theorists did not share this analysis of social 
revolution. Moreover, as they developed their stance primarily (but not 
exclusively) from religion and pacifism rather than anarchism, their 
agenda on moral issues was quite different from the non-pacifists. 
Though there is little evidence to prove the point, philosophical 
anarchists, who tend to share greater common heritage with non-pacifists 
than pacifists, surely derive their reservations over pursuing the road 
to anarchy as much from doubts over ideological consistency as practical 
concerns. 
Anarchism and the Era of Attentats 
The anarchist Attentater of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries had a disproportionately large effect both on 
hi movement. It was not that there were very few society and the anarc st 
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incidents performed by anarchists (or those who claimed to be 
anarchists) - Robert James' rather hopeful assertion that there were 
"(approximately) forty violent attacks" by anarchists from 1880 to 1912 
(1985, appendix iv), pales beside Nunez Florencio's detailing of over a 
hundred bomb incidents (aimed overwhelmingly at property not people) in 
Catalonia alone between 1888 and 1909 (1983, pp. 191-7). Rather it was 
because the performers (as a percentage of the anarchist movement) and 
casualties (as a fraction of the period's violent deaths) were 
exceedingly few. It was the combination of the volume of incidents with 
the few notorious assassinations and infamous bombings that enabled the 
anarchist to be labelled terrorist: The fact that the vast majority of 
anarchists had nothing to do with either planning or supporting the 
bombs or the attentats was completely overlooked. 
Anarchists were hundreds if not thousands of years removed from 
the invention of political assassination or indiscriminate sub-state 
killing (see Ford, 1985, chs. 2 & 5). They were not the only or the 
first people in the nineteenth century to use clandestine violence: 
monarchists, republicans, democrats, and constitutionalists all had. Nor 
did anarchist Attentater use clandestine violence as part of a 
systematic revolutionary programme as had Russia's Narodnaya Volya 
(People's Will), or the later Socialist Revolutionaries (Kirkham, et 
al., 1969, pp. 427-9). 
Indeed, the turn to individual violence needs explanation, for so 
much in anarchist theory implicitly appeared to reject its use. 
Incendiary anarchist literature had, in the years prior to 1881, made 
reference to clandestine violence but it was primarily written in 
bravado, to shock or excite (as it is today), with neither the authors 
nor their readers actually practising the deeds. The anarchists and 
socialist revolutionaries up to the 1880s had not been Qreatly 
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interested in clandestine violence because they had seen no reason to 
be; massive change had to involve a mass. 
In this section I examine some of the important factors associated 
with the initial spread of anarchist involvement in clandestine 
violence. There are the failures of open revolutionary movements from 
the middle of the century to the Benevento uprising; the attraction to 
conspiracy and clandestinity in response to repression, exemplified by 
Bakunin; and the example of others, particularly Narodnaya Volya and 
their assassination of Alexander II. After these are taken into account 
I examine the history of the attentats in several of the front-line 
countries. Deterrence and retaliation are seen as the two most important 
motivations while revolutionary intent is but a minor factor. The 
political consciousness (or a psychological profile) of the Attentater 
is hardly possible to determine in most cases as information about them 
is so sketchy. Finally I find little in common of the duration and form 
of conclusion of the attentat "era" in each country. 
Causation 
Propaganda by the deed developed from a number of sources. Perhaps 
most significant for anarchists was the reaction of Bakunin (fresh from 
his association with Nechaev) to the apparent collapse of the new French 
republican government in the face of the Pruss ian armies in 1870: 
..... from this very moment we must spread our prinCiples not with words 
but with deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and the 
most irresistible form of propaganda" (1980, pp. 195-6). In principle 
Bakunin maintained hope of practical victories rather than propaQanda 
ones, and when the cantonalist insurrections in Spain (1873-4) collapsed 
he moved onto the developinQ situation in Italy. The mainsprinQs of the 
Italian movement, Malatesta, Cafiero, and Costa were involved in 
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insurrectionary uprisings in 1874 which failed bef 
, ore militating toward 
the idea of the insurrection as propaganda for, rather 
than prelude to, 
revolution. 
The insurrectionary incarnation of propaganda by the deed achieved 
its apex with its adoption by the Italians at the Congress of Florence 
in 1876, and its implementation in the Benevento uprising in 1877. 
Despite its unimpressive results the educational spirit of Benevento was 
applauded by Paul Brousse, an advocate of propaganda by the deed as 
early as 1873, in his L'Avant-Garde. It was Brousse, who provided the 
link between the revolutionary potential of insurrectionary propaganda 
and the attempted tyrannicides by Hodel and Nobiling on the Kaiser, and 
Moncasi on Alfonso XII of Spain in 1878 by applauding both (Cahm, 1989, 
pp. 86-7). Of the Moncasi attentat L'Avant-Garde commented that if 
successful it would have done "un grand service a. la r6volution l1 
(Stafford, 1971, p. 124; but see also Dubois, 1894, p. 151 for L'Avant-
Garde on the republican nature of regicide) . 
Where repressions and imprisonments in the most rebellious 
countries made the organisation of propagandistic uprisings impossible 
or their cost too high, the practitioners varied in response. Brousse 
and Costa opted for electoral possibilism, Malatesta maintained the 
value of insurrection, and others sought clandestine activity. 
Secret societies found favour with several leading anarchists 
because of their anti-establishment history, practical successes and 
almost mystical appeal. Freemasonry provided the organisational 
blueprint for the later secret societies; the Sicilian Mafia (from the 
late eighteenth century) and the Neapolitan Camorra (from around 1820) 
both began as movements of rebellion and resistance. More relevantly the 
Italian Carbonari (also beginning around 1820) was a secret society 
chiefly intended to counter oppression by landowners. The Carbonari used 
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intimidation, blackmail, arson violence and d . 
, , mur er aga~nst 
intransigent landowners and government officials 0 . . 
. rgan~sat~onally, the 
Carbonari's members could not opt out of the society on pain of death. 
The French Charbonniers were organised into cells so that no member knew 
more than twenty others (Hyams, 1975, pp. 53-4, 56-7). 
Whether Bakunin's freemasonry encouraged his foundation of secret 
societies, or his interest in conspiracy made freemasonry appealing is a 
moot point. Either way his interest in conspiracy led to various 
attempts to form clandestine groups with himself at the centre. A 
Florentine Brotherhood emerged in 1864 and submerged in 1865 when 
Bakunin moved to Naples. The International Brotherhood which he 
developed there sought to imitate the organisation and ethos of 
allegiance of the Carbonari - cells and hierarchy, threats and vengeance 
against renegades - despite a negligible membership. Nevertheless, 
Bakunin made fantastic and unbelievable claims to its international 
appeal within a year (Carr, 1961, pp. 327-31). Perhaps the only real 
product of the organisation was Bakunin's 1866 National Catechism and 
Revolutionary Catechism (1980, pp. 76-101). Written as the Brotherhood's 
programme it has been described by Kaminski as "the spiritual foundation 
of the entire anarchist movement" (Bakunin, 1980, p. 73). 
The Nechaev affair (1869-70) initially reconfirmed Bakunin's love 
of adventure, secrecy, and intrigue. Nechaev created out of thin air the 
same kind of revolutionary organisation that Bakunin had been dreaming 
of on a grander scale. Bakunin even created the World Revolutionary 
Alliance on the spot so that Nechaev could be its accredited Russian 
representative. He also collaborated with Nechaev on the most 
significant appeal to amoral terroristic methods, the 1869 Catecbism ot 
a Revolutionary (the actual authorship is debated; Carr, 1961, pp. 395-
6, and Nettlau, 1924, p. 30 suggest Bakunin wrote it; Joll, 1979, p. 77. 
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HYams, 1975, pp. 25-6, and most persuasively Avrich, 1988, p. 40, and 
Saltman, 1983, p. 13, that it was entirely or predominantly Nechaev's). 
The Catechism bore little similarity to anythinq Bakunin wrote before or 
after Nechaev. It shadows the vanquard revolutionary Tkachev and 
Ishutin's inner circle "Hell" in its contempt for anythinq less than 
total dedication not to a harmonious post-revolutionary future, but to 
nihilistic revolution alone. The Catechism is the handbook of the 
literal terrorist: 
He is not a revolutionary if he feels any sympathy for this world. 
He must not hesitate to destroy any position, any place, or any 
man in this world - all must be equally detested by him .... Above 
all those who are especially inimical to the revolutionary 
orqanization must be destroyed; their violent and sudden deaths 
will produce the utmost panic in the qovernment ... (Payne, 1967, 
pp. 174-5). 
The cynical amorality of Nechaev was anathema to contemporaneous and 
later anarchists, but his fanatical loqic had been allowed to make its 
mark. With the qreat revolutionary loudspeaker Bakunin as patron his 
voice was heard. His subsequent murder of a co-conspirator and his 
resilience (unto death) in the Peter-Paul Fortress directly inspired not 
only Narodnaya Volya, but also Lenin, the Black Panthers and the 
Japanese Red Army (Payne, 1967, pp. 230, 243; Avrich, 1988, pp. 50-1). 
The most direct influence on the direction that some anarchist 
revolutionaries took in the face of the difficulties of insurrectionary 
propaqandism was the example of other politically-motivated assassins 
and bombers. Clandestine violence by individuals and sub-state qroups 
(commonly known as terrorism, thouqh terror was only occasionally the 
explicit aim) was not a new phenomenon in the late eighteenth century, 
having been used by the weak aqainst the stronq at least as far back as 
the Zealot struqqle against Rome (Laqueur, 1977, pp. 6-10; Ford, 1982, 
pp. 1-2). More recently Napoleon had been the subject of a number of 
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assassination attempts, and President Lincoln was J' t f 
us one 0 a number 
of victims. 
However, it was a strand of Russian populism that provided some of 
the greatest impetus to the anarchist attentats. Populism was a 
disparate theme revolving around the rejection of both the ancien regime 
and the threatening bourgeois industrialisation, and the acceptance of a 
simple decentralised peasant/intellectual society (Berlin in Venturi, 
1964, pp. vii-xii Lampert, 1957, pp. 142-3). It emanated from the 
circles surrounding Herzen and Bakunin in the 1840s, Chernyshevsky and 
the nihilist Pisarev in the 1860s, and Tkachev and Lavrov in the 1870s 
(see Avrich, 1967, p. 36). It came to life in Serno-Solovevich's 
intellectual movement Zemlya i Volya (Land and Liberty; 1861-3); in 
Zaichnevsky's manifesto for Young Russia in 1862; in the "go to the 
people" movement inspired by Natanson and the Chaikovskists (1873-4); 
and the revolutionary organisation Zemlya i Volya (1876-9; Venturi, 
1964). The repression of the "go to the people" movement signalled a 
recognition that open revolutionary movements could not hope to operate 
effectively. This came to a head in the split in Zemlya i Volya between 
the Chaikovskist-oriented Cherny Peredel and the urban Narodnaya Volya, 
whose medium-term goal was the assassination of Tsar Alexander II. 
Where the 1866 attack on the Tsar by Karakozov and its consequent 
repression had done little to inspire and much to discourage (not 
Nechaev however), the 1878 attentats by HOdel and Nobiling, and attacks 
by elements of Zemlya i Volya on oppressive Tsarist officials attracted 
increaSing anarchist interest in western Europe - if not uncritical 
support (Cahm, 1989, p. 86; Fleming, 1989, p. 204). Of immense 
inspiration was the successful assassination of Alexander II in 1881. 
This initial success was hailed as a heroic blow against tyrannical 
autocracy (Cahm, 1989, pp. 141-143; von Borcke, 1982, p. 48; Laqueur, 
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1977, p. 57). The subsequent arrest, imprisonment, and execution of the 
conspirators (and others) brought condemnation and sympathy from western 
socialist, and some liberal, opinion (Fleming, 1979, p. 205; Payne, 
1967, pp. 286-9). 
Although the assassination of the Tsar was audacious and succeeded 
in removing one head of state, it made way for a more despotic one _ 
Alexander III - and a reaction which mortally wounded Narodnaya Volya. 
Having said that, it would be wrong to say a programme of assassination 
alone brought repression. The pacific open "go to the people" movement 
was similarly crushed. Moreover, clandestine violence played a 
significant, if less dramatic, part with the next generation of 
populists, the Socialist Revolutionaries. 
The transfer of the Russian example to liberal democratic 
countries was not recommended by the narodnovoltsy. The surviving 
members wrote a letter of condolence on the occasion of President 
Garfield's assassination later in 1881: 
In a country where freedom allows the individual an honourable 
intellectual fight, where the free will of the people not only 
determines the law, but the persons in government; in such a 
country political murder as a combat method is a manifestation of 
the very same despotic spirit we have made it our task to destroy 
(von Borcke, 1982, p. 56). 
This might be viewed as an expression of the soberness of the 
narodnovoltsy, or a gauge of their limited revolutionary aims - they 
were after all no anarchists. western Attentater might also like to 
proffer that the narodnovoltsy were displaying a critical unfamiliarity 
with the repressive capacity of the bourgeois democrats of the West. 
Many populists, among which were Kvyatkovsky and zhelyabov (one of 
Narodnaya volya's conspirators), came to doubt the revolutionary import 
of the assassination of political figureheads under any regime. This, 
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however, has little significance for the later anarchl.'st Attentater; 
their deeds were acts of resistance rather than l' revo utl.on. 
A Selection of National Profiles of the Attentats 
These then are the general components found prl.'or to the anarchist 
grasping of the knife and the bomb: the apparent failure or cost of 
insurrectionary methods; the failure and cost of open movements such as 
the Chaikovskists; the continuing interest in some anarchist circles for 
conspiracy; the reinterpretation of propaganda by the deed to mean any 
symbolic gesture; and the exciting example of other European Attentiter, 
particularly the Russian populists, 
Each country where anarchist attentats occurred had its own 
particular history or spark. Some "eras" lasted only two years, in 
others the method ebbed and flowed for decades. Each country saw a 
repression which varied greatly in permanence of success. In this 
subsection I examine the path of the attentats in fin de si~cle Germany, 
France, and Spain, all of which were greatly affected. Although Austria 
might also count as an interesting case, there is unfortunately very 
little in English on that country's stormy period. 
Ulrich Linse believes that the 1878 anti-socialist law, which made 
open agitation extremely difficult and hazardouswa~ a major cause of the 
turn to terrorism in Germany (1982, p. 210). The anti-socialist law 
itself was a response to the attentat of Nobiling on the Kaiser. Two of 
the influential anarchists who took up the cudgel were August Reinsdorf 
and former SPO deputy Johann Most. Reinsdorf, whose circle had included 
Max HOdel, accepted the symbolism of propaganda by the deed, but was 
also driven by the idea of symbolic punishment of those responsible for 
the 1878 repression (Linse, 1982, p. 210). He planned, amongst other 
things, to combine these two inclinations in a spectacular bomb attack 
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at the dedication of the Niederwald Monument 1.'n 1883 
. Although the 
attempt failed Reinsdorf paid with his life. Most, who had so 
enthusiastically welcomed the Tsar's death that the British imprisoned 
him (Oliver, 1983, p. 18; Hyams, 1975, pp. 43-4) urged on German-
speaking workers (1881-1885) in his organ Freiheit: 
We will murder those who must be killed to be free ... We do not 
dispute over whether it is right or wrong. Say what you will, do 
what you do, but the victor is right. Comrades of "Freiheit", we 
say murder the murderers. Rescue mankind through blood, iron, 
poison, and dynamite (Carlson, 1982, p. 188). 
Further urging of anarchist terror in Germany came from the 
establishment itself. Andrew Carlson details the elaborate machinations 
of the German police to maintain the anarchist threat in order to 
encourage governmental restrictions on all socialists (1982, pp. 185-7, 
192). Freiheit's "secret" distribution network was riddled with police 
agents, some of the most inflammatory articles were written by them, and 
it appears likely that it was secretly financially assisted by the 
police. 
Perhaps to the dismay of Bismarck and the police, the attentats in 
Germany abruptly ended after the killing of Frankfurt Police Chief Rumpf 
in response to the Niederwald sentences. The reason for this was not 
repression but rather the Bruderkrieg (fraternal conflict) which 
enveloped the German-speaking movement in Europe. From 1884 the major 
issue was the conflict between collectivists and communists, between 
Most's Freiheit and the Bohemian Peukert's Autonomie (Trautmann, 1980, 
p. 172; Carlson, 1982, pp. 191-2). 
Most was a formidable agitator among German speaking 
revolutionists in Europe and, upon emigration in 1882, in America. His 
major influence among foreign-born artisans and peasants turned-
industrial workers in New York and other northern seaboard cities was, 
however, to be contrasted with shortcomings elsewhere (Perlman, 1966, 
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pp. 293-4; Sorge, 1977, p. 203). His incendiary writings could not have 
the same power in ethnically and so . 11 d' c~a y ~verse America as Germany. 
His collectivism and rejection of syndicalism 
also lessened his impact 
in many northern and mid-western cities. 
Most was an inspiration to Emma Goldman and Al 
exander Berkman, who 
later attempted to assassinate union-buster Henry Frick (Goldman, 1934, 
p. 6). These, in turn, were to influence Czolgosz, the assassin of 
President McKinley (Trautmann, 1980, p. 213; Goldman, 1934, p. 311). Yet 
Most's writings did not consistently praise the attentats. Whether 
through jealousy or fear of imprisonment/expulsion Most repudiated the 
Berkman attentat in 1892, thereafter throwing the American anarchists 
into further confusion (as after the Haymarket Affair) and Bruderkrieg 
(Trautmann, 1980, pp. 203-5). Nor dared he applaud the McKinley 
assassination as he had that of Alexander II. 
In France the build up to its era of attentats had been such that 
it is more a surprise that the explosion did not occur earlier. The 
concentration of advanced theorists and a large number of attentive, if 
independently-minded, declasse followers is reflected in the mass of 
material inciting violence that had been produced by local groupes 
d'affinite for years (Dubois, 1894, p. 47). When the explosion did occur 
between 1892 and 1894 a sensationalist press, a sympathetic artistic 
elite, and an enthralled/appalled public ensured a comprehensive 
profile. Attentater had declared themselves to be anarchists prior to 
this period (Chaves in 1884 and Gallo in 1886). However, it was 
Fran90 is-Claudius K6ningstein (or Ravachol), Auguste Vaillant, and Emile 
Henry who captured the spirit of the times - the loose spiritual 
confederacy of terrorist, thief, propagandist, and artist later 
reflected in the Pr~cis de Trente in August 1894 (Sonn, 1989, pp. 18-9; 
Weber, 1986, pp. 119-20). 
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The period up to the capture of Ravachol involved a number of 
cases of violence linked with attempts at la re,nr;se . eli 'd 1 
r· ~n v~ uel e, the 
tactic of individual expropriation (or thefts from th bo " 
e urgeol.sl.e) 
exposed by Elisee Reclus in 1880 (Fleming 1979 p 195) Ra h 
' ,. . vac 01' s 
final acts in 1892 were more in keeping with Spanish colleagues insofar 
as they were symbolic bomb attacks in retaliation for harsh punishment 
meted out to the May 1st 1891 demonstrators. In December 1893 Auguste 
Vaillant bombed the Chamber of Deputies, but killed no one. The 
repression that followed this act included the lois scelerates 
(villainous laws) which eventually made simple advocacy of anarchism 
illegal, and were responsible for the closure of La Revolte and Le Pere 
Peinard. After the execution of Vaillant, Henry bombed the Cafe 
Terminus, to the horror of many. Rounding off the period in June 1894 an 
Italian, Santo Caserio, assassinated France's President Sadi Carnot as a 
response to the Vaillant execution (Goldman, 1969, p. 98; Sonn, 1989, p. 
243, says Caserio was avenging Ravachol) . 
Various commentators disagree as to the emphasis that should be 
put to reasons for the end of the French era of attentats. Fleming 
stresses the strait-jacket the lois scelerates had placed on anarchist 
propagandism (1979, p. 214); Weber notes the loss of public sympathy in 
particular after cafe Terminus bombing (1986, p. 117); Sonn suggests the 
relief of anarchists at the acquittals at the Proces de Trente (1989, p. 
24). Part of the problem of propaganda by the deed was that it relied on 
publicity. If the dramatic political message of the anarchist Attentiter 
could be strangled - the anarchist press being gagged and Caserio put to 
death without a statement - much of the romance and point was lost. 
If the police repression stopped the immediate round of attacks, 
it seems likely that it was the internal movement of the anarchists 
themselves that prevented the emergence of a new generation of 
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Attentater. It was clear that the attentats had not advanced the 
development of the anarchist movement in France one iota. Figures such 
as Kropotkin, Grave, and Malatesta were thoroughly alienated (Tuchman 
, 
1964, p. 457; Joll, 1979, pp. 127-8). Even the t .. 
mos oPt1~stic of the 
theorist-propagandists, Reclus, was willing to believe that the lull 
signified a new level of consciousness (Fleming, 1979, p. 219). 
Moreover, the injection of the idea of syndicalism, propagated notably 
by Emile Pouget and practised by Fernand Pelloutier, opened up a 
challenging path to the anarchists, drawing them back to the dogged 
workers and away from the more romantic declasses. 
It is thanks, perhaps, to myopia and the media (their selectivity 
or incapability) that the atentados in Spain have received less 
attention than those of France. The French era was shorter in duration, 
with fewer activists, and resulted in fewer deaths on either side. 
Shadowy amateurish groups such as Los Desberedados (The Disinherited) 
and Mano Negra (Black Hand) sprang up among the largely peasant 
Andalusian anarchists in the early 1880s in response to the legalist 
approach of the Federaci6n de Trabajadores de la Regi6n Espanola (FTRE; 
which was controlled by the industrial north; Brenan, 1969, p. 159; 
Esenwein, 1989, pp. 84-6). These groups performed acts of coercion, 
arson, and assassination against local landowners. The exaggerated Mano 
Negra affair justified, for the authorities, an intense repression which 
crippled Andalusian anarchism for years (Bookchin, 1977, p. 108i 
Bernecker, 1982, pp. 104-5). 
These earlier clandestine groups were local responses using 
retaliation or deterrence against economic targets. The era of atentados 
proper was marked by its combination of the more blunt retaliatory 
attacks with propaganda by the deed - the full force of the theory of 
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propaganda by the deed not having filtered down to Spain "until well 
into the 1880s" (Bookchin, 1977, pp. 116-7). 
The initially low-intensity property-oriented bombings (Nunez, 
1983, pp. 191-3) peaked in 1893 with Paulino Pallas' atentado against 
General Martinez Campos for the Je . ( rez repress~on Esenwein, 1989, pp. 
184-5; Hyams, 1975, p. 112, wrongly states Pallas attacked Canovas; 
Bernecker, 1982, p. 102, is incorrect in believing the general was 
killed). In response to Pallas' execution an acquaintance, Santiago 
Salvador bombed a Barcelona theatre killing fifteen. A return to the 
low-intensity bombing campaign was interrupted three years later. In 
June 1896 a bomb was thrown into the Barcelona Corpus Christi 
procession. That the bomb killed not the attending dignitaries but 
rather twelve common people gave many the impression that the person 
responsible was an agent provocateur (McCabe, 1909, pp. 57-61; Esenwein, 
1989, pp. 184-5). In retaliation for the savage repression following the 
Corpus Christi bomb an Italian, Michele Angiolillo killed Spanish 
Premier Canovas del Castillo. Public disgust at the Corpus Christi 
repression was such that there was little outrage at the death of the 
"doomed" premier; still less over the attempted assassination of one of 
the Montjuich prison torturers (the perpetrator of which, Ram6n Sempau, 
was released without conviction). 
After 1897 the atentados ceased. Esenwein suggests that the Corpus 
Christi persecution physically smashed the bombers' cells (1989, p. 
199). If this is so, the idea remained alive for a new generation of 
Attentlter who emerged with a vengeance between 1904 and 1909, 
frustrated with the teething problems of anarcho-syndicalism. The 
pistolerismo of the early inter-war years marked the uncomfortable 
fusion of the Attentlter with anarcho-syndicalism. 
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The Nature and Intentions of the Attentater 
It is of some significance whether the Attentater should be 
addressed as conscious anarchists (disregarding approval or 
disapproval), or as lunatics desirous of martyrdom, or authoritarian 
socialists. Solnemann for one posits the idea that anarchism and 
"terrorism" are logically incompatible and that the nineteenth century 
Attentater were "partly pathological muddleheads or ideologically 
confused people with no idea of real anarchism ... and partly fanatics 
whose real aim was a communism strictly opposed to anarchism" (1983, p. 
197). It is unsurprising that both non-pacifist anarchists who support 
only reactive violence, and anarcho-pacifists reject a terrorist 
heritage. Though all the Attentater so far examined claimed to be 
anarchists, their degree of consciousness of the baggage attached to 
that label is arguable. 
Commentators point to the borderline personality of such as Gallo, 
the attacker of the Paris Bourse (Joll, 1979, pp. 110, 112). The poverty 
and disrupted family life of several of the Attentiter (for instance 
Ravachol) is frequently mentioned as the psychological root of their 
violence. Tuchman implies the importance of retaliatory frustration, 
Sonn of "oedipal revenge" (Tuchman, 1964, p. 444; Sonn, 1989, p. 245). 
Although a psychological typology may be used as a way both to 
lambast anarchists and to vindicate the assassin, the expansive 
characteristics of the anarchist Attentater defies the construction of a 
single typology (for an in-depth picture of four of the famous 
Attentiter see Longoni, 1970). The cluster of typologies necessary 
really render the exercise pointless. Emile Henry was from an educated 
bourgeois (though revolutionary) background, and extremely intelligent. 
Auguste Vaillant was a single parent employed in white-collar jobs, who 
had raised himself from a desperately poor childhood that began in an 
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orphanage. Alexander Berkman was well-educated and fro " m an 1mm1serated 
Jewish background. Gaetano Bresci was a silk-weaver, family man, and a 
witness of misery rather than its victim. Leon-Jules Leauthier was a 
level-headed workman. The Desheredados were peasants. 
The acts themselves were not in any way un; form. S 
4 orne acts were 
purely symbolic. Luccheni stabbed Elizabeth, the estranged Empress of 
Austria, in doubt over the arrival of his intended victim. Her lack of 
explicit political responsibility was unimportant for she was held 
merely to be a suitable example of the ruling class. Luccheni intended 
by his act to convey a message to ruler and ruled. To the rulers: 
beware, all are tacitly responsible for popular misery and therefore 
under sentence; to the ruled: the ruling class are not invulnerable. 
Leauthier prefaced his random attack on a Serbian minister by writing: 
"I will not strike an innocent in striking the first-come bourgeois" 
(Maitron, 1975, p. 229). 
Similarly, other attentats were performed against leading 
political figures not because they had ordered a particular repression, 
or in retaliation for any particular event, but because they were the 
embodiment of political and economic domination. Umberto I was 
indifferent to the economic conditions of the common worker, but was no 
authoritarian tyrant. Ga~tano Bresci chose him as his victim because of 
his symbolic leadership of the system which to Bresci brought nothing 
but la miseria. Bresci is one of the few Attentater for whom there is 
evidence of a good degree of collusion (Woodcock, 1979, p. 326; Hyams, 
1975, p. 118; but see also Goldman, 1969, pp. 103-5). Leon Czolgosz 
assassinated McKinley not because he was a particularly bad president, 
but because he was a president (Goldman, 1934, p. 317; Hyams, 1975, p. 
120) . 
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However, most anarchist assaults were upon those they held 
responsible for a particular act of repression against anarchists or 
workers: Pallas' attack on Martinez Campos was a reaction to his 
repression of the Jerez uprising,· Salvador bomb d h e t e Liceo to avenge 
Pallas; Caserio killed Camot because of Vaillant, and so on. Even 
Henry's bombing of the Cafe Terminus was predicated on the general 
responsibility of the bourgeoisie, rather than just its political 
representatives, for the Vaillant repression (Henry, 1983, p. 193). 
It is impossible to know exactly how consciously anarchist most of 
the Attentater were at the time of their acts. Some were undoubtedly 
very young and hot-headed, but many others could hardly come under the 
label of easily impressionable: Vaillant had edited anarchist 
newspapers; Reinsdorf had worked with Paul Brousse on the Arbeiter 
Zeitung. A common disposition among the Attentater of which something is 
known (primarily from their trial testimonies) was their sense of 
outrage at the existing state of affairs. Henry noted the hypocrisy of a 
society which talked of justice and equality but in which he saw stark 
divisions of wealth and poverty (1983, p. 190); Caserio related his 
experiences of seeing poverty, starvation and misery (Goldman, 1969, p. 
100). Driven by this sense of injustice they sought ideas of genuine 
change, eventually coming across anarchism. 
The attentats were acts of those unwilling to witness injustice 
without combating it. Vaillant divided the exploited into the complacent 
and the aware: "Tired of leading this life of suffering and cowardice, I 
carried this bomb to those who are primarily responsible for social 
misery" (Goldman, 1969, p. 95). 
If asked whether their acts were really appropriate responses the 
Attentiter coolly responded that their victims were not undeserving. A 
strong strain of retribution against society, or a particular class, ran 
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through their reasoning. Even if the attentat was for a particular 
repression, the persons who conducted or ordered that repression could 
not necessarily be regarded as wholly responsible. On his attitude 
towards his innocent victims Ravachol responded: "There are no innocent 
bourgeois" (Heppenstall, 1969, p. 20). Henry was not disturbed that his 
bomb at the Carmeaux mine offices had in fact only killed policemen, for 
they too were his class enemies. Nor was the arbitrary nature of the 
Terminus bomb felt unjustified: " ... since you hold a whole party 
responsible for the actions of a single man, and strike 
indiscriminately, we also strike indiscriminately" (1983, pp. 194-5). 
vaillant indicated his "satisfaction of having wounded the existing 
society, that cursed society in which one may see a single man spending, 
uselessly, enough to feed thousands of families" (Goldman, 1969, p. 93). 
While Vaillant accepted that two wrongs did not make a right he 
defended his act as necessary self-defence. The lumbering giant had to 
be made aware of its destructive course, and he felt his bomb had the 
power to startle the bourgeoisie: "It takes a loud voice to make the 
deaf hear" (Goldman, 1969, p. 96). 
Henry displayed the idea of deterrence, retribution, and 
propaganda all in one: 
I wanted to show the bourgeoisie that henceforward their pleasures 
would not be untouched, that their insolent triUmphs would be 
disturbed .... At the same time I wanted to make the miners 
understand that there is only one category of men, the anarchists, 
who sincerely resent their sufferings and are willing to avenge 
them (1983, p. 193). 
None of the Attentlter who were allowed a voice expected that 
their particular acts would have anything more than an inspirational 
I · d None were under the illusion that they would effect upon the exp o1te . 
have revolutionary import. Each appeared very aware of the limits that 
an individual could have. Vaillant talked of the insignificance of his 
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act, and the court's punishment in comparison to the greater "cosmic 
forces" (Goldman, 1969, p. 97). Henry showed a remarkable awareness of 
the common criticism of the inability of most people to interpret a bomb 
as the bomber intended: 
I know my deeds will not yet be understood by the masses who are 
unprepared for them ..•. many, misled by your newspapers ..• will 
regard me as their enemy. But that does not matter. I am not 
concerned with anyone's judgement (1983, p. 196). 
Henry fell prey, by this, of the criticism of vanguard individualism, to 
which he was similarly unconcerned. 
The Reaction of Kropotkin and Reclus 
Sources do not exist which tell us the attitudes of the anarchist 
movement as a whole on the matter of the attentats. Two of the leading 
anarchist theorist-propagandists of the day, Peter Kropotkin and Elis6e 
Reclus are worthy of study not because they exactly reflect the 
movement, but because their stances through the era of attentats are 
interesting illustrations of the evolving attitudes of two survivors -
both physically and ideologically - of the period. Moreover their ideas 
on the subject are well documented, unlike Grave or Malatesta, and their 
own writings (particularly Kropotkin) have less of an agenda than those 
of Goldman or the master propagandist Most. 
Kropotkin is a model for the reaction of anarchists to the 
attentats. He was drawn to the question of regicide by the spate of 
attentats in 1878. At this point Kropotkin is found by Caroline Cahm to 
be sympathetic to the perpetrators of the exploits in Germany and 
Russia, be they acting out of desperation, or anti-autocratic intent 
(1989, pp. 108-10, 114). The assassination of Alexander II accelerated 
Kropotkin's interest in clandestine violence as a possible tool of 
revolution rather than the reactive last-ditch of the damned. Kropotkin 
wrote in Le R6volt6 that the narodnovoltsy had taken "an enormous step 
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toward the coming revolution in Russia" (M A Mill 19 
•• er, 76, p. 153). Yet 
in the 1881 London Congress Cahm finds it was Kr tki' opo n s powerful 
influence that counterbalanced the more outrageous stance of such as 
Serreaux, later uncovered as a police spy (cahm, 1989, pp. 154-8). At 
the Congress Kropotkin rejected the euphemistic call for research into 
"chemical studies," reiterating the power of verbal and written 
propaganda as well as that of the deed (M.A. Miller, 1976, p. 146; cahm, 
1989, p. 157). 
It would not be unfair to say that in Kropotkin there could be 
found two forces, which were not necessarily mutually exclusive. He was 
consistent in his support for those whose acts were made out of 
desperation, or where there appeared no avenue of peaceful agitation (as 
he believed was the case in Russia). However, in the 1880s he 
increasingly began to feel that conscious anarchists should know better 
and work toward a collective approach. Cahm feels that Kropotkin's 
desire to emphasise the economic infrastructure was indicative of his 
ambivalence to attacks on the political structure, the result of which 
could only be a change in government (1989, p. 167). 
Kropotkin approved of the assassinations of Carnot and Canovas as 
expressions of self-defence (or retribution) against repressive measures 
(Cahm, 1989, p. 207). However, he could not applaud the acts of violence 
associated with la reprise individuelle (particularly in the case of 
Ravachol) because they appeared to him to be indicative of an unhealthy 
egoism, and because he felt they had no revolutionary content. Likewise 
he rejected acts such as the Liceo theatre bomb in 1893 and the killing 
of Empress Elizabeth in 1898 because the victims were not apparently 
directly responsible for any outrage. He did not feel that revolutionary 
goals could be reached with terrorism, and condemned pro-active Russian 
anarchist terrorists in.Khleb i Volya and Khlebovoltsy in 1904/5 (M.A. 
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Miller, 1976, pp. 206-7; Avrich, 1967, p. 60). Nevertheless, while he 
might not approve of their actions, he refused to condemn those he 
thought were driven by despair to commit brutal and unhelpful acts. 
Luccheni could not be blamed for he was "driven mad by horrible 
conditions" (M.A. Miller, 1976, p. 174). 
David Miller unjustifiably lambasts Kropotkin as incapable of 
censuring brutal murderers. Kropotkin sought to divide the indefensible 
act from the defensible actor, an actor driven to act irresponsibly from 
desperation. Miller characterises Kropotkin's stand as "moral elitism" 
(1984, p. 120). He believes that Kropotkin really should have demanded 
that all act by the same moral standard he demanded of himself. 
Kropotkin was incapable of doing this because he recognised that he held 
his views only by the privilege of not having been exposed to the misery 
which he believed the Attentater had been. It would have been pompous 
indeed for him to demand that all anarchists act as he did when he miqht 
well have acted as they did if he had had their experiences. Kropotkin 
was not one of those who, as Thomas Carlyle put it, "think that it is 
their virtue which keeps them from committing crime, when it's simply a 
full stomach" (Longoni, 1970, p. 51). Where Kropotkin failed himself was 
in not registering enough protest against acts which were in his opinion 
counter-productive to the anarchist cause. 
Elisee Reclus, a scientist of Kropotkin's calibre, was one of the 
few anarchist theorist-propagandists to actively support la reprise 
1nd1viduelle (Fleming, 1979, p. 185). From this it was an easy step to 
h h i one who refused to be the passive victim of accept t at t e assass n was 
oppression any longer. In striking at the oppressor he had become a 
primitive knight of justice. For Reclus, Ravachol was not a fully 
conscious anarchist, no matter how much he might have claimed the label. 
Nor was Ravachol acting immorally in robbing and killing, for Reclus 
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judged that his motivation was good and that th1.'s w ' 
, as more 1.mportant 
than the nature of the act. 
Reclus' anthropological studies and adherence to the idea of 
progressive evolution, brought him to expect a degree of . 1 ' V1.0 ence 1.n the 
course of social change. Human consciousness and sophi t' t' 
s 1.ca 1.on went 
hand in hand: those totally unconscious of oppression did not resist; 
primitive rebels resisted violently; conscious anarchists preferred 
persuasion to violence, but would never entirely rule out its use. The 
more the oppressed gravitated toward anarchist consciousness the less 
likely they would instinctively lash out. Symbolic violence, as 
experienced in the era of attentats was inevitable, but not commendable. 
Fleming writes that Reclus believed that a new level of consciousness 
had been reached at the end of the attentats in France in 1894, and that 
the revolutionaries were ready for a new stage in the struggle for 
change (Fleming, 1979, p. 219). Reclus was hardly as bloodthirsty as 
some of his detractors claimed. Certainly he could not abide the idea of 
conscious anarchists seeking vengeance in the revolutionary struggle, 
for this was utterly reactionary (Fleming, 1979, pp. 210-2). 
The Part the Attentats Played in a Selection of Anarchist Movements 
This subsection attempts to address two important questions 
regarding the significance of the attentats. Firstly, I investigate the 
degree to which the anarchist movements were immersed in the attentats. 
Were the attentats the main attraction or a side-show which stole the 
audience? The actual practitioners had an effect far beyond their 
numbers, but were they simply the tip of an iceberg? Secondly, to what 
degree were they to blame for the repression of popular anarchism? 
Italy, with its history of terroristic secret societies, produced 
some of the most noted assassins: Caserio, Angiolillo, Luccheni, and 
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Bresci. Yet, although there were attentats in It I ' , 
a y, part1cularly 1n 
1878, there was nothing on the scale of France or Spain, The 
insurrectionary influence of Malatesta and Caf' b 
1ero must e considered as 
the nineteenth century zenith of the Italian movement Th I ' 
. e en1ency that 
the insurrectionists had received was replaced by an . 
earnest represS10n 
for the attentats (though they were never directly linked to the 
anarchists) that saw the imprisonment, exile, or renunciation of the 
movement's leaders. The movement only regained vigour with the growth of 
syndicalism before the First World War. 
The German anarchist movement came out least fortunately from its 
period of attentats. Nobiling's attempt in June 1878 and Reinsdorf's 
bomb at Niederwald in 1883 had allowed Bismarck to push through and 
renew anti-socialist laws which crippled the open movements of both the 
fledgling anarchists and socialists (Carlson, 1982, p. 178; Crankshaw, 
1981, p. 345). Freiheit had to be produced in exile and smuggled in, 
groups were persecuted and infiltrated. Yet, although it was the effect 
of the attentats that prevented the spread of anarchism, it was actually 
the Bruderkrieg that, by 1887, had effectively broken their 
organisation. 
In France the relatively small but influential anarchist movement 
(Woodcock, 1979, p. 276, estimates an activist core of 3,000 in the 
1880s) were, from the assassination of the Russian Tsar and the London 
Congress, deeply impressed by violent acts of propaganda by the deed. 
The propagandists concentrated more on mobilising the d'class' than the 
proletarian. Tiring of Zola's naturalism many radical symbolist artists 
and poets attached themselves to anarchism because of its romantic 
aspect (Sonn, 1989, pp. 184-5). The proletarian was humdrum, but 
Ravachol, the thief, murderer, and Attentater became herOically noble 
(Weber, 1986, p. 118). The most vocal portion of the movement was 
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utterly uninterested with industrial organisation, which until 1895 
appeared to augur little more than reformism and delay (Fleming, 1979, 
p. 113). 
The French government were unprepared for the savage measures 
which would have snuffed out the anarchist movement 1 a together, but they 
did make mass propaganda impossible (for a short while), and broke the 
back of the local groups which had fostered the cult of the bomb. It was 
a lesson well learnt by many anarchists shell-shocked from the failure 
of the attentats to achieve much more than the lois scelerates. That the 
fantastically quick amnesty given by President Faure in 1895 saw no 
return to the attentats is indicative of the veneer-like hold that they 
had. Anarchist activists with nowhere else to go, became interested in 
the "sudden" vitality of the syndicats. 
Anarchist involvement in syndicalism was very underexposed during 
the early 1890s, yet many talented organisers, unimpressed with the 
effectiveness of small-group anarchism and the indiscriminacy of the 
attentats, followed this path. Fernand Pelloutier, at a youthful 27, 
acceded to the secretary-generalship of the Bourses du Travail in 1895 
(Ridley, 1970, p. 65). Pouget, eventual editor of the CGT's La Voix du 
Peuple, had kept his eye on anarcho-syndicalism as editor of Le ~re 
Peinard (Ridl~y, 1970, p. 25); Kropotkin, though never a syndicalist, 
studied it with interest. The appeal of anarcho-syndicalism lay in 
Pelloutier's encouragement of anti-possibilism, and the idea of the 
General Strike as a means of emancipation rather than for piecemeal 
reform (Jennings, 1990, p. 15). 
Alongside anarcho-syndicalism there survived, if somewhat more 
circumspectly than before, a more traditional current. Those wary of 
anareho-syndicalist mass organisation, such as Andr6 Lorulet, cultivated 
the idea of the groupe d'affinite. If the CGT was one of the heirs of 
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• 
anarcho-syndicalism, then the Bonnot Gang was part f th inh . 
o e er~tance of 
the affinity group. 
In Spain the pattern was somewhat different. The Bakuninist 
collectivist FTRE was the dominant anarchist influence around the time 
of the original anarchist clandestine bands, the Desheredados. The FTRE 
crumbled between 1885 and 1888 - well before the first peak of the 
anarchist atentados - under the pressure of a collectivist/communist 
Bruderkrieg (Esenwein, 1989, p. 122). The rise of the anarchist 
communists was accompanied by the spread of the idea of propaganda by 
the deed. Pure anarchist cadres in grupos de afinidad paralleled their 
French counterparts in developing a cult of violence. Their recent past 
having been consistently more harsh compared with the French, the 
Spanish grupos were in many cases much more prepared to turn thought 
into deed. Acts of clandestine violence were by no means the only 
interest of the anarchist communists, particularly in its heartland of 
Andalusia. The rising at Jerez in 1892 was indicative of the maintenance 
of an insurrectionary tradition. 
The heirs of the FTRE in 1888 were the effectively anarchist 
communist Organizaci6n Anarquista de la Regi6n Espanola and the 
predominantly Catalonian collectivist Pacto de Uni6n y Solidaridad (the 
forerunners of the FAI and CNT), both of which were victims of 
repressions in the 1890s. Whilst the communists gravitated around anti-
possibilism and propaganda by the deed, and the collectivists in 
fomenting industrial unrest, both began to lose out to the socialist 
possibilist UGT. Furthermore, the repressions from 1893 to 1897 made 
anarchist organisation particularly difficult, and sent many - including 
those opposed to the atentados such as Tarrida del Marmol and Jose Prat 
- into exile. 
1~ 
It would be fair to say that th ,. e repressl.ons (in part caused by 
the atentados) had the effect of creatl.'ng a gap , hi l.nto w 'ch the newest 
French influence of anarcho-syndicalism spread. The influence of the 
attentaters was not, however, erased. Unlike most of the rest of the 
Europe anarchist atentados ebbed and flowed into the twentieth century. 
From the birth of the CNT in 1910-1911 the growth of anarcho-
syndicalism was quick, if spasmodic. Owing largely to Anselmo Lorenzo 
(according to Bookchin, 1977, p. 160) even the anarchist communists 
became interest~d in the mass semi-conscious labour movement. Alongside 
anarcho-syndicalism came the pistoleros. Pistolerismo was endemic 
between 1919 and 1923, and only died with the advent of the Civil War, 
Yet in 1919 the CNT claimed around 100,000 members, much larger than the 
rival UGT (Brenan, 1969, p. 199; Bookchin, 1977, pp. 169, 182). 
The Liceo theatre bomb in 1893 saw a general repression in 
Barcelona including the execution of five unconnected anarchist 
militants. It also saw the creation of special anti-anarchist laws and a 
police unit expressly used to harass anarchists, the Brigada Social. The 
1896 Cor.pus Christi bomb saw a savage repression in which hundreds were 
tortured at the Montjuich prison. However, it would be wrong to say that 
the anarchist movement was treated especially harshly for every supposed 
anarchist outrage. Angiolillo was the only victim after he killed 
ctnovas; the assassination of Canalejas was followed within a year by 
the amnesty of the 1911 General Strike activists. 
Moreover, some of the most crushing repressions had little to do 
with the atentados. The International was suppressed after the 
cantonalist uprisings in 1874. The 1892 Andalusian repression came after 
an abortive rising at Jerez. Canalejas forced the CNT underground after 
the 1911 General Strike. The link, then, between the atentados and 
repression was not exclusive. 
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The second half of the nineteenth century was a period in which 
juvenile anarchism studied and experimented with a number of methods of 
effecting change. The anarchists of this period experienced both 
pinnacles of optimism, plateaux of impatience, and depths of despair. 
The attentats occurred in the midst of these moods. Propaganda by the 
deed developed because it appeared that written propaganda was 
insufficiently convincing, or symbolically weak to the oppressed 
majority; covert methods became more attractive when popular uprisings 
proved too costly, or where insurrection was not even feasible. 
There is no ideal type for either the Attentater or the milieu in 
which they worked. Outbreaks of anarchist clandestine violence occurred 
in both the authoritarian autocracy of Russia and liberal democratic 
France. On the eve of their "eras of attentats" the German movement was 
small and weak, while the Spanish one large and experienced. While the 
evidence appears to show that overwhelming proportions of grassroots 
movements in most affected countries were never more than cursorily 
supportive of their comrade Attentater, the consistent reappearance of 
clandestine violence in Spain implies a stronger undercurrent of support 
in at least one part of the movement. Perhaps the only Significant 
common denominator is that wherever Attentater were active, their effect 
both on anarchists and the population in general was greatly out of 
proportion with their actual number. 
The revolutionary import of clandestine violence was negligible. 
Most of the anarchist attentats of this period are served better by such 
reactive words as resistance, retribution, and deterrence, than 
revolution or revolutionary propaganda. The reactive theme of the 
attentats did not mean that they were without value. But if some 
anarchist theorists observing the passage of the attentats may not have 
155 
disowned individual acts, practically all sought new h avenues trough 
which to pursue more positive objectives. The attentats illustrated the 
destructive capabilities of the anarchist, but not the constructive 
ones. 
Violence, Nonviolence, and the Concept of Revolution 
The identification of anarchism with social revolution is very 
strong. Anarchy requires, after all, a thorough-going change in the 
economic, social, and political arrangements of society. The act of 
dissolving institutionalised authority, capitalism, patriarchy, or 
whatever is captured in such romantic notions as the storming of the 
Winter Palace. This act of revolution is often one of the least 
significant aspects of revolution, but it remains of great symbolic 
importance. Partisans of nonviolence threaten this symbol. Advocates and 
apologists of the violence of revolution are particularly doubtful about 
the possibility of a successful nonviolent systemic revolution, and 
complain that attracting revolutionaries to this blind alley only 
succeeds in diluting those committed to the more promising, violent, 
route. Partisans of nonviolence may in turn claim the impossibility, 
inefficiency, immorality, and ideological inconsistency of reaching 
anarchy by means of violent revolution. 
In the first sub-section I investigate the argument over the goals 
of those whose approach might well be described as philosophical 
anarchists, and whether it is appropriate to call their models 
revolutionary. Secondly I view the debate over the compatibility of 
nonviolence with the idea of revolution. Though many theorists associate 
l~ 
revolution with violence, this does not appear to b 
e a necessary 
conjunction. 
In the second and third sub-sections I look into the strategic 
paradox and attendant moral and ideological dilemmas It' 'bl 
. 1S POSS1 e to 
propose that the use of violence (or indeed coercion) as a means, and 
the goal of anarchy, are entirely irreconcilable. At the same time the 
critic who points out deficiencies in the consistency of non-pacifist 
anarchist revolutionary strategy may also doubt that persuasive means 
are sufficient to overcome the egoistic materialism and 
institutionalised authority that anarchists combat. If anarchism is to 
be anything more than philosophical, it has to be able to argue that 
either rational persuasion is of itself capable of effecting societal 
change, or as I investigate here, that violence is morally excusable, 
ideologically consistent, or simply historically inevitable. 
Enlightenment, Nonviolence and Revolution 
The ideal of a Godwin, a Gandhi, or any of those who gravitate 
around the grey areas of philosophical anarchism is the institution of 
an enlightened anarchy without recourse to methods that contravene 
political or religious/moral tenets. The ideal that Godwin sought was on 
a par with that of Tucker, Warren, or Proudho~. Gandhi's utopia was no 
less far-reaching than the anarchist communism of Kropotkin or Berkman, 
One might note that unlike the true philosophical anarchists Gandhi was 
prepared to become physically involved in securing social change. 
Godwin had faith in the progressive effects of experience and 
education upon people as rational moral agents (1985, p. 414). He 
envisaged that eventually people might be able to assert their full 
right of private judgement, unrestricted by law, yet at the same time 
act to the fullest utility of all (Godwin, 1985, pp. 200, 381-8, 695; 
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Philp, 1986, pp. 169). This was a massive step away from the pessimism 
of Hobbes who feared that without sovereign government, a situation 
where desire outstripped availability would always end in conflict: 
" ... it is manifest that during the time men live without a common Power 
to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called 
Warre" (1992, p. 88; see also Schultz, 1984, p. 6). Nevertheless, Godwin 
felt that until the necessary enlightenment was evident in the mass of 
the population the dissolution of government was undesirable. Until 
virtue supplanted self-love, a condition of anarchy would simply add the 
element of disharmony in human relations to that of injustice (which 
already existed under government; 1985, pp. 663-4). Government had a 
place in an unenlightened society, and it would be all to the better if 
politicians were active in the process of enlightenment (1985, p. 388). 
Gandhi felt even more strongly that working with government in 
order to change it was a desirable and necessary step. While satyagraba 
was the route to national and personal swaraj, government was the best 
means of maintaining the conditions necessary for this harmonious 
change. The premature collapse of government meant to Gandhi nothing but 
a negative and fearful anarchy (1987, pp. 307; 602). 
The application of Gandhi's principles would lead to massive 
societal rearrangement, but the process was predominantly a personal 
one, a gradual one (Gandhi, 1987, p. 447). For Godwin a revolution was a 
hiccup rather than the prime-mover (Godwin, 1985, pp. 269-70). He did 
not label the process of change "revolution," though Gandhi did (Gandhi, 
1987, pp. 447, 507). 
One of the major problems of labelling "revolution" a seamless 
process, which has every expectation of taking generations to complete, 
is that practically all change becomes revolutionary (for instance, see 
Bdwards, 1973, p. 9). It is difficult to describe the movement from 
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feudalism to capitalism as a revolution, whereas most 
are content to 
regard the French Revolution as a revolution. Neumann . 
1S an exception in 
pointing out that hindsight may give an extended period of total social 
rearrangement the appearance of a revolution (1949, p. 334). 
Factors missing from the Gandhian or Godwinian processes, but 
common to political-legal definitions of revolution, are some form of 
societal convulsion within a relatively short time-span. Alternatively, 
sociological definitions concentrate on issues such as the breakdown of 
authority or obedience and de-emphasise the durational and convulsive 
connotations (Ellwood, 1905, p. 51; Amann, 1962, pp. 38-9). Whilst this 
does help to avoid the confusion over the convergence of rebellion, coup 
d'etat, and insurrection with revolution, it also means that any 
breakdown of authority, intended or not, successful or not, becomes 
revolutionary, thus sacrificing one confusion for another. 
Going back to political-legal definitions, and leaving the pOint 
about convulsion until later, it does not seem unreasonable to argue 
that a process of growing rationality and rule by private judgement, 
taking generations to eliminate the need for government should not be 
furnished with the label social revolution. Social scientists concerned 
with a political-legal definition seem fairly agreed that duration is a 
factor which helps separate that which is revolution from that which is 
evolution (Calvert, 1970, p. 14). While Rejai is prepared to quantify 
his position to the extent of "perhaps over a period of two or three 
years to two or three decades" (1977, p. 7), most simply use the words 
"rapid" or "sudden" (Kamenka, 1969, p. 124; Dunn, 1974, p. 12). 
It is definitionally apt to describe a process of great social 
rearrangement with no observable act or time-scale social 
"transformation" rather than social "revolution." Some anarcho-pacifists 
certainly do not feel comfortable with the word revolution (Tolstoy, 
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1960; Redpath, 1960, p. 25). Those who do apply it positively use it 
synonymously with certain types of change; Sampson employs it to mean 
personal enlightenment (1985, p. 23). Yet while most are unlikely to 
feel aggrieved if the effects of gradual societal change are described 
as "transformation" rather than "revolut;on" ;t;s dOff 
• •• a ~ erent matter to 
try and dismiss all nonviolent anarchists from the realm of revolution. 
Political-legal definitions tend to distinguish the socio-
political revolution by the inclusion of a violent convulsion 
(Friedrich, 1969, p. 5; Huntington, 1968, p. 264; Rejai, 1977, p. 8) 0 
This inclusion is partly based on empirical review and partly on the 
perceived need to differentiate revolution from sweeping reforms within 
the constitutional framework. Conventional paradigms such as the French 
and Russian Revolutions are seen to have involved a vi~lent phase and 
break-down in constitutional continuity. Nonviolent tactics are conceded 
at most a partial role in an otherwise necessarily violent revolutionary 
strategy (Oppenheimer, 1969, cho 6; Childress, 1971, pp. 20-1). 
Nonviolence is certainly associated, both by its critics and its 
advocates, with reformism and resistance. The many instances of 
successful or partly successful nonviolent campaigns mentioned by Gene 
Sharp (1971, ch. 5) and Richard Gregg (1960, ch. 1) deal predominantly 
with resistance to alien dominion, or attempts to secure changes in 
government policy by conversion or coercion. Some advocates of 
nonviolence actually dismiss the likelihood of successful nonviolent 
revolution (W.R. Miller, p. 93; Walzer, 1960, p. 372). 
The strategy of determinedly nonviolent "revolutionaries" need not 
lead to further confusion. It is not hard to see, as does Nielsen, the 
possibility of a continuum between reform and revolution (1979, pp. 162-
3); radical reforms may have great transformational import (Gorz, 1967, 
pp. 6-8; Bruyn, 1979, p. 30). But the real differentiation between 
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reform and revolution is the ultimate reliance on illegal or non-legal 
methods to effect the change itself. Kamenka grudgingly admits the 
theoretical possibility of a violence-free revolution which nevertheless 
maintained other factors, chief of which is convulsion (1969, ) p. 124 . A 
degree more enthusiastically, Nielsen notes that "there is no conceptual 
reason why a revolution must be violent, though there may very well be 
substantial empirical justification for believing that all revolutions 
[will be]" (1979, p. 161). However, the prevailing Marxist and anarchist 
attitude is that a nonviolent revolution is a practical impossibility: 
The element of coercion or violence is ... essential to revolution, 
because every political system rests ultimately on the sanction of 
force, and force is therefore needed to overthrow it. In theory 
the upholders of the old system may be so demoralised, and the 
champions of the new one may be so confident and united, that 
power is transferred peacefully. In practice these conditions 
never exist (Close, 1985, p. 2). 
Nonviolent revolutionaries firstly reject the subsidiary that force is 
necessary to counter force. One may also challenge the belief that if 
the necessary conditions for nonviolent social revolution have not 
existed that means they cannot exist. A "hard" nonviolent critique notes 
that if these conditions have not occurred in the past then neither have 
the conditions necessary for the anarchists' social revolution; they are 
contingent upon each other. A weaker form comments that one can hardly 
dismiss nonviolent strategy as ~opeless when violent revolutions have 
singularly failed to take mankind remotely near socialist paradise. 
The viability of nonviolent revolution tends to stand or fallon 
the persuasiveness of its hypothetical strategy. The dearth of past 
experience in the field of social revolution is hardly important if 
nonviolent theorists can produce a logical and complete model. George 
Lakey's (1973) strategy for nonviolent social revolution is possibly the 
most coherent to have emerged (Lakey is not an anarchist, but his model 
is applicable to anarchist-inspired revolution). Lakey puts forward a 
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strategy of progressive stages, which may run concurrently. It begins 
with "cultural preparation" or consciousness-raising, making people 
aware of the faults in society and awakening them to the possibility of 
change. Organisational approaches are made, with basic units being 
affinity groups in the community or work-place. Radical caucuses or 
ginger groups are created within larger, less progressive bodies, which, 
if they cannot be converted, can be left to create counter-institutions. 
Propaganda by the deed, in the shape of symbolic gestures and acts (one 
might think of C.N.D. 's "die-ins" in this context), is used as a further 
method of attracting popular support. Once one's organisational strength 
is assured, be it at affinity group, provincial, or national level, 
political or economic non-cooperation may be countenanced. Only when the 
mass of the population are conscious, organised, and active can the 
revolution, the combination of non-cooperation with intervention against 
the existing institutions and promotion of parallel institutions, begin. 
The possibility remains that some might be prepared to use 
violence to attack the revolutionaries. For Lakey this is not the 
insuperable problem that many non-pacifist anarchists believe it to be. 
Given the preparedness of the revolutionaries for sacrifice, and their 
dogged nonviolent resistance, the defenders of privilege would soon 
realise their untenable position. Nonviolent revolutionaries do not 
necessarily suggest there will be no casualties, but rather there would 
be fewer aggregate casualties than if reactionaries were faced with 
violent revolutionaries. 
Another alternative to the essentially violent approach of 
insurrectionary anarchists is anarcho-syndicalism. Although there is 
nothing to say violence should be entirely dissociated from anarcho-
syndicalism, a number of its early European advocates were anarcho-
pacifists (for example, Nieuwenhuis and de Ligt). The essence of 
162 
anarcho-syndicalism is that the state's (and capitalism's) existence is 
dependent on the economic cooperation of the proletariat. It is through 
the coordinated action of this industrial muscle, not physical attack, 
that anarcho-syndicalists believe the state can be effectively 
challenged. 
Social revolution may still be revolution without the 
revolutionary forces necessarily using violence. Other aspects of 
revolution are more essential: great change; time-boundedness; 
dependence on extra-legal or illegal means to effect the change 
directly; discontinuity and/or convulsion probably involving some 
definable act of revolution or revolutionary moment. Violence is only a 
subordinate factor, dependent on the will of the reactionary and the 
revolutionary. Lakey and others have produced persuasive hypothetical 
models which assert that the determination of nonviolent progressive 
forces can undermine the power and authority of the state without 
violence. Their models share traits with the revolutionary rather than 
the transformational or radically reforming models because they assume a 
time-bounded quality and reject any role for institutional methods of 
change. In both Lakey's strategy and anarcho-syndicalism there is a 
convulsion of sorts: in the former the ultimate competition between 
institution and counter-institution; in the latter a definite act of 
revolution, the General Strike. It makes little sense to deny the 
possibility of nonviolent revolution. The argument is best waged over 
whether it appears likely or unlikely, effective or ineffective. 
The Strategic Paradox and Other Moral/Ideological Dilemmas 
A final area to address is the strategic paradox which is 
sometimes alluded to in academic surveys (Novak, 1954, p. 184; Goodwin, 
1992, pp. 150-1; D. Miller, 1984, pp. 94, 123). Perhaps the most fluent 
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exploration of the paradox is to be found in chapter 5 of Alan Ritter's 
Anarchism (1980). Firstly, Ritter posits that the anarchist goal of 
"conununal individuality" can only legitimately be obtained by methods 
which are not inimical to that 1 ( goa p. 90). Given that he finds only 
rational persuasion in the Godwinian mould as consistent with the mode 
of anarchy, he believes that this is the only legitimate tool for 
anarchists. Secondly, Ritter declares that rational persuasion is an 
insufficiently vigorous method in the face of vested interests prior to 
the dissolution of government, and incorrigible elements in the 
aftermath (pp. 96-8). 
There can be few anarchists who would disagree with the 
proposition that rational persuasion or personal example are the most 
ideologically sound methods of changing behaviour and attitudes. Non-
pacifist anarchists accept that methods of violence and coercion can at 
best eliminate opposition and change behaviour. They are most 
ineffective at breeding committed cooperation and the general good will 
that is necessary for the creation of stable anarchy. From Godwin (1985, 
Book VII, ch. II) to Bakunin (1980, p. 421), to Berkman (1942, p. 52), 
to interviewees in the present work, most anarchists of all hues have 
recognised that understanding and acceptance are the only means to a 
mature anarchy - albeit not necessarily the only path to the dissolution 
of institutional authority and economic subjection. 
Even the champions of rational persuasion, Godwin and Proudhon, 
were doubtful that it could be the motive force of social 
transformation. Ritter finds Bakunin the natural heir to this doubt or 
disillusionment. He finds this arch-conspirator espousing a strategy 
which "often involves what is for anarchists the illegitimate use of 
because Ritter believes that if anarchists force" (p. 103). Illegitimate 
accept the validity of a strategy involving power concepts then they are 
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refuting their own denunciation of power and undernu.'n' th ' 1ng e anarch1st 
ideal. Ritter gives us the proposition that either power concepts are 
valid, and are valid all the time, or they are invalid, and are invalid 
all the time. Ritter sees Kropotkin as a theorist aware of the 
inconsistency of anarchism and power concepts, struggling desperately to 
accommodate this with the apparent impotence of rational persuasion. As 
far as Ritter is concerned Kropotkin failed to produce a practically and 
ideologically sound compromise because it is almost impossible to do so: 
anarchist strategy is invariably illegitimate or ineffective (p. 108). 
The second clause of the strategic paradox, the ineffectuality of 
persuasion, is outside my remit and is not discussed here. The 
ineffectuality of rational persuasion in social transformation at any 
point in human existence may be a point of historical fact. The 
existence of those who are deemed philosophical anarchists indicaterthat 
there are some who doubt the practicability of their ideal. However, the 
interview study shows that there are others (Tom, Seamus) who cling to a 
strategy of pure persuasion. They believe, though it may not convince 
many others, that it is not impossible that persuasion and personal 
example might at some point prove sufficiently appealing, history 
notwithstanding, to convert mankind. 
If the question to be investigated is that of the legitimacy of 
violence we might fish around for arguments other than Ritter's 
allegation that power concepts are inconsistent with anarchism. Anarcho-
pacifism's rejection of violence derives from a number of a priori 
principles and empirical hypotheses which need to be addressed. Also 
there is the challenge of Kantian morality, which parallels the 
ideological critique provided by Ritter. 
What then makes violence so unacceptable? Certainly by most moral 
standards the pain and damage violence causes are bad and are something 
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that at the very least need to be justified or excused. But the 
Tolstoyan insists that there are in fact no justifications or excuses 
for the spilling of human blood. Developing out of a religious 
background the Tolstoyan tradition of absolutist pacifism refers back to 
the commandment "Thou shalt not kill." To the absolutist pacifist this 
commandment is fundamental, set in stone, as it were. Theoretically, a 
non-religious humanist might also hold this commandment to be 
intuitively correct. There is little to be gained from arguing the value 
of this fundamental if it derives directly from a faith in a supreme 
being who is not to be judged by rational discussion. But while the 
intuitive or religious bases of absolutist pacifism might be internally 
secure, neither is a particularly good argument against the use of 
violence to those who do not share that religion or intuition. Indeed, 
they can be made to appear thoroughly ludicrous to the outsider. 
One attempt to make the absolutist pacifist's position credible to 
others is the system of priority rules suggested by Whitman (1966, p. 
307). An absolutist pacifist may have any number of legal obligations or 
religious principles which should be adhered to, but if any should come 
into conflict they refer to the rule: "Never do what is evil ... or, if we 
must choose between evils, never to choose the greater." Absolutist 
pacifists choose as their supreme principle the refusal to kill, or to 
use violence. 
Narveson attempts to deny the a priori nature of this by 
suggesting that a situation might arise where in order to prevent a 
massive quantity of killing it would be logical for the absolutist 
pacifist employing the priority rule to break his/her supreme principle 
_ the classic assassinating Hitler scenario (1968, p. 149). Tom Regan 
adequately dispatches Narveson's argument by questioning the validity of 
his assumption that the absolutist pacifist believes that the use of a 
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lesser quantity of violence to prevent a greater quantity of violence 
from occurring will lead to a lesser resultant evil/wrong. If, as Regan 
believes is logically possible, violence/killing might be conceived by 
the pacifist to be "irredeemably evil" or wrong, then "It is a greater 
evil to use force than to make additional force possible by refusing to 
use it, which is to say, no one ought ever to use force" (1972, pp. 80-
1). Regan's uncertainty over whether pacifists do hold this to be true 
may be quashed by this statement from anarcho-pacifist Ronald Sampson: 
... pacifism rests on a true religious understanding of the nature 
of man's relation to the universe. Reverence for life does not 
mean killing in order to influence a subsequent series of events, 
which is never within the capacity of any individual to control in 
any event. The purpose of life is not to save good people from 
perishing at the hands of bad people .... The purpose of life is to 
exemplify goodness at the expense of badness (1985, p. 22). 
That it is logically possible to hold an absolutist pacifist 
position does not make it particularly useful tool against those who 
advocate violence, and clearly do not believe it irredeemably evil. A 
possibly more functional position is that of the quasi-absolutist 
pacifist. The quasi-absolutist pacifist, whom Robert Holmes confuses 
with the absolutist pacifist (1971, p. 119), holds that there is never a 
conceivable circumstance in which killing or violence is justified. The 
quasi-absolutist pacifist appears to work largely on an aphoristic 
basis. Lund argues: "We must never be misled into believing that the end 
justifies the means, but realize that with evil means the best 
intentions will come to nothing" (1966, p. 356). The roots of other 
common quasi-absolutist maxims are, "violence doesn't work", "violence 
breeds violence", and, "violence eventually harms the perpetrator" (see 
for instance Huxley, 1946, p. 25). Absolutists may also argue with 
axioms, in order to make their stance more appealing to others. However, 
the two positions are not logically complimentary. If, as the absolutist 
holds, the use of violence is irredeemably wrong/evil it is irrelevant 
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whether good or bad consequences result from abjuring it (Regan, 1972, 
p. 86). 
The quasi-absolutist's maxims are not a priori. As Melzer points 
out, objections such as the idea that violence always leads to 
substantive evils "require empirical investigation" (1975, p. 126). If 
one is to investigate the statement "violence breeds violence" 
seriously, one can hardly rely on unsubstantiated value judgement, or 
empirical hypotheses. One requires factual evidence to prove it. It 
seems highly unlikely that the quasi-absolutist position can stand much 
examination if it depends on pure aphorisms alone, for there can be 
little doubt that some acts of violence have brought no retaliation, or 
that the use of violence achieved certain goals without producing 
ruinous side-effects. Naturally, the failure of an empirical rule on a 
single occasion puts the validity of that rule into doubt. 
Nevertheless, this should not indicate that those (such as Cullen, 
1992b, p. 8) who maintain the disutility of violence argue from an 
entirely untenable position. It is the often unstated general truth of 
their maxims that is most defensible. The concern with the increasing 
destructiveness of war in the twentieth century made suggestions that 
further global conflict would be catastrophic quite reasonable after 
both the First and Second World Wars. It is not unreasonable to argue 
that in the long-run the use of revolutionary violence will lead to the 
maintenance of a culture of violence, or greater violence than if 
violence had been forsworn. If one does not know for sure (as one 
cannot) which circumstances will bring unfavourable results in the short 
or long term, it is best to avoid violence entirely. The general rule of 
the quasi-absolutist is a proposition that non-pacifist anarchists have 
to face, but they too need not produce empirical proof to refute it, 
just reasonably argued doubts. 
168 
A further possible configuration is strategic pacifism. Some very 
good examples of such reasoning may be found in Pike (1990, pp. 24-30) 
and Ihara (1988). In the context of anarchism the strategic pacifist 
suggests that violence may be acceptable in self-defence, but not on 
behalf of any political or social goal or, for some, may it involve 
premeditation (Crosswell, 1992b, p. 8; Colin, 1987, p. 9). Strategic 
pacifism is derivative of absolutism and/or quasi-absolutism so it need 
not be pursued here. At most it should be pointed out that their 
exemption on grounds of self-defence does not aid the case against the 
use of revolutionary violence, and indeed weakens it in ways to be 
explored later. 
A more aggressive a priori attack on power concepts than that of 
the absolutist pacifists may be made by introducing the Kantian 
challenge of a deontological basis to morality. Kant argued that the 
morality of an act should be judged on its motive rather than its 
result. The main determinant of the morality of an act was whether it 
was motivated by good will. If one needed further qualification one 
might refer to Kant's imperatives. The Formula of the Universal Law 
(FUL) declares: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at 
the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant, 1959, 
p. 39). The Formula of the End-in-Itself (FEl) states: "Act so you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an 
end and never as a means only" (Kant, 1959, p. 47). On the basis of 
these formulae historical-empirical data are superfluous to any moral 
consideration. That bad consequences might often stem from good motives 
(e.g. duty or obligation) is largely irrelevant. The anarchist Baldelli 
writes: To use men as means and to incorporate them in an organization 
or institution whose purposes transcend them is to turn them into bits 
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of machinery, to degrade them lower than the slaves of antiquity" (1971, 
p.162). 
Kantian morality does not have the same foundational point as that 
of the absolutist pacifists. The FUL could certainly justify 
unpremeditated self-defence in the face of unwarranted physical attack. 
However, the FEI makes considerations such as pro-active Violence, 
manipulation, or coercion in the name of social revolution morally 
difficult to maintain. These methods aim to use those upon which they 
are directed as means to an end. The social revolutionary who 
assassinates the autocrat essential to the survival of the ruling 
hierarchy contravenes the FEI because the autocrat in considered purely 
as a means. It might appear that the FUL is also a moral tool against 
the anarchist use of violence to effect social change. Anarchists would 
certainly flinch from approving of the universal right of anyone to use 
violence against anyone else. However, there are ways to apply the FUL 
to the satisfaction of the non-pacifist anarchist. The revolutionary 
anarchist might easily concoct a corruption of the Golden Rule along the 
lines of: act unto oppressors as you would expect others to act unto you 
if you sought to oppress. 
Finally we might return to the anarchist strategic paradox itself. 
Ritter and his fellow academics are not alone in suggesting the 
inconsistency of end and presumed means; anarchists themselves are aware 
and concerned. The argument is most readily made from the anarcho-
pacifist tendency (Sampson, 1985, p. 23), but others whose agenda is not 
dominated by the issue of minimalising violence may also raise the 
question. Solnemann, an individualist anarchist, declares that the 
"standard of whether someone is really an anarchist or not lies in 
whether he renounces domination of others or not" (1983, p. 180). 
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There are at least three specific doctrinal objections that can 
explain the reasoning that supports the doubts of both commentators and 
some anarchists. The first is that anarchism's critique of the state is 
based on the idea that the use of power concepts by one f group 0 people 
to control another group of people is unjust. The logic goes that if the 
use of violence or coercion is unjust when used by a tyrannical autocrat 
or an elected representative democrat, it is still unjust when used by 
anarchists. The second objection is that anarchists believe that anarchy 
is a desirable alternative to the state because people are capable of 
rational choice, and that it is just that they are allowed to use this 
faculty. In using power concepts in the revolutionary context the 
revolutionary anarchists are disallowing the free function of individual 
autonomy, and also indicating that they do not have faith in the ability 
of people to make the "right" choice. 
The sum of the first two objections is that the anarchist ought to 
function as if "is" were "ought", otherwise they appear to indicate that 
they have no faith in the truth of their own ideas. If the strategists 
of violent revolution have arguments to counter these objections, they 
then have to face the third objection: if the postponement of 
fundamental tenets until the end of the revolution is possible, then why 
should anarchists be so opposed to the idea of transitory revolutionary 
government? 
Refuting the Strategic Paradox and Moral/Ideological Dilemmas 
Morally, the strategist of violent revolution must believe that 
the spilling of blood is not the only evil to be considered in any 
equation concerning the value of social change. They must be able to 
balance of eVl.'ls wl.'ll be worse if they do make a fair estimate that the 
not use violence, and that there is no other feasible course of action 
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which could produce the same result, but with fewer resultant wrongs. 
The non-pacifist anarchist should also be able to go some way towards 
relating the ideal end with less than ideal methods 
, especially where 
they might be taken to be clearly at odds with fundamental ideological 
tenets. 
Strategically, most anarchists believe, reluctantly or otherwise, 
that the massive societal change they desire must be accompanied by 
violence and killing, that a violence-free transformation is impossible. 
The major reasons for this are the vested interests some have in terms 
of political power and economic wealth, and the tendency of 
institutionalised power to maintain itself. We cannot say that under all 
circumstances the champions of the state will fight to maintain it, or 
that they cannot be persuaded to give up their power and wealth 
voluntarily. The empirical evidence non-pacifists provide points only to 
the great likelihood that even when the mass of the population desire 
change, some small minority will always be militarily prepared in 
reaction. 
Whilst the absolutist pacifist must logically rely on the a priori 
principle that violence/killing is irredeemably wrong or evil, a defence 
of the use of violence might begin with the idea of the absolute right 
to self-defence. Certain interpretations of reactive self-defence have 
been justified in many traditional cultures, including those with 
prohibitions on killing, such as Judaism. Early Christian theorists such 
as Augustine rejected unauthorised self- and other-defenee for its 
unhealthy concentration on worldly things (though he defended war by 
just authority; Holmes, 1989, p. 120). However, this changed with such 
as Aquinas, who argued the morality of self-defence was based on the 
good intention of preservation and not the bad intention of killing 
( 929 64 t 7 208 10) Self-defence is considered so 1 ,q . ,ar. , pp. - . 
172 
instinctive that some pacifists find it necessary to excuse the 
possibility of nonviolent campaigners reacting to physical attack with 
violence (Crosswell, 1992b, p. 8). 
The right to self-defence would appear to be very closely linked 
to the idea of the right to life: in order to preserve one's life one 
might need to apply the right of self-defence. Yet the problem 
immediately arises that if there is a natural right to life, then the 
self-defender may have to violate this by employing a lethal blow 
against an otherwise unstoppable homicidal aggressor. Jenny Teichman is 
rightly hesitant in accepting any compromise in the principle of the 
right to life (1986, pp. 81-2), but concedes that Hobbes' analysis of 
the situation appears the most palatable: 
... there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any 
words or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first 
a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault 
him by force, to take away his life ... (Hobbes, 1992, p. 93). 
Hobbes does not adequately explain why lethal self-defence is morally 
preferable to the right of the homicidal aggressor to life, and Teichman 
is at a loss to do so beyond noting its a priori status. Possibly its 
individual intuitive appeal transcends morality, for it is morally 
difficult to argue that aggressors forfeit their right to life (though 
Locke seeks to do so, by recourse to the "law of nature;" 1960, II, 
section 23, p. 302), or that they in turn do not have a right to self-
defence against the self-defender (as Nozick, 1974, p. 100, attempts to 
argue) . 
If one considers self-defence a natural and inalienable right -
something that is rationally chosen rather than unconsciously reactive -
it becomes difficult to stop the tide of claims of morally justifiable 
or excusable acts of defence. Teichman contrasts aggressive war with 
individual self-defence to make us aware of the qualitative differences 
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between the two (1986, pp. 88-9). This does not howe eb . 
, ver, r ut the 1dea 
that there is a slippery slope from reactive self def d 
- ence own to pro-
active collective defence. If it is ethical to defend oneself, it 
appears morally incoherent and counter-intuitive (except to the egoist) 
that it should be unjustifiable to defend someone incapable of defending 
themselves. 
Thus I turn to the question of premeditation. If one knew that 
armed homicidal bandits were about to attack, and one agreed that one 
had the right to use whatever means (say, a gun) were appropriate and 
likely to succeed in defending oneself against them, it would seem 
illogical to refuse to prepare such means of resistance. Similarly, if 
premeditated combination with others appeared to be the only way to stop 
homicidal attackers it would be bizarre to disbar it. By this reasoning 
revolutionaries may be held morally justified in defending themselves 
and others against attack during the act of revolution; also of joining 
into collective armed defence units in advance, if there appeared no 
more justifiable means of forestalling attack, and if success seemed 
likely. The greyest area of justifiable defence is pro-active defence: 
where the only way one's military weakness can prevail against armed 
homicidal bandits is a pre-emptive attack. This is perilously close to 
the divide between defence against actual threat and preservation 
against potential threat. 
A further area of contention is where self-, other-, or collective 
defence is applicable. The clearest context is the direct physical 
attack, which accords with the earlier definition of violence. To • 
consider physical attack the sole basis of justifiable/excusable defence 
is to suggest that, (a) it alone can be counteracted by physical 
defence, and, (b) it alone deserves to be counteracted by physical self-
defence. If we assume there is a plausible argument against (a) then (b) 
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only makes sense if physical attack is h t e worst possible thing that can 
happen to people. 
It is manifest that those who define violence to encompass social 
injustice or coercion can set . 1 . . SOC1a 1nJustice or coercion on a par with 
physical assault. Wolff justly questions whether satyagraha in practice 
should be considered automatically more ethical than some forms of 
physical harm. As I noted in Chapter 1 it is possible that those who 
take a narrower definition may share doubts about the supreme evil of 
violence. Gerald Runkle suggests that some degree of violence is 
justifiable to counter "conditions of misery, anguish, poverty, 
alienation, disease, insecurity, dehumanization, and slavery" (1976, p. 
375). Runkle must believe that it is possible to make some rough moral 
correlation between violence and subjection to social injustice; that a 
certain degree and amount of violence can be justified because it will 
prevent or circumvent a greater equivalent of social injustice. 
The non-pacifist revolutionary may accept that the priority rule 
system is good and useful, but deny that the supreme principle can be 
"thou shalt not kill/commit violence." For non-pacifist moral 
philosophers (e.g. Narveson, Regan) and anarchists this choice of 
supreme principle is counter-intuitive. It is possible to suggest an 
alternative supreme principle. Emma Goldman, with an eye on propaganda 
rather than theory, declared: 
Anarchism, more than any other social theory, values human life 
above all things .... That however, nowise indicates that Anarchism 
teaches submission. How can it, when it knows that all suffering, 
all misery, all ills, result from the evil of submission? I would 
say that resistance to tyranny is man's highest ideal (1969, p. 
107) . 
If one has an alternative highest principle, as Goldman appears to have, 
then an appeal to avoid violence because it is bad may fallon deaf 
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ears. Violence may be bad, but something else may be I' qua :Ltatively 
worse, and if so, then Goldman is prepared to choose the lesser evil. 
The argument of the alternative supreme principle is only an 
argument against absolutist pacifism, which Regan contends can all to 
easily be made to appear counter-intuitive (1972, p. 84). It is also 
doubtful whether Goldman's "highest ideal" would be defended by her to 
the extinction of the world. The reason why, after all, Narveson 
believes that the majority finds pacifism "bizarre and faintly 
ludicrous" is because of the countless scenarios where a small 
deployment of violence would in all probability prevent a vastly bigger 
one. One way of making the a priori system more palatable is to opt for 
a fluid priority rule system that is, one without a supreme principle. 
Alternatively, one might reject a system of rules for the single 
utilitarian rule that an action is right if, and only if, it promotes 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. Under this rule 
committing violence is just one factor in any moral equation. If one can 
make a rough calculation of the positive and negative points concerning 
the use of violent revolution one may find that the sum is less than the 
equivalent injustice if revolution had not taken place (assuming that 
there was no less painful means of effecting that change). This is not 
an easy calculation to make. There are no golden rules as to how many 
degrees of pain relieved for how many people are equivalent to a single 
killing. One must certainly be able to say that the relief from misery, 
and the benefits of moral autonomy of the vast majority, will far 
outweigh the pains of the obdurate ruling minority. Even if one accepts 
such a calculation as the basis of a moral decision, one may fall prey 
to the logical pacifist doubt that one can never predict for sure the 
outcome of one's actions, and therefore the calculation becomes invalid. 
The utilitarian can only appeal to probability and historical evidence. 
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In any case the Kantian FEI is rejected for the teleological idea 
that the end may justify the means. Runkle believes mankind find the 
idea of doing something unpleasant in order to get something pleasant so 
intuitive that "we assume the so dn f h' 
un ess 0 t ~s maxim in every waking 
hour of our lives" (1976 , p. 373). Some anarchists do argue from the 
maxim that the end justifies the means (JS, 1992, p. 8), though 
utilitarianism is rarely associated with anarchism. The difficulty in 
relating the two sets of ideas is found in the possibility of the 
felicific calculus interfering with anarchist doctrinal tenets, though 
if it was firmly believed that the greatest happiness could always be 
found by dissolving government there might be real grounds for 
convergence. 
The retort to the quasi-pacifist who argues that "violence does 
not work" or "violence breeds violence" could be the equally 
hypothetical "violence does work," and "violence does not necessarily 
breed violence." One need not necessarily accept the idea that pacifist 
maxims tend towards general truth over time. That violence has occurred 
in various places at various time through history does not indicate it 
has virus-like properties. A violent episode between peoples has not 
always been followed by further violent episodes. Non-pacifist 
anarchists have their own store of aphorisms, the most appropriate of 
which are: the ruling class will not give up without a fight; and, 
social injustice breeds violence. This has empirical evidence behind it 
as well as some reasoned argument. However, it, like the pacifist 
maxims, is not empirically absolute. 
For every Gene Sharp arguing the possibilities of nonviolence 
there is a Narveson (1965) or Runkle (1976) arguing the probabilities of 
violence. If the anarcho-pacifists point out that violent revolutions 
have not led to the diminution of state power and rigid societal 
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hierarchy, non-pacifist anarchists may note the coincidence of 
potentially socially revolutionary situations with popular violence. 
Despite the efforts of such as Sharp and Gregg, the non-pacifists would 
appear to have the empirical edge as far as it goes. The problem is that 
empirical evidence does not go far enough to prove particularly useful. 
There has not been anything approaching a successful anarchist-
influenced revolution. We cannot know that a uniquely extraordinary 
thing can be created from methods that sometimes achieves ordinary 
things. In a fair debate neither side may produce conclusive evidence 
that the other is wrong. Each individual is left to decide for 
themselves which is empirically most persuasive. 
If anarchists find they intuitively lean toward a fluid moral 
priority rule system tempered by social hedonism, and are persuaded that 
violence appears hypothetically an empirical necessity, and/or capable 
of producing the dissolution of the state, then they must finally ask 
whether violence is ideologically consistent with anarchism. The first 
clause of the strategic paradox is that violence, coercion, or 
manipulation, are inconsistent with anarchism. 
Purists such as Giovanni Baldelli may concur that means and ends 
are ethically indistinct and yet make no judgement over the consistency 
of violence or coercion in a revolutionary context (1971, p. 162). He 
does this by asserting that forces motivated by desperation may be 
unethical, but are also instinctive and unstoppable: 
Antipower is the motive force of genuine revolutions. Being a 
fruit of desperation it dissipates as soon as hope returns and, 
being unethical, it becomes power as soon as it is triumphant. 
Yet, being different to power in origin and motivation, it is not 
inconceivable that it could be so disciplined as to defeat power 
in behalf of authority [anarchy] without itself becoming power 
(1971, pp. 169-70). 
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While Baldelli's argument may be attractive, one must note that he 
appears to say that revolutionaries are at one moment motivated by 
primordial urges and the next by rational judgement. 
To be doctrinally secure non-pacifist anarchists must be able to 
hold that violence is not inconsistent with anarchism. To go back to the 
doctrinal objections: they have to argue that it is not unjust to use 
force on the protectors of the state during the social revolution; they 
must believe that it is not unjust that the individual autonomy of the 
defenders of the state be abrogated. The early Christian theologian 
Augustine of Hippo made the case for the just use of violence, in 
apparent sharp contrast to the non-resistant teachings of Christ. Thomas 
Aquinas clarified and widened the conditions for the just use of 
violence by a good Christian. Both noted the serious nature of the rules 
concerning the contravention of the commandment "Thou shalt not kill." 
Other sources make out the secular case for the existence of special 
conditions in which violence is justified. Arneson notes: 
Those who eschew all violence as a tool of the movement fail to 
discriminate adequately between violence harnessed to a mass 
movement against oppression and violence employed by those who 
benefit from the oppression .... Nobody in his right mind wants 
peace at any cost (1971, p. 157). 
Violence is not taken to be essentially good or essentially bad by 
Arneson. It is taken as a morally neutral tool, the use of which 
normally entails either immoral motives or intention, or produces 
unpleasant results, but which may be justified under certain 
circumstances. 
Anarchists might use this argument to justify the use of violent 
self-defence against homicidal maniacs in anarchic society (for crazed 
murderers may exist even in a stable anarchy). The argument is also 
used, along with less helpful ones, to justify the promotion of violent 
revolution. The class struggle school of anarchism tends to have little 
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concern for those who they believe have overstepped the boundaries of 
individual autonomy by disallowing the workers theirs. For Stuart 
Christie and Albert Meltzer to suggest that the "use of force is 
inconsistent with freedom" is not entirely consistent with their 
strategic theory. They must qualify this by saying that the motive and 
intent behind the use of force is the determining factor: 
Resistance to force ... is the first essential to achieve freedom 
. , 
even 1f one has to employ violence to do so. The violence that is 
practised by the State is the antithesis of freedom, because it is 
the means by which rule is maintained. If one can only resist the 
imposition of the State's commands by violence, then such violence 
must be a prerequisite of freedom (1974, p. 134). 
From this it is very clear that they believe that violence used for a 
just purpose is very different from violence used for an unjust purpose; 
coercion used to constrain the freedom of the oppressed is inconsistent 
with anarchism, coercion used to counteract that constraint (albeit at 
the expense of the oppressors) is consistent. 
Anarchists who accept the use of violence and seek ideological 
consistency cannot accept the first two doctrinal objections set at the 
end of the last section. They must say that the use of violence and 
other power concepts are unjust where they are used with the intention 
of initiating or maintaining institutionalised authority and hierarchic 
power structures, but are justifiable/excusable (rather than "just") 
where the intention is their dissolution and there are no more efficient 
means. Similarly, the autonomy of individuals is desirable except where 
that free function is used to abridge the individual autonomy of others 
and where no persuasive means succeed in altering such irresponsibility. 
Anarchism, by these tokens, is for responsibly autonomous liberty, not 
freedom for egoistic liberties. These two doctrinal tenets, if they are 
to be held, may be held prior to, during, and after the dissolution of 
the state. 
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In maintaining these two doctrinal tenets one appears to come into 
conflict with the third doctrinal objection - that if there are 
qualifications to the ideological prohibitions on the use of power 
concepts, then why not on the prohibition on revolutionary provisional 
government. Anarchists who come to accept the idea of the value of 
revolutionary government (for instance the A.W.G.) have been looked on 
as renegades by the movement as a whole. One might accept the axiomatic 
claim that institutional arrangements tend to self-preservation (where 
individual use of violence does not), but this is not the heart of the 
non-pacifist case. The solution to this third objection is to be found 
within the nature of the state and its associated concepts. Power 
concepts are seen by non-pacifist anarchists to be functions, possibly 
bad but not essentially so. The institutionalisation of power concepts 
is seen as a qualitatively different thing. A revolutionary hierarchy, 
no matter how well intentioned, must suffer the same objections that 
anarchists have for any hierarchic arrangement. 
The message from this, as from Baldelli, is that any anarchist 
prepared to use violence or coercion in pursuit of anarchy is on a 
knife-edge. It is possible to use these power concepts as part of a 
struggle to dissolve the state, but reliance upon them or 
inattentiveness may at any time throw the user into the role of the 
reactionary or the proto-statist. Even if the use of violence is 
necessary, justifiable, and consistent, it is still dangerous. 
The aim of this section was twofold. The first aim was to 
determine the relationship of persuasive and nonviolent anarchist 
I' To do so it strategies of change to the concept of social revo ut10n. 
was necessary to isolate the relevant strategies. I found that a 
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gradualist strategy whose key Component was persuasion and personal 
example was better suited to the concept of transformation than 
revolution. On the other hand, nonviolent strategies which claim both 
rapidity of execution and non-constitutional;ty . 
..... can quJ.te justifiably be 
seen as having revolutionary import. 
The second intention of the section was to investigate the 
validity of revolutionary strategies. A number of claims are made to the 
effect that violent revolution (or indeed coercive/manipulative 
nonviolent revolution) is unconscionable for anarchists. Pacifists 
provide a battery of arguments for why violence is morally wrong in all 
(or practically all) circumstances. However, their arguments are 
conspicuously flawed. Absolutist pacifism is dependent on acceptance of 
a principle that few hold to be paramount; quasi-absolutism is 
empirically refutable. Given the prevailing approval of violent 
sanctions such faults are enough to maintain the minority status of the 
pacifist outlook. 
A further attack on revolutionary strategy emanates from Kantian 
deontological ethics. Whilst the FEI might be laudable in stateless 
society anarchists intent on revolution may defer to a teleological 
principle: that the end justifies the means. This is not an entirely 
satisfactory retort. Any prior calculation as to whether the result of 
social revolution will actually justify massive dislocation and/or 
casualties is hardly be more than sheer speculation. Nevertheless, a 
consequentialist ethic is a reasonably secure place from which to base 
revolutionary strategy. 
The most critical argument facing anarchists intent on revolution 
is that which brings into question the ideological consistency of 
anarchism with the use of power concepts. This forms the basis of the 
strategic paradox which Ritter and others believe confers anarchism to 
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impotence. In order to refute such allegations anarchists cannot claim 
both that they reject power concepts absolutely and that they accept a 
strategy of violent (or coercive) revolution. They must maintain that 
there is a particular context where the use of power concepts is 
justifiable. That circumstance is where violence (or coercion) is 
acceptable for the dissolution of institutionalised power and 
. 
institutionalised injustice, if no less costly means are available. In 
pursuing a strategy of revolution they are drawing a distinction between 
individual use of power and institutionalised power. The first is 
justifiable in a special circumstance; the second is unjustifiable in 
all circumstances. As Baldelli indicates, this is a consistent, if 
precarious, line. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
The prompt for this work was the bel;ef ha 
• t t the popular 
representation of the anarchist as a scheming t . error1st was a sweeping 
distortion, and that academics had done little to contradict this. While 
counterbalancing prevailing media norms was hardly a realistic goal, it 
was hoped that this study could add weight to the treatment of the 
anarchist as a subject worthy of serious political interest. In order to 
do this it appeared necessary to address both empirical distortions of 
the relationship of anarchists with violence, and issues of theoretical 
contradiction. The former required techniques uncommon in this context. 
The latter required both a critical faculty and an empathy for anarchism 
(empathy is for some academic commentators, however, a euphemism for 
condescension). This combination, in the desirable proportions, allows 
anarchism a fair representation without ignoring, or failing to 
untangle, apparent discrepancies. 
The political (as opposed to purely historical) aspect of the 
relationship between anarchism and violence has not entirely avoided the 
attention of academics. As we have seen, some academic works have 
approached the classical theorists' views on violence with varying 
degrees of fair but critical analysis (Ritter, 1980; Crowder, 1991). For 
an illustration of a theoretical overview that is both clumsy and 
dismissive one might look at Friedrich (1972). For Friedrich the 
anarchists "exaggerate the goodnaturedness of man" and are determined in 
the "simplistic notion that all ills are 'caused' by the state" (po 
168). Anarchists, however, have several different conceptions of human 
nature, and few believe that people are innately good. Nor do they 
necessarily believe that the state is the source of all evils. If that 
was the case the interview study in the present work would not have 
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indicated the grave doubts that many respondents had that stable anarchy 
would take less than a couple of generations to develop; nor would there 
be the concern over sexism, animal rights, and environmentalism as 
issues in their own right. On violence Friedrich totally misrepresents 
Bakunin's stance, in a couple of sentences, as akin to a fiendish 
bloodlust (1972, p. 175). The present study contends that Bakunin was 
keenly concerned by the threat and cost of violence as well as being one 
of its most renowned advocates. 
Anarchism and individual terror is cautiously and objectively 
considered by Novak (1954). He is conscious of the limited (i.e., not 
revolutionary) goals to which anarchists have applied clandestine 
violence (p. 177). Additionally, his study does not dismiss the 
anarchist recourse to clandestine violence without weighing-up the moral 
and practical costs and benefits. However, he fails to grasp the full 
potential of anarchist morality. He assumes that anarchists believe that 
life is sacred and that anarchists reject "a teleological view of life" 
(p. 180). By this token, had the anarchist Attentater been true to 
themselves, there would have been no need for a study on anarchism and 
individual terror. Such a patent contradiction is not necessarily due to 
the moral confusion of the Attentater, as Novak suspects. The present 
study indicates that the sanctity of life is a tenet appropriate only 
for absolutist pacifists. 
, . 
Novak also believes that the moral justification of violence is 
dependent on whether it is the "only possible means" to achieve a 
particular aim (though this question would not be pertinent for 
anarchists if they were all deontologists). Many anarchists would arque 
that violence does not deserve the label of supreme evil that Novak 
accords it: the present study shows that it is morally feasible for 
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anarchists to argue that a moderate degree of V1.' I . be 
o ence 1.S tter than a 
immense amount of injustice. 
The faults of the above studies' analyses may reflect the agenda 
of their authors, or carelessness. These studies were, in any case, 
bound to have limited value for those seeking to grasp the possible 
configurations of the relationship between violence and anarchism 
because of their lack of comprehensiveness. Two studies which 
empathetically address the misrepresentation of anarchism and violence 
in a wider context are McKeown (1991) and James (1985). While both 
studies offer valuable insights into possible configurations on 
theoretical and historical levels, neither derives sufficient data from' 
contemporary reference to tell us much about the existing relationship 
between anarchists and violence. Only Schultz's (1984) comparative study 
of "evolutionary" and "revolutionary" anarchisms goes anywhere near to 
attempting this. 
The primary goal of this research was to draw together disparate 
elements of anarchism, from a variety of perspectives, both modern and 
historical, in order to provide a comprehensive and relevant picture of 
the relationship between anarchism and violence. The attainment of 
comprehensiveness was seen to require not only reference to past and 
present, but also a reflection of the division of labour in the 
anarchist movement (which is not necessarily mutually excluding) between 
theory, propagandism, and activism. It was clear that such a reflection 
required an unconventional method. 
The first chapter helped contextualise the research. Anarchism was 
approached as an ideology maintaining a few fundamental tenets from 
which there was a great divergence of opinion. The chief principles of 
anarchism were seen to be the critique of institutionalised power and 
authority, the desire for a society based on some balance of individual 
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autonomy and voluntary cooperation, and the belief that institutional 
power could not be used to dissolve itself. Divergence of opinion might 
begin with the anarchist view of human nature, which was contended to be 
egoistic, social, or dependent on external stimuli. The deSirable form 
of social and economic organisation were seen to be t t' i con en 10US ssues, 
with some anarchists leaning toward liberal-egoistic individualism, and 
others toward communalism and communism. The method by which anarchists 
seek to accomplish social change is an issue creating a similar degree 
of dissonance within anarchist circles - indeed may be considered by 
anarcho-pacifists, in particular, to be of greater importance or 
immediacy. In addition, the apparent contradictions concerning this 
issue do not go unnoticed by unsympathetic critics. 
In order to progress toward discussing this question it was 
necessary to make sense of the terms violence, nonviolence, and 
pacifism. Violence, in particular, was found to be a term which has to 
be used very carefully because of the tendency of social scientists to 
mould it to fulfil their own agendas, rendering it completely alien to 
everyday usage. In carefully sifting through the three main schools of 
thought on the meaning of violence a definition which was both helpful 
to the study and close to popular usage was established. 
Given the uncustomary decision to use interview data in a study 
dealing with political theory Chapter 2 is primarily an attempt to 
express the seriousness with which the researcher has been concerned 
with the validity of data obtained from interviews. On reflection, it is 
felt that the comprehensive depiction given is of sufficient competence 
to act as a model methodology for any further research into fringe 
political subculture involving qualitative interviewing. 
The third and fourth chapters cover an area rarely approached by 
academics into any political subculture, let alone anarchism, probably 
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the least seriously studied maJ'or 'd 1 1 eo ogy, These chapters, then, give 
to anarchist activists and d' propagan 1StS something that academics have 
never been prepared to allow th b f em e ore: their own voice, The study of 
activists and propagandists reveals ' a qu1te different picture of 
anarchists than that commonly held. C 1 ' one US10ns that may be wrought from 
such an overview are inevitably subJ'ect t ' o v1gorous minority dissent. 
Nevertheless generalised answers to the questions asked in Chapter 1 are 
available from the coalescence of the evidence from the propagandist and 
the activist. 
A charge often levelled at anarchists is that they fail to be 
realistic, If to be realistic is to disbelieve that revolution is just 
around the corner then the anarchists of today are more or less 
realists. While it is true that many of the theorists in the nineteenth 
century believed that total social rearrangement was a credible medium-
term goal, the (English-speaking) anarchists of the 1980s and 1990s have 
maintained few such illusions. 
Contemporary anarchists are not struggling for their ideal so much 
as fighting for a tangible political presence. This is reflected in the 
chief goal among anarchists: the creation, or resurrection, of a 
credible anarchist movement. Even the creation of a credible movement is 
seen as a long-term prospect. Hence most anarchists have concentrated on 
propagandism, and/or become involved in wider social issues, such as 
environmentalism. The most recent (1980s) swell of enthusiasm, stemming 
largely from the i~terest generated by the punk subculture, has 
partially receded over a decade featuring heavy anarchist involvement in 
the British miners' strike and anti-poll tax campaign, the blooming of 
the autonomist squatters movement in northern continental Europe, and 
the revival of anarchism in Eastern Europe. While English-speaking and 
European anarchists have contributed a great deal to popular movements 
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challenging policies of governments and business in recent years, the 
condition of their own movement remains one of decrepitude. 
As so few of the respondents and so little of the recent 
literature regard revolution as a subject of urgent concern, it is not 
altogether surprising that attitudes on the form of revolution are 
vague. Non-pacifist anarchists can envisage a number of scenarios which 
precipitate revolution within the foreseeable future, but these do not 
begin with anarchists as the motive force. Some feel they could take 
advantage of a global system subject to economic slump, ecological 
crisis, or nuclear war. In speculation upon such crises the emphasis is 
put very firmly on ensuring the existence of an anarchist movement 
capable (propagandistically or physically) of reacting to discontent and 
disorder rather than calculating on pro-active revolutionary strateqy. 
The contemporary sources indicate that non-pacifist anarchists 
accept the inevitability of violence in the social revolution, but that 
the essence of that violence is defence. That latter-day anarchists 
reject any suggestion of glorifying violence was made crystal clear. 
There is no room for the concept of a purifying flame destroying all 
traces of the corrupt old society, nor any lust for punishing former 
oppressors. The urge to destroy is thoroughly overwhelmed by the 
creative urge. 
Defensive violence is seen primarily, but not exclusively, as a 
reactive tactic. The scenario most envisage is that of violent state 
intervention against those engaged in social revolution. Pro-active 
defence does, however, receive a certain degree of approval; the value 
of pre-emptive attack against a stronger adversary cannot be dismissed 
by some. The classic revolutionary insurrection is not, however, 
received well. 
Social revolution is such an abstract concept to contemporary 
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anarchists that the issue of violence in the revolution engenders little 
enthusiasm. Much greater animation is found over the issue of pre-
revolutionary violence. The concept of defence remains the primary 
justification of pre-revolutionary violence. Again it is stretched by 
many to cover the idea of defence of the people, the oppressed, or a 
particular class. While the benefits of anarchy appear indefinitely out 
of reach, anarchists are keen to support popular struggles. In becoming 
involved with the day-to-day battles of the people it might be argued 
that anarchists lay themselves open to the charge of seeking reform 
rather than revolution. For instance, given that economic slump and 
general immiseration is considered one possible route to social 
revolution, in supporting pay/conditions related strikes they appear to 
be forestalling revolution. However, anarchists see the preparedness to 
confront state and business policy at every opportunity (but most keenly 
when the population as a whole feel an injustice is being done to them) 
is not seeking reform so much as making a statement of preparedness to 
resist. Anarchists may be cheered by any reforms that arise from an act 
of resistance, but they are, or should be, pleased more by the idea of a 
community acting in concert, and that some lessons might have been 
learnt from this. The creative urge itself is subordinated to a mood of 
resistance. 
The liaison that some anarchists had with clandestine violence in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries could be seen as a 
stage in the anarchist exploration of avenues of change. If so, it 
proved a dead-end. Nevertheless, clandestine violence remains a 
contentious issue. Indiscriminate clandestine violence is rejected, but 
this rejection is often conditional, as if to say that any outrage 
performed by a self-styled anarchist could never compete with the crimes 
performed by the state. 
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One fraction reject the use of discriminate clandestine violence 
because they believe that attacking individuals is mistaking the nature 
of power and hierarchy. Another fraction supports the idea of 
discriminate attentats, not as a revolutionary tactic, but for reasons 
of retribution or deterrence. The appeal of primitive justice has little 
to do with the ideology of anarchism and a great deal to do with 
pessimism regarding revolution. It should also be noted that 
contemporary anarchists tend to defend the recourse to clandestine 
violence rather than actually advocate it. Today's anarchism has fewer 
concrete reasons to be associated with terrorism than does Marxism, the 
ideology to which a far greater number of late-twentieth century terror 
groups have claimed adherence. 
A division from the mainstream which cannot be ignored is anarcho-
pacifism. The crux of anarcho-pacifist credo is the rejection of the 
recourse to violence in achieving political goals. Beyond this it 
becomes difficult to typify. Anarcho-pacifists may believe that violence 
is supremely wrong, that it is completely ineffective, or that it is 
doctrinally inconsistent; they mayor may not accept coercion as a 
justifiable by-product of nonviolent direct action; they mayor may not 
reject any form of action beside personal example or persuasion. With a 
number of exceptions (for instance, some philosophical anarchists), the 
anarcho-pacifists derive their anarchism from their pacifism, and this 
in turn is derived from religious/humanist impulses. Their greater 
affinity with pacifists than non-pacifist anarchists is evident. 
That the anarcho-pacifist arguments are extremely fractured does 
not mean that they can be dismissed by the non-pacifists. Many of the 
non-pacifists find addressing the morality and ideological consistency 
so challenging that they do not bother or make do with platitudes. 
Criticising anarcho-pacifism and nonviolence is no substitute for a 
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strong defence of the recourse to violence Th 
. e arguments for the moral 
justifiability of violence hold good for anarchi t h 
s s as t ey do for 
liberals, socialists, or whoever The most cruc1.·al qu t' d 
. es 1.on, an one 
barely touched by the non-pacifist respondents or propagandist 
literature, is the doctrinal consistency of violence with anarchism. If 
violence is found to be inconsistent with anarchism then, as 
philosophical anarchists might say, anarchy brought about by violent 
revolution will fail from its inner contradictions. The solutions to 
this dilemma are available, but most grassroots anarchists do not appear 
to consider it important enough to work for them. 
It is perhaps interesting to note that the flow of evidence in 
Chapters 3 and 4 differs substantially from conclusions reached by the 
only other comparable academic study which both addresses anarchist 
concerns over issues of violence, nonviolence, and social change, and 
maintains a contemporary reference (Schultz, 1984). Schultz seeks to 
draw a line between "revolutionary" and "evolutionary" anarchists which 
does not accord with the picture I draw. Schultz's "revolutionary" 
anarchists thrived between the mid-nineteenth century and the end of the 
Spanish Civil War; they criticised the system from an economic 
perspective; they sought support from the proletariat (this is a 
questionable point given that the anarchists of these times also 
appealed to peasants, artisans, and declasses)i and they desired violent 
revolution. Schultz's "evolutionary" anarchists are the modern 
incarnation of anarchism: they are products of the 1960s, ignorant of 
the old theorists, and anarchists by default (he declares them "de 
facto" anarchists) i they have emerged from the middle class to combat 
the elite; they have no trust in the industrial proletariat as agents of 
change as they have a stake in the global hierarchy; and they seek 
personal change through education and direct action, not revolution 
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(1984, pp. 48-56). Yet the competition between idealism/materialism, 
lifestylism/workerism, and nonviolence/violence has existed from 
anarchism's earliest days Nor has the compet't' b f 
. 1 10n een won or the 
evolutionists, indeed by my reckoning they are not even 
majority status. 
close to winning 
If Schultz's "evolutionary" anarchists (who approximate my 
lifestylists, green anarchists, and anarcho-pacifists) dominated in the 
1960s anarchist swell as he claims they did, this is certainly not the 
case in the 1980s and 1990s. The non-pacifist anarchists who prevail 
today accord much more with Schultz's superseded "revolutionary" 
anarchists. This study contradicts Schultz largely because he relies on 
the evidence of (who he takes to be) the leading theorists of the post-
war anarchist movement, such as Herbert Read, George Woodcock, Murray 
Bookchin, and Paul Goodman. Above all other prescriptive socio-political 
doctrines, anarchism demands attention not only to abstract theorists 
but also the grassroots. The latest generation of anarchist activists 
have, to a greater or lesser degree, taken on board issues concerning 
the environment and the co-option of the developed world's working 
class. This does not, however, preclude the majority from remaining 
convinced of the need to uphold the recourse to violence in both 
indicating resistance and effecting social change~ This divergence 
between theorists and grassroots is of crucial significance to a 
comprehensive and realistic modern view of anarchism and violence, and 
could only be discovered by referring to grassroots anarchists, as the 
present study has attempted. 
Chapter 5 takes a more conventional look at theoretical angles on 
anarchism and violence. The classical anarchist theorists' meditations 
on the ethics of violence are generally deficient, but this is mitigated 
to a great degree by their conception of the process of change. The 
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classical theorists were working under the . .. ~sapprehens10n e1ther that 
social transformation was a pre-determined social process (in which case 
moral ising was inappropriate) or that social revolution was just around 
the corner, hence moral judgements were to be made with that in mind. 
The era of attentats could be seen as the ultimate expression of 
the failure of the anarchist theorists to address violence as a critical 
ethical issue. However, this would be crediting the grand theorists with 
more influence than they actually possessed. The anarchist bombings and 
killings occurred as a result of the collision of a clutch of events and 
processes - many of which derived from outside the anarchist sphere _ 
and maintained by a momentum which might be referred to as Zeitgeist. Of 
course, had the classical theorists all come out in favour of pacifism, 
then the attentats might not have occurred, but as the present study 
indicates, one cannot assume that grassroots anarchists are in thrall to 
theorists. Kropotkin, the finest anarchist theorist of the time, was an 
irrelevancy to those infuriated by repression or frustrated by their own 
apparent impotence. The unease of the theorists and the bulk of the 
national movements toward the attentats counted for little until 
repression crushed the movements as a whole, or the technique was deemed 
a failure by those previously inclined to favour it. Lessons learnt from 
the era of attentats have been pass~d down to later generations of non-
pacifist anarchists such that there is no inclination to repeat the 
experiment. This is due at least as much to the attentats' overall 
tactical failure as to ethical and ideological disquietude. 
The ethical dimension of violence is one which is, on the whole, 
insufficiently addressed by non-pacifist anarchists. It may be because 
they are unsure of the validity of their own arguments, or because they 
believe watertight logic is of secondary importance to the promotion of 
action and change. However, consistency, if it is immaterial to some 
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activists, is not to commentators. If anarchism is to be taken seriously 
beyond those already converted, and not as a threat but an option, then 
the theorists of anarchism need to consider the study of such apparently 
unessential topics with greater zeal. The potential value of this study 
to anarchists themselves is the stimulation of this, rather than any 
conclusions by the author. 
Though the a priori moral arguments of the anarcho-paCifists 
require a mind-set which would be alien to most, their empirical 
hypotheses are arguably as strong as those of the non-pacifists. The 
central strength of the anarcho-pacifist stance is its ideological 
consistency. The academics' formulation, the strategic paradox, depends 
on the ideological inconsistency of violence with anarchism. However, 
the present study finds that violence, along with other power concepts 
(ones which nonviolence may also be associated with), may be consistent 
with anarchism, and that it is only to accumulated power that they are 
irreconcilable. Consistency demands that all anarchists aspire to the 
complete abandonment of violence and power concepts as they aspire to 
anarchism. However, it does not demand the immediate renunciation of 
power concepts - like it does not demand anarchist lifestylism - so much 
as remaining meticulously sensitive to any accumulation. 
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